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THE

FATHERHOOD OF GOD

BEING THE FIRST COURSE OF THE
CUNNINGHAM LECTURES

DELIVERED BEFORE THE NEW COLLEGE, EDINBURGH,
IN MARCH 1864

BY

ROB. S. CANDLISH, D.D.

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EDINBURGH

SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME TO FIFTH EDITION

CONTAINING REPLY TO DR. CRAWFORD, WITH ANSWERS TO OTHER
OBJECTIONS, AND EXPLANATORY NOTES

EDINBURGH
ADAM AND CHARLES BLACK
1870

" Hoc tamen constanter tenendum est, nunquam vel angelis vel hominibus Deum fuisse Patrem, nisi Unigeniti Filii respectu; præsertim homines, quos propria iniquitas Deo exosos reddit, gratuita adoptione esse filios, quia ille est natura."—CALV. *Inst.* lib. ii. cap. 14, sec. 5.

" The saints, being united to Christ, shall have a more glorious union with, and enjoyment of, the Father, than otherwise could be: for hereby their relation becomes much nearer; they are children of God in a higher manner than otherwise they could be; for, being members of God's own Son, they are partakers of his relation to the Father,—of his sonship. . . . There is doubtless an infinite intimacy between the Father and the Son; and the saints, being in him, shall partake with him in it."—JONATHAN EDWARDS, vol. ii. p. 624, imp. 8vo edit.

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I.

REPLY TO PROFESSOR CRAWFORD'S ANIMADVERSIONS IN HIS LECTURES ON THE FATHERHOOD OF GOD (1866), WITH NOTICES OF HIS "REPLY TO MY STRICTURES" IN THE SECOND EDITION OF HIS BOOK (1867).

It was not without some hesitation that I resolved to attempt so full and formal an answer to Dr. Crawford as I have now prepared. On first looking into his book I rather shrunk from the task, chiefly because I feared that the dust raised by stirring so many points of detail as he handles might obscure the real question at issue; nor did a more careful examination altogether remove this fear. But, considering Dr. Crawford's high standing and merited repute, as well as the fact that he meets me openly, with the weight of his avowed name, I felt it due to him not to mix up his elaborate criticism with merely anonymous censures, but to give it a place by itself. Hence this reply, which, I venture to hope, has not been found to interrupt friendly relations between us any more than his own free strictures on my statements and opinions.

I frankly say that one thing which disinclined me at first to this course was the studious endeavour

to create a prejudice from the outset by ostentatiously proclaiming the alleged novelty of my views. "Novel opinions," "a new theory," "principles very novel and startling," "novel and peculiar position;" —these and similar expressions, occurring at the very beginning of his book, before any proof has been led, are surely fitted to place me at a great disadvantage. Of course, Dr. Crawford was at full liberty to bring against me the charge of novelty or innovation, and to substantiate it as he best could. But he must have known that I disclaimed the charge, and that I had made some effort to disprove it. In these circumstances, he was scarcely entitled to parade so confidently this imputation of a new theology, as if it were conceded on my part, or might be quietly taken for granted on his part. I do not propose to take up this matter here; for it might distract attention, and so embarrass the discussion of the great subject under review. I shall dispose of it, so far as I think it needful to advert to it, in a subsequent part of this volume.

Meanwhile I address myself to the work of examining Dr. Crawford's objections to the teaching of my lectures. And I do so under the following successive heads:—I. The alleged original and universal fatherhood of God; II. Its bearing upon the doctrine of the atonement; III. The realisation of the true sonship in and by believers; IV. The revelation of it before the incarnation; V. The teaching

of our Lord respecting it; VI. The mode of admission into it; and VII. The privileges and duties involved in it.

PART FIRST.—General Fatherhood of God.

This is the author's title; implying, as he avows, a distinction between "the fatherhood of God in relation to all men as his intelligent and moral creatures," and his fatherhood "more particularly in relation to those who are 'the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus.'" In neither of these aspects has it occasioned "heresy" or "schism;" having "hitherto been in a remarkable degree exempted from the speculations and controversies of theology. A comparatively small space has ordinarily been allotted to it in our articles of faith and systems of divinity. And for the most part it seems to have been regarded as a theme better fitted for popular impression or appeal, than for scientific investigation and discussion."

So he begins his treatise. He does not blame me for disturbing this peace of the church, though apparently he throws upon me the responsibility of raising "speculations and controversies" fitted to do so. I shall have occasion arterwards to vindicate myself against any charge of presumption which may on that account be brought against me, especially in the light of the author's strange relegation of this "theme" from the study to the pulpit. Meanwhile

I ask attention to his assertion of an original and universal fatherhood.

1. "In regard to the more general aspect of this doctrine, the prevalent opinion of the Christian church has ever been that all mankind may be held to be the children of God." Let the cautious phrase be noted. They "may be held to be the children of God." On what grounds? First, "as deriving their existence from him;" secondly, "as created after his likeness;" thirdly, "as still retaining some traces of his image though grievously defaced and distorted by the fall;" and fourthly, "as largely partaking of his providential care and bounty" (pp. 1-2, 3d edition, from which I quote throughout).

2. As regards "the special aspect of this doctrine," all agree that believers "are children of God in a higher sense than other men." But some "apparently hold this higher sonship to be a mere restoration of the primal closeness and fulness of that relation which subsisted between God and man prior to the fall, while others speak of it as to a great extent a new relation, resting on grounds peculiar to itself." All however agree as to "the parties to whom it belongs," and "the inestimable blessings which result from it" (p. 2).

That is the creed of Christendom, against which it seems I "promulgate a new theory" (p. 2).

Now I might fairly deny that I do any such thing. If I am allowed to stand among the latter of

the two admittedly orthodox schools, as regards "the special aspect," I am as sound and old-fashioned as my critic himself. I venture, indeed, to question if a relation resting on the grounds on which he places the original relation of man to God does really imply fatherhood, in any reasonable or scriptural sense,—in any definite sense at all,—in any sense reaching beyond the vaguest sort of analogy, or figure of speech. And I further venture to connect the sonship of believers with the sonship of him in whom they believe, somewhat more closely and personally perhaps than some divines are accustomed to do. And this may lead me to distinguish somewhat sharply the old relation constituted by creation from the new relation introduced by redemption.

Let Dr. Crawford, however, have his way. Let mine be "a new theory," of which he gives the substance in these words :—"That *the relation which God sustains to his Eternal Son is his only true and proper Fatherhood, and that it is only by their partaking of that relation that angels and men become the sons of God*" (p. 2). I take no formal objection to these terms, except that they are fitted to present my view at the very outset in the barest possible form, with none of the limitations and qualifications which the course of my argument is fitted to suggest. I pass from all that to the author's view of the first sort of fatherhood which he ascribes to God. (Lectures I. II.—"Common Fatherhood of God.")

I. Dr. Crawford begins with the argument from reason. He postulates or assumes, first "the *personality of God;*" and secondly, his "affinity to us." The first he asserts against the Pantheists. The second he urges, partly at least, against what he holds to be the teaching of Mansel. "God is a living person, and he has a true affinity to us" (p. 4). I am not now concerned with his criticism on Mansel, but only with his own doctrine, to which, of course, I assent; for otherwise I see not how any real relation of intelligence, sympathy, and moral truth can subsist between God and us. I accept also his inference that we have thus, on the one hand, "a sufficient basis for concluding that God actually possesses those qualities essential to the perfection of human nature, which reason and revelation alike teach us to ascribe to him;" and on the other hand, "a no less sufficient warrant for believing that he really and truly sustains towards us such relations, analogous to those which subsist between man and man, as the actual course of his dealings with us may be found to indicate, or the positive declarations of his inspired word may be found to reveal" (p. 8). All this is plain enough. And it is vague enough too. For now the question comes to be, Is fatherhood thus attributable to him? Have we satisfactory grounds, from reason and from revelation,—not only for ascribing to God "the characteristics of a father,"—but for holding that he does actually, and originally,

and universally, "sustain the relation of a father," towards "the human race?" (p. 8).

I might object to this alternative as a one-sided way of putting the question; as if "to possess the characteristics of a father," and "to sustain the relation of a father," were one and the same thing. Reserving that objection, I proceed to the main point at issue between us.

Dr. Crawford regrets that, "at the outset of my argument, no definition or description of fatherhood should have been given." He cannot accept the reason I assign for this omission, "that the duty of defining or describing the relation in question is incumbent on those who assert it as a natural relation, and not on him who denies it." And in reference to my complaint, that "for the most part the assertors of it decline the task, and are more inclined to deal in vague generalities," he offers this explanation, that "having never till now any opponent to contend against, they did not see the necessity of giving any precise or logical definition." "They thought that the simple application to God of the word 'Father' would be sufficiently understood, as ascribing to him a relation to his intelligent creatures somewhat analogous to that which subsists between an earthly parent and his children" (p. 9). Somewhat analogous! It is a general enough phrase. Nor is it made much more precise by what follows—"Had any one disputed their doctrine and asked them to define 'father-

hood,' they might probably have said that '*fatherhood implies the origination by one intelligent person of another intelligent person like in nature to himself, and the continued support, protection, and nourishment of the person thus originated by him to whom he owes his being.*'" And he adds, with exquisite simplicity, "I need scarcely say that the word, as thus defined, is certainly applicable to God, with reference to all mankind."

Certainly, I reply. Such a universal fatherhood as that I do not care to call in question. But is there any relation of any sort defined or described here?—anything to determine on what footing the two intelligent persons are to stand to one another, or what principle is to rule and regulate their mutual dealings with one another?

I attempt at least, in my first lecture, by a sort of exhaustive analysis or induction, to bring out the exact bearing of intelligence in the creature on his position towards the Creator. It makes him a proper subject of moral government; of government by a rational and moral law; a law addressed to the reason and conscience, and enforced by sanctions which the reason and conscience may approve as suitable and right. I presume that their intelligence secured this in the case of the angels; and I do not see how in their case it could do more. They had no experience or analogy to suggest any other relation than that of a moral ruler to responsible subjects, the conscious-

ness of which is implied in their being created intelligent and free. Nor had man, when he was first made, and when God first began to deal with him, anything else or anything more. There is no vagueness here; all is definite and precise. A well-defined relation is established; and one which at once places the intelligent creature, simply as such, on a footing of far truer and nobler affinity to his Maker than Dr. Crawford's description of original sonship, even if stretched to the utmost, will allow. He stands out now as one with whom the most high God may confer as in some sense an independent person; to whom God says, Thou shalt or thou shalt not; and who himself in reply can say, I will or I will not. That is his high standing; a standing which admits of intercourse on terms all but equal; into which all conceivable kinds of mutual confidence, sympathy, and esteem may be infused. It is a standing, moreover, framed and fashioned, as all creation is, in the mould of the sonship of the Creative Word; and therefore it may pass easily and gracefully, as his divine sonship is unfolded, into a real participation with him in whatever of that sonship the incarnation, with its service and its sacrifice, proves to be compatible with the state and circumstances of a creature and a subject.

This view covers, or rather does more than cover, all that is involved in the so-called original and general fatherhood of God. And it meets Dr. Craw-

ford's rejoinder to my argument. I draw from intelligence, as the attribute of the creature, the inference of moral rule on the part of God and moral responsibility on the part of man. Dr. Crawford considers himself entitled, by parity of reason, to infer from love, as the attribute of the Creator, a distinct relation of paternity. The manner in which he does so is somewhat strange (p. 15, etc.) He "assumes that God is love;" and that "in the exercise of that love he has brought into existence a race of intelligent and moral beings, with reference to whom he must equally have been disposed to manifest his love, and to maintain his rightful authority." And he "assumes yet farther, that these rational and moral creatures, as bearing the image of him by whom they are made, *have something more* to distinguish them from his other creatures, '*beyond the bare fact of intelligent responsibility*,'—that they have the capacity of knowing, loving, desiring, trusting, serving, and enjoying him." The italics here are surely most unfair. He must mean to represent me as denying his "*something more*;" as if "*intelligent responsibility*" did not in its very nature involve, not only the capacity, but the obligation, of "knowing, loving, desiring, trusting, serving, and enjoying God;"—as if that were not its very essence. But I acquit him of intentional misrepresentation. For he labours throughout, as it seems to me, under an utter inability to comprehend the dignity and glory of service; the voluntary, and

yet obligatory, service of one absolutely supreme and infinitely worthy; such service as man was made for at first, and is re-made for at last, in the Son and by the Spirit. My meaning in the words which he unwarrantably isolates and misapplies is simply that, as regards any definite relationship constituted by creation, what distinguishes angels and men from the other creatures of God is "the bare fact of intelligent responsibility." That bare fact, however, I regard as carrying in it a position towards God greatly in advance of Dr. Crawford's description of the fatherhood. So far, therefore, from being reluctant to "concede" Dr. Crawford's "supposition,"—so far from "holding the image or likeness of God to consist in anything *so barely intellectual and so coldly judicial* as a mere 'capacity of understanding the divine will, and feeling a sense of responsibility under it.'"—I hold the divine will itself to be the law of love, and the divine image in the creature to be the harmony of his moral nature with that law, understood and owned by him as the law of his creature-relationship to the Creator. The truth is, Dr. Crawford confounds nature and relation; not perceiving apparently that while the obligation of love which our relation to God and to his will or law imposes is fulfilled through the conformity of our nature to his nature in love, that conformity is not itself the relation.

Hence, of necessity, his whole subsequent reasoning on this point is of the vaguest possible sort (p. 16,

etc.) It proceeds entirely on the assumption of God's general benevolence, or his being love. Of course, since that is his essential characteristic, he will be moved to bestow upon his intelligent creatures, his moral and responsible subjects, simply as such, all gifts and bounties compatible with their position. Dr. Crawford seems to think, or at least he would lead others to think, that I lay an arrest on the flow of God's goodness towards those whom he has made in his image, because I consider them to be originally subjects only, and not sons. I go no farther in that direction than he does himself. He says, "The circumstance that God is our Father, as having created us, does not imply that we have any right or claim upon him beyond strict legal justice" (p. 20). I say the same, and it is all that I say,—though I set little value on a fatherhood that implies no more, and in fact call it no fatherhood at all. And I go as far as he does in asserting "an evident excess and exuberance of divine bounty—a constant and overflowing fulness of beneficence—far beyond aught that mere equity or justice on the part of a sovereign ruler could have dictated, and such as can only be satisfactorily accounted for by ascribing it to the care and kindness of our Father in heaven." So he puts it. I substitute for "our Father in heaven,"—"our sovereign ruler, the God whose name and nature is love." So I venture to finish the sentence. Can a ruler not be kind and generous without being a father also? Or is God,

as our father by creation, more kind and generous than is consistent with his prerogative as a ruler? Dr. Crawford must admit that God did indeed deal with angels and men, as originally made in his image, legislatively and judicially. If he chooses to call his dealings of another sort with them,—his dealings of superabundant and overflowing generosity,—the dealings of "our Father in heaven," I might not much object, were it not that such language tends in my view to detract alike from the original honour of created and accountable subjectship, and from the ultimately higher honour of regenerate and adoptive sonship.*

* I have little to say about Dr. Crawford's rejoinder on this part of the subject. He boasts (p. 292, 3d edition) that I "make no reply to his remarks on my attempt to deduce God's exclusive relation of sovereignty to His intelligent creatures from the fact of His having created them." He complains that I "exclude from the premises every element which could possibly have led to any other than the desired conclusion." The only element which he would have to be admitted is love; "God is love." And his insisting on that seems to me to indicate a radical misconception of the question at issue. Love is an affection of the divine mind and heart, which may modify the character of any and of all relations, but cannot of itself constitute any relation. Creation is a fact, constituting a relation, clear and definite; the relation of dependence and responsibility. The attribute of love in the Creator invests that relation with a character of bounty and beneficence which it would not otherwise of itself have had. But it does not constitute a distinct and separate relation. The extraordinary interpretation of John xv. 15 (294, 295) would have been avoided if this simple principle had been kept in view. When our Lord calls his disciples, no longer servants, but

II. The argument from Scripture, as urged by Dr. Crawford, is certainly meagre enough, if the point to be proved is fairly considered.

The idea of a general fatherhood introduces, as I have shown, into the original relation of intelligent creatures to their Creator an element not given in the necessary *à priori* intuition of reason and free will, as the sense of rule and responsibility is given ; but confessedly springing out of an *à posteriori* analogical inference from a human tie, which did not exist, and

friends, he does not surely institute a new relation ; he places an old relation on a new footing. It is substantially the footing on which the original relation of subjectship must have stood, in virtue of the overflowing love of the Creator. It would have been the relation of servants or subjects to their Maker and Lord ; but, being on such confidential terms as mutual freedom of speech implies, the servants or subjects would have been friends. If the original and universal fatherhood means nothing more than that sort of friendship,—imparting a friendly character to the only real relation actually recognised,—I yield. But my surrender wins my cause. My view of Dr. Crawford's strange inability to distinguish between "relation" and "affection," is confirmed by a paragraph marked 3 (p. 293) ; in which he says "Dr. Candlish speaks in very glowing terms of the much higher position occupied by the intelligent creature, when viewed merely as a responsible subject, than when held to be, on the footing of creation, a son of God." This is a sad misstatement ; of course unintentional ; but yet inexcusable and offensive. He knows,—for he quotes from me in his immediately following sentence,—that it is "Dr. Crawford's description of original sonship,"—and that alone,—I have in view ; not any real original sonship, such as I have admitted might have been constituted at creation, although I see no evidence of its having been then constituted.

could scarcely be imagined, when angels were tried and fell, or when man himself was tried and fell. This last consideration is surely of some importance, as we enter on the field opened by the discoveries of revelation. For surely, in the view of a universal divine fatherhood being inferred analogically from the human relation, it is very material to ask where was the ground of it, or how could it enter into the mind of any creature to conceive of it, before the human relation began to be? The trial of angels and of man could scarcely proceed upon the assumption of sonship.*

But I do not care to press this point farther at this stage. I simply say that to support a theory fraught with so strange a difficulty, very plain and strong scriptural evidence is surely needed. What Dr. Crawford alleges seems to me to be of the weakest sort.

He quotes, as the first two of his proofs, two texts,

* But it seems (p. 295) I "forget that, besides the 'sense of rule and responsibility,' there are other instincts and appetencies of a religious tendency, betokening an affinity to the Father of our spirits." I have never founded on any sense, or instinct, or appetency, as proving an actual relation. I found relation on fact. The fact of creation, when it is intelligent and moral beings that are created, involves the relation of which their intuitive sense of rule and responsibility is the recognition. What follows in this paragraph I cannot understand. My friend contends, on behalf of "angels and unfallen man," for a certain "endearing relation" which apparently took shape and name only when Abel was born.

the one from the Old Testament, the other from the New, which, severed from the context, may have a sound somewhat in his favour, though the sense is quite away from his purpose.

The first text is Malachi ii. 10—"Have we not all one Father? Hath not one God created us?" (p. 27). This looks like a strong assertion. It is to be observed, however, that, read in the light of the context, the force of the prophet's appeal turns, not on the universal fatherhood of God as regards mankind generally, but on his special fatherhood with reference to his chosen people Israel. And that fatherhood is made to rest on their being constituted his people through redeeming grace as well as by creative power. So the word "created" is to be understood here, as it is also to be so understood in Isaiah xliii. 1—"Thus saith the Lord that created thee, O Jacob, and he that formed thee, O Israel, Fear not: for I have redeemed thee, I have called thee by thy name; thou art mine." A fatherhood of this sort towards Israel as such,—that is, towards the nation in its collective capacity,—I have admitted, or rather proved, to be declared in several Old Testament passages, such as those which I may have occasion to notice afterwards, as quoted and misapplied by Dr. Crawford. This text of Malachi is simply one of these.

The other text is Hebrews xii. 9, where God is called "the Father of our spirits," in contrast to "fathers of our flesh" (p. 29). Here, again, the whole

argument of the apostle has respect to believers, and to believers exclusively. Nor is any such psychological doctrine as Dr. Crawford imagines intended to be taught, as to "our corporeal frame proceeding by ordinary generation from our earthly parents, and the nobler part of our constitution—the immortal soul—being directly communicated by the Creator, so as to be in a peculiar sense his offspring." That may or may not be true; and it may or may not be proved by the other texts referred to. But Paul had too much sense, and was too thorough a master of tender and persuasive reasoning, to be giving a lesson in natural philosophy to mourners needing spiritual consolation. Plainly his appeal is more simple and touching. You reverenced those who were your natural parents, when they corrected you, often unwisely and in haste. Much more may you submit to him who is your Father in a far higher, in a truly spiritual sense,—your Father in a sense that allies your spirits to himself as a Spirit,—and all whose dealings with you are ordered accordingly.*

* On Dr. Crawford's rejoinder, as regards these two Scriptural arguments, I do not think it needful to say much. As to the first (p. 295), he overlooks the fact that, as I have indicated, the text is necessarily restricted to Israel, while at the same time he interprets the term "create" in a way quite inconsistent, as I have also indicated, with the prophetic use of it as applicable to Israel. As to the second, I would not care to notice it at all were it not for his most extraordinary closing fling. "Dr. Candlish is too hasty when he says, at the close of the preface to his third edition, 'I

Dr. Crawford's third scriptural argument is a mere *petitio principii*, founded on "the account given of man's original creation, as 'made in the image of God, after his own likeness'" (p. 29, etc.) To give it even the semblance of logical reasoning, he is obliged to assume the very point to be proved,—the original fatherhood of God as respects his intelligent creatures (p. 31). And even then, all that he infers is that, on such an assumption, "'creation after his image' must be held to bear on his relation to the subjects of it, as implying not only 'intelligent responsibility,' but also that congeniality of disposition which will animate them with childlike confidence and affection," making it "their chief joy to dwell with him in close fellowship, and in all things to honour and imitate and obey him." Of course, I admit and hold quite as much as this, if not even more, to be implied in the relation of intelligent creatures, simply as such, to the great Creator. But this is very far short of their being animated with an assurance of real sonship, like the sense they must have of real obligation. It is not worthy

claim Owen as on my side.'" I said that in an entirely different connection; in connection with the general doctrine at issue; and without the remotest reference to the interpretation of this particular text, as to which I quoted no authorities whatever. And yet what reader of his "Reply" (p. 295) would not understand him as meaning that I had claimed Owen as on my side in the exposition of the verse in question? When my friend explains, or apologises for, such literary injustices as that, it will be time enough for him to complain of a few strong words.

of Dr. Crawford to be putting the question between us so persistently on that issue ; at least, it would not be worthy of him if he could be supposed to apprehend the distinction between community of moral nature and the constitution or adjustment of mutual and reciprocal personal relationship.

It is partly, I suspect, this very confusion of ideas that makes Dr. Crawford exult so much in the dilemma between whose horns he thinks he has fixed me (p. 31, etc.) I hold (Lecture V.) that "regeneration or the new birth" has "a prominent place in the manner of entrance into that divine sonship which is peculiar to believers," because it is the implanting of the seed of a new life, consisting in likeness to God. Therefore, he argues, I am inconsistent in not allowing that creation after God's likeness at the first involves sonship. I may have occasion to return to this topic in a more suitable connection. Meanwhile, even if I held—which I do not—that the new birth, or new creation,—for I do not object, as he seems to think I do, to that figure (p. 32)—did no more than restore the broken image of God in the soul to what it was before the fall,—I have never said that by itself alone it constituted sonship. Dr. Crawford's dilemma is therefore at fault.*

* Here I would simply ask the reader to observe that Dr. Crawford's attempt, in his reply, to floor me again by the double logical method of fastening on me a begging of the question and fixing me on the horns of a dilemma, proceeds altogether on a supposed admission by me that to bear "the image or likeness of

I leave Dr. Crawford's fourth scriptural argument, —that from the close of our Saviour's genealogy in Luke iii. 38,—to stand as it is against the remarks in my volume, with these two observations. In the first place, he who finds the assertion of fatherhood in this genealogical tree, at any of its stages, as a real, conscious relationship,—or, indeed, as anything but a link in the chain of succession from age to age,—might almost equally well find it in a line tracing one of an inferior race of animals to its divine source; the present representative being "of his predecessor"—he again being "of his"—and so on to the first of the family, "which was of God." And, in the second place, I hold it to be unfair to mix up with a criticism on my very brief exposition of the text in Luke, as if it formed part of it, a discussion of the general question, which occurs quite apart, and which I can only relevantly deal with by relegating it to its proper place.*

God" implies sonship, because I say that that is the fruit or effect of the act of God in regeneration. The old confusion comes in again here. Bearing the image or likeness of God has no respect at all to relation, but only to nature. It implies intelligence and holiness; conformity of character to the mind and will of God. Man had it at first, in his relation simply of creature to his creator. He has it now in Christ, in that relation still, rectified and readjusted;—but yet also in a new relation, that of sonship, constituted by regeneration and adoption.

* In regard to my first remark, Dr. Crawford, in courteous and emphatic italics, represents me as asserting "that a like argument *would equally prove the first of a race of the inferior animals to be*

I proceed to the fifth scriptural argument, that derived from Paul's pleading at Athens (Acts xvii. 26-29). And even here I need do nothing more than avail myself of Dr. Crawford's own exposition. "Admitting that Paul's immediate object was to expose the absurdity of rational beings ascribing their origin to what is irrational, it does not therefore follow that *this is the only inference* which can be logically drawn from the statement that 'we are the offspring of God.' This was the only inference, as it so happened, which Paul at the time was concerned to draw from it. To have drawn from it

a son of God!" (p. 298). He knew that I objected to the interpolation of the term "son," all through the genealogy; but it seems he could not see how it is under that objection that my *reductio ad absurdum* is urged. This is not only illogical but unfair. In connection again with my second remark, Dr. Crawford enters on a long discussion (pp. 298-303) about the character of God's original dealings with Adam, as regards our respective views of which there is a simple misunderstanding between us, I do not attempt to clear it up in detail. I content myself with extricating my real views out of his cauldron of misconception and confusion. I simply hold, *first*, that the condition annexed to the grant of paradise as a test of obedience was legal and governmental altogether, and not fatherly at all; *secondly*, that the sentence of death denounced and incurred was exclusively of the same character; and *thirdly*, that the sentence of respite, with its hope of deliverance, bore the same character, and spoke of nothing more than suspension of judgment, in the meantime, for all, and a righteous victory for all the true seed of the woman at last. Of course, I speak of relation strictly, and not of disposition. As to the latter portion of his reply here, I hope my friend will one day come to see that if he and I are agreed in "ascribing a method of recovery,"—"be it ever so strictly and ex-

anything else, or anything more, would, as the objector himself"—meaning me—"affirms, 'have been out of place.' But by thus deducing from it the only conclusion which his purpose required, he evidently recognises it, not as a mere rhetorical figure, but as the announcement of a real relation between man and God; and warrants us in like manner to deduce from it such farther conclusions, suited to our purpose, as may be reasonable and legitimate" (p. 41). Surely this is something strange and new in exegetics. The sole question is about the sanction which, by quoting this verse of a heathen poet, Paul may be

clusively judicial,"—"to divine love,"—in its origin and issue;—that does not entitle him to class me among those who accuse the scheme itself as vindictive, on the ground that I do not call that love fatherly, in the sense of its implying a definite parental relation. Still more, I hope that he will come to see and own the injustice of interpreting my statement, resolving the entire original purpose of redemption,—and indeed of creation,—into the Father's love to the Son,—as if it impeached the Father's love to his intelligent creatures,—and especially to the elect and redeemed. I trust it will not be imputed to me as a heresy if I say that, having out of his great love to his Son, created all things by him and for him,—and having, out of his still greater love to his Son, given to him a people from among a fallen race to be redeemed and brought to glory,—God loves all men for the love he bears to him by whom he made them all; and loves the elect and believing with the love with which he loves him to whom he has given them all. If this is a heretical denial of the general love of God to all, or of his special love to his chosen ones, in his Son,—I have no defence but only, as to the last, the seventeenth chapter of John's Gospel; and as to the first, the eighth chapter of Proverbs.

supposed to give to a universal fatherhood, and not at all about the conclusions which others may draw from it. He quotes it for a purpose, in an argument *ad hominem*. He does not quote it as inspired; nor does his quoting it make it inspired. Even if it had been a text of Scripture that he quoted, his authority could not be pleaded beyond the precise design for which he quoted it, or the use to which he turned it. Of course, in such a case, we are free to turn the text to other uses, and to plead it as divine in doing so. But it is our own judgment which we exercise; we cannot bring in Paul as responsible. Here, however, we have not a text of Scripture at all, unless Paul's citation of it is believed to canonise it. We have simply an uninspired verse of poetry, of which that consummate master of oratory avails himself most happily on a special occasion and for a special purpose. And neither his comment, nor the verse itself, can be legitimately brought forward as of divine authority, beyond the special occasion and the special purpose. Dr. Crawford's admission therefore confirms my interpretation; and so the question between us falls.*

* I do not think it necessary to notice Dr. Crawford's reply here, beyond remarking that the question between him and me is as to the inference which Paul would have the Athenians to draw from his quotation of one of their own poets, "We are all his offspring." Is it that we all stand, each of us individually, in a definite relation of sonship to God? Or is it that we all, as a race, owe our origin to God? I maintain the latter opinion in my Lecture; and my argument has not been touched.

There remains only the argument drawn from the parable of the prodigal son (p. 43, etc.); in regard to which I would be content to leave the decision, as between Dr. Crawford and myself, to any one carefully reading over again my remarks, in the light of his criticism. I must still insist on the danger of bringing a parable, circumstantially interpreted, to prove a doctrine not otherwise established; and I venture to retain my opinion that to make such a use of this parable is not in the best taste. Plainly the point in it, and the only point in it, at all relevant to the occasion, is the father's way of treating the returning prodigal, as the model of the way in which any one claiming the position of the elder son ought to treat him. That point the Lord brings out in the most emphatic possible manner; and he does so, be it remembered, in the course of a ministry designed, in large measure, to reveal God's fatherhood, and to prepare men's minds for the reception of that truth in its highest sense. Interpreted too closely, in all its details, the parable, as Dr. Crawford must admit, may be pressed into the service of error on the vital doctrine of the ground of a sinner's reconciliation and acceptance. I submit that, whether my comment approve itself or not to competent judges, it is at least more in the line of safe exposition than that which Dr. Crawford would substitute.*

* Dr. Crawford is equally willing with myself to "leave the decision, as between us, to any one carefully reading over again my

And here I have a word or two to say on Dr. Crawford's closing remarks as to the vast practical importance of the tenet of a general fatherhood, chiefly in its bearing on our appeals and invitations

remarks in the light of his criticism." So be it. But I cannot deny myself the pleasure of referring to a passage in the precious work of my most beloved friend, Dr. James Hamilton, on *The Prodigal Son*,—his latest literary gift, if I remember rightly, to the Church,—in which he quotes from my Lecture. It gratifies me all the more because it does not commit him to my opinion about the Fatherhood, but only shows how thoroughly he apprehended my view of the Parable, and how far he sympathised with me. (See the collected "Works of Dr. Hamilton," published by Nisbet and Co., 1869, volume second, pages 354-355.)

I decline to enter into "a *seventh*" scriptural argument, which Dr. Crawford has "now added" (pp. 47-50), drawn from "the first and great commandment;" although it "seems to him altogether conclusive" (p. 305). It proceeds upon the strange assumption that God cannot so manifest himself to his creatures in the relation of their maker and governor, as to appear worthy of their love, and entitled therefore to claim it by commandment. That assumption again arises out of the fact that his whole argument requires him to strip the relation of God to us, as our creator and ruler, of all beauty, amiability, glory, unless the relation of fatherhood is superadded to it, or held to be involved in it, not of grace but by necessity. And that fact again is explained by his failing, all along, to discriminate between the relation in which one person may stand to another, and the feelings which he may shew and upon which he may act towards him. Surely in the relation of dependence and subjection, *per se*, men might witness the goodness of God, and experience his beneficence, in a manner sufficient to lay them under the obligation of loving him supremely. I doubt if Dr. Crawford perceives the very serious bearing of this "seventh scriptural argument" on the sin which occasioned the fall, and the grace which provided a remedy.

to sinners (p. 51, etc.) We lose, it seems, a mighty lever-power, when we let go that tenet. It gives us a hold on them for which nothing can compensate, whether we try to convince them of guilt or persuade them to return to God. I very much doubt this, as regards both of these ends. As to the first, when he and I go to plead with a brother, still in his unconverted state, what have we respectively to say, so far as this subject of the fatherhood is concerned? He dwells pathetically on the folly, baseness, and ingratitude of departing from one who is a father, in virtue of his creating, supporting, protecting, and nourishing all of us. I too dwell on the same considerations,—with equal pathos if I can;—when I speak of the right which, as our maker, God has to rule us, and the claim which his unnumbered benefactions and his unwearied patience and benignity give him upon us. And then, over and above all that, I ask my poor brother to see, in the light of the Son's revelation of the Father, what the Father originally would have had us to be, if only we had stood the reasonable test of subjection to him as our ruler;—and what he will have us to be now, if only we accept the Son as first placing us on a right footing with his Father as our ruler, and then sharing with us his own filial standing in the Father's house, and all the fatherly love of which in his Father's house and heart he is the object. For moving to repentance also, not less than for convincing of sin, I cannot but

think that I have at least as good a purchase as my friend. I do not indeed address sinners indiscriminately as "those who are sons of God by creation;" nor do I address, as he most erroneously represents me as addressing, in a special manner, "those whom it is God's purpose to make his sons by redemption." I have nothing to do with "God's purpose," as regards adoption, any more than as regards justification, or sanctification, or any other of the benefits which God holds out in the gospel freely to all who will receive them in and through his Son. To all sinners alike I make offer, in the Father's name, of the Son, as his free gift to all who will accept him. And I commend the offer by urging the assurance that with the Son the Father "freely gives all things;" and among the all things, this above all, that they who are the Son's become sons as he is, and "because they are sons, God sendeth forth the Spirit of his Son into their hearts, crying, Abba, Father."

PART SECOND.—Relation of the Fatherhood of God to the Atoning Work of Christ.

Having dismissed the doctrine of the original fatherhood of God, in relation to his intelligent creatures, both in a rational and in a scriptural point of view,—Dr. Crawford proceeds, in his Third, Fourth,

and Fifth Lectures, to deal with it as bearing on the subject of the Atonement.*

And here it is with sincere pleasure that I declare my concurrence in the whole substance of these two lectures. Dr. Crawford has, in my judgment, rendered a signal and seasonable service to the cause of truth, by the clear, cautious, and able exposition which he has given of the great Catholic doctrine of the atonement, and his thorough vindication of it against Socinian and neo-socinian objections, founded on its alleged inconsistency with right notions of the character and government of God. If he were to give the church the benefit of this exposition and vindication,—which is not only very complete in itself, but sufficiently independent of the rest of his book to admit with all propriety of separate publication,—I for one would hail such a use of it with all my

* I am relieved from the necessity of much farther annotation on Dr. Crawford's Reply, by his own intimation (p. 305), "I shall confine myself to two or three particular topics, being content that the general merits of the question should be judged of by what I have stated in the foregoing Lectures, viewed in connection with the strictures which have been made upon them." If he is content, so am I; all the rather because I can advert to what he goes on to say, so far as it may be needful to do so, when I come to deal, in a subsequent part of this volume, with other objections to my views. I intend this sort of reserved right to cover, both what he says about the sin of man, its judicial sentence, and the remedial bearing of the sentence; and what he says on the subject of our Lord's double sonship. He complains of me because I spoke doubtfully about his holding that theory. I will not so offend again.

heart. I would only suggest the propriety of his adopting the usual phraseology, and speaking of God as being in his nature love, apart from any relational question about his fatherhood; for I am persuaded that the assertion of fatherhood, as a universal relation, does really give an advantage to the adversary to which he is not entitled, enabling him to make out at least a plausible case of incompatibility between paternal and judicial modes of dealing. With this remark I might leave these two lectures, were it not that I must endeavour to bring out my own position with regard to the atonement, especially when taken in connection with some of his previous strictures on my views.

I observe at the outset that it seems to me most important to distinguish the atonement, considered in itself, from the motive in the divine mind originating it, and from the mode of divine action for which it opens up the way. That, on the one hand, it springs from divine love,—fatherly love if you will,—the love of the eternal Father to his only-begotten Son,—love longing to have a household of sons in him, and to see him "the first begotten among many brethren;" —and that, on the other hand, it issues in the actual accomplishment of the purpose on which his fatherly heart is set;—both of these things may be allowed or asserted, in perfect harmony with the most strictly legal and judicial aspect of the dread transaction of Calvary. And still the question will remain, how far

fatherhood, as a real personal relation between God and any of the human family, either did or could exist, prior to that transaction and independently of it.

This question may be best considered in connection with what rendered the atonement necessary. I refer of course to the fact of the fall, viewed in the light of the constitution of things,—the economy or dispensation,—under which it occurred. I assume also, as in arguing with Dr. Crawford I am clearly entitled to assume, the ordinary evangelical interpretation of the transaction recorded in Genesis, upon which the whole plan of revealed theology, all through Scripture, is based and fashioned. Amid the ample and luxuriant provision made in paradise for man, considered simply as a sentient and intelligent being, capable of undertaking voluntary labour and reaping its joy and fruit in fellowship with him who "worketh hitherto,"—the one single and solitary feature in his condition that indicates any special dealing with him as a moral and responsible agent, is the prohibition to eat of the forbidden tree. And let us make of that what we will, as implying the highest dignity of which an intelligent creature, simply as such, can partake,—his being invested with a trust and put upon an honourable probation,—we cannot find in the thing itself anything but the assertion of legitimate authority and the imposition of a peremptory yoke of obligation. There might be much in the

accompanying circumstances to indicate the gracious character and design of that arrangement, and to awaken the expectation of something better coming after it and out of it, when it had served its turn. But the arrangement itself lies wholly and exclusively in the department of the legal and judicial ; and it is the only arrangement revealed as characteristic of man's creation-state that throws any light whatever on the real personal relation then subsisting between his Maker and himself. And the procedure of God towards him, after the arrangement was violated, is in this respect in perfect harmony with the view now given of its essential character and import.

But at this point Dr. Crawford, in his previous lecture (II.), thinks he has me at a disadvantage, and tries to fasten upon me a charge of flagrant inconsistency. The attempt is somewhat remarkable (p. 36, etc.) He holds that "not a few of the most notable transactions in the garden of Eden can scarcely be said to come within the province of a judge or ruler, any more than of a father. For," he adds, "certainly it is not the strict function of a judge or ruler to impose 'an arbitrary or discretionary conditional test'—still less to suspend on conformity to such a test the doom, not only of the person so tried, but of all who by ordinary generation shall descend from him. It was a *special covenant* which God made with our progenitor—such as does not properly come within the analogy of the ordinary deal-

ings, either of parents with children, or of rulers with subjects." True, it was a special covenant—an extraordinary dealing—not the strict function of a judge or ruler, if by his strict function be meant what must always and in all circumstances be his function. Let it be an exceptional arrangement—an anomaly if you will. Still the question remains, Was it in its proper nature, or in itself, a paternal act on the part of God, or one simply legal and judicial? Or does it fall under neither category? Dr. Crawford apparently thinks so. I doubt if, in thinking so, he has the Westminster Divines on his side. Be that as it may, he is not prepared to admit that "the sentence pronounced upon Adam was 'strictly and exclusively forensic and judicial—the legal condemnation of a servant, with no trace of the fatherly chastisement of a son.'" And here he is sure that he has caught me. For in a certain book on Genesis, "among other things he shows very beautifully"—so my friend is pleased to compliment me—"that the sentence denounced on the first fallen pair 'was a remedial, and not a retributive, sentence, fitted in all its parts exactly to meet their case;' 'setting them free from the deceitful bondage of Satan, the fear of instant retribution, and the shame of guilt,' and 'restoring truth and hope and confidence'" (pp. 36, 37).

Now, compliment or no compliment, I must say that this is not very creditable conduct on the part of Dr. Crawford. It may be a clever controversial hit,

but it is the reverse of fair reasoning. Who ever heard of the oracle or word in the third chapter of Genesis being "the sentence denounced on the first fallen pair?" I have never said it was, though it is insinuated that I have; and the insinuation is fitted, and can scarcely fail, to impose on the unwary reader. Does Dr. Crawford identify the two? If so, I consider it strange divinity for a professor to teach. As for me, the very words quoted, when candidly interpreted, imply the opposite; for I speak of the Lord's address setting our first parents free from "the fear of instant retribution." Surely that refers to and describes "the sentence denounced on them." It was death, instant death, retributive and final. In the view of that sentence of "instant retribution," already realised by them in the sense of sin and "shame of guilt" which drove them away from God, the sentence now in question is "remedial and not retributive;" for it holds out the hope of salvation, and in connection with that hope secures, upon the condition of man's irksome labour and woman's sore travail, a season of gracious respite and forbearance. In this last sentence there is love; fatherly love, as I assert, according to the sense I have explained; scarcely, however, in the sentence which it implies as having preceded it.

But Dr. Crawford has another ingenious shift. He objects to my representation of "the hope of recovery," because I say that "the *way* of recovery held

out was strictly and exclusively indicative of legal judgment and legal deliverance," and that "the remedial work of Christ," by which the hope of recovery has been fulfilled, "is always represented in Scripture as purely and wholly legal, forensic and judicial." And how does he sustain his objection? Simply by quoting Scripture and advancing reason to show that the whole plan of redemption originated in the love of God, and is not the procuring cause but the blessed effect of his love—as if I denied that; or as if, when admitted or asserted, it had anything whatever to do with my argument. He does not, in express terms, impute to me the odious misrepresentation of the doctrine of the cross which he justly and strongly condemns; he could scarcely venture to do so with my book, even half-read, in his hands. But he does so by implication;—leading, or rather forcing, his students to class me with Socinians and others, of whose views he speaks when he says, "It is a gross perversion of the atonement to represent God as a stern and implacable Being, characterised by the strictness of the judge without aught of the mercy and tenderness of the parent, and as only induced to extend pity to transgressors by the interposition of his only-begotten Son" (p. 38). I might resent all this, with some indignation, did I not ascribe it to mere confusion of ideas, and sheer inability, apparently, to apprehend the distinction between what a transaction is, in its own proper nature, and what

are the motives which cause and the consequences which flow from it. So I explain the complacency with which he closes the paragraph I am quoting from, as if he fairly demolished me by means of what, in an evangelical school, is the merest theological truism; "And thus may we see in the work of our redemption a joint manifestation of the judicial and parental character of that adorable Being with whom it originated. It was doubtless as a Judge that the atonement was exacted by him; but it was no less surely as a Father that he provided it" (p. 38). Of course I assent cordially, as Dr. Crawford can scarcely deny, to what he here says; understanding it, on his own showing, to mean simply, that while the atonement itself is a satisfaction required by justice, the providing of it must be ascribed to love, such as perhaps may, in virtue of a human analogy, be safely, though indefinitely and improperly, called fatherly or paternal. I consider it, as I have already indicated, to be fatherly or paternal love, in a sense infinitely higher.

The same confusion of which I complain appears in the fault he finds with me for saying, on the one hand, "Not a hint is given that Adam and Eve violated, when they transgressed, any filial obligation;" and on the other hand, "It is nowhere said that Christ atones for any filial offence—any offence committed by them as children against God as their Father. If they sinned in that character and re-

lation, their sin, so far as appears from Scripture, is up to this hour unexpiated" (pp. 38, 39). So far he fairly enough quotes my words. But what is the gloss he puts on them? "Though the objector may not be able to discern anything *unfilial* in the particular sin which they committed, others have discerned in it, and have readily recognised, as one of the most prominent features of their offence, that lack of childlike confidence in God which induced them to give heed to the suggestions of the father of lies, rather than to the true and kind warning of the Father of their spirits;"—a new contrast or antithesis, by the way, for the interpretation of the text in Hebrews morally as well as psychologically.

Assuredly there is neither truth nor kindness here on Dr. Crawford's part towards me. He quotes from my comment on the third chapter of Genesis; but evidently he has not read it, for if he had he could scarcely have written this sentence. Nay, fairly interpreting the words he is criticising, he should not have written it. I recognise as fully as he does,—and somewhat more distinctly,—all the elements of unbelief, disaffection, and ingratitude which the offence of our first parents had in it; committed as it was in the face of the most reasonable assertion of their Maker's authority, and the most ample experience of his goodness,—the clearest light and the richest love; committed, too, not only in defiance of a most explicit threatening of judgment, but in con-

tempt of that higher destiny to which they might have looked forward as the natural fruit and legitimate reward of steadfastness, if they had stood firm. All these and similar views of their conduct it is as open to me as to Dr. Crawford to enforce; while yet I hold the essence of their sin to be,—what the apostle John (1 Epistle iii. 4) puts as the essence of all sin,—"the transgression of the law." The sin which lost them paradise, and entailed on them penal death, was "the transgression of the law;" nothing more or less; nothing else. For sin, as "the transgression of the law," atonement is made; for sin, considered in the light of a subject's disobedience to the ruler whose law is transgressed, and in no other light whatever. For sin, viewed in any other light,—in the light, for instance, of a breach of filial duty,—I have asserted, and I repeat the assertion, that no atonement is made. It is not I, however, but Dr. Crawford, who insists on so regarding it. I know of no sin but "the transgression of the law." I see that sin committed by our first parents, in violation of their duty, as standing to God in the relation of subjects to a sovereign. And seeing that, I own the justice of condemnation, and the necessity of atonement. But if another relation subsisted and was violated, I am at a loss to see how atonement provides for the breach of that relation. It suffices for rectifying the position of a subject who has transgressed the law of his ruler. I cannot con-

ceive how it can have any bearing on any other relation which sin may be supposed to have outraged or broken. Even when committed by one who is a son of God, by adoption and regeneration, in and with the Son, sin is still simply "the transgression of the law." It is highly aggravated by his filial standing; but its essential character is not changed. Accordingly, when he sins, he sins as a subject transgressing law. And he has nothing for it but to have recourse, precisely as the whole world may have recourse, to the great "propitiation" by which justice is satisfied and sin righteously forgiven.* That is all my argument. It is meant to show that, whether we look to the original command, its breach and its sentence, or to the provision made for the remedy of the evil,—in a word, whether we look to sin as such, or to the atonement as such,—there is no trace whatever of any other relation between God and man than that for which I contend. The whole economy of the fall and of the redemption is explicable on the principle of law and judgment having their due course under the administration of a righteous ruler, righteously condemning and righteously saving. To say the least, it is greatly complicated and obscured if it is placed upon any other footing.

On the whole, I am still of opinion, after weighing all Dr. Crawford's arguments and objections, that there is not only no evidence from reason or Scrip-

* See *Exposition of First John, in loco.*

ture in favour of an original and universal fatherhood on the part of God, as a real and definite personal relation sustained by him towards his intelligent creatures, but strong presumption against it in what is revealed of man's sin and Christ's redemption. The primary relation in which a person made in the divine image,—a rational, moral, free, and responsible agent, —stands to his Maker, is that of subjectship ;—with that of sonship looming, not in the distance, but very near, since that is the mould, or type, or ideal, in which creation by the Son is from the beginning cast. Before sonship can be reached and realised, however, subjectship must be tested, proved, and perfected. Obedient angels are confirmed,—disobedient men are redeemed and justified,—in terms of law, simply as law, fulfilled and satisfied. Then comes "the adoption of sons ;"—with regeneration, where it is needed, to secure more than at the first of the "participation of the divine nature." For a time, in the case of men, the new relation is but partially apprehended as in harmony with the old. God's children here sin ; and their sin, as "the transgression of the law," needs a fresh application of the blood which atones for it as such. But they have in them the germ or seed of an impeccable and inviolable life as sons of God, in the Son, whose life as the Son they share. And they look for the day, not far off, when subjectship and sonship shall be found perfectly to "agree in one ;" —and the Father, as he sitteth on the throne, shall

behold with infinite complacency the mighty multitude of sons brought by the Son as their elder brother to his glory;—of all of whom it may be said at last, with fullest assurance and unreserve, that "his servants shall serve him."

PART THIRD.—The Realisation of the true Fatherhood of God in and by Believers.

I have endeavoured to explain and vindicate the first of my obnoxious opinions, and to show why I hold that there is no warrant, in reason or Scripture, for ascribing to God an original and universal relation of fatherhood towards his intelligent creatures. I now proceed to deal with Dr. Crawford's views on the fatherhood of God "considered in its special reference to those who are 'his children by faith in Christ Jesus.'"

And here I must say I could have wished that, in justice to himself as well as to me,—and still more, in justice to the great subject on hand,—Dr. Crawford had seen fit to treat it, as I have at least sought to do, more as a matter of grave theological inquiry than as an occasion for minute special pleading,—not to say word-catching and fence of logic. I could have wished that, instead of setting up at the very outset a formidable-looking and seemingly novel theory in which he may pick small holes and flaws, he had

fairly discussed the successive steps of my argument, in order to apprehend the full force of it as a whole. If he had, I think he might have avoided some mistakes on which I shall have to animadvert. However, as every man has his own way of looking at things, I must take my friend as I find him, and go over with him sundry points of detail before I again try to place the doctrine which I advocate, in all its integrity, before my readers and his.

I. Here I have to deal first with his sixth Lecture, on the "Fatherhood of God in relation to Believers."

I have not much to say on this lecture, with the greater part of which I cordially agree. Like him, I hold "a divine sonship which is not a common prerogative of all mankind," but "restricted to those who receive Christ, or believe on his name;" and, like him, I hold it to be "a sonship which originates in the special grace of God, is founded on the mediatorial work of the Redeemer, and is certified and sealed;" —I would say more than that; constituted and realised, "by the work of the Holy Spirit." But I accept his distinction; all the rather as he puts it in another place, where he says of this peculiar sonship of believers that it "has not only the original ground of creation and providence to rest upon, but the superinduced grounds of discriminating grace, redeeming love, regenerating agency, and covenanted promises, in which none else besides themselves can claim an

interest" (pp. 139-142). Two things, however, embarrass him, with which I need have no concern.

One of these is the scriptural use of the term "adoption," which, as he says, "properly denotes the introduction into a family of one who does not belong to it by birth." He explains this, even on the supposition that "the grace of adoption were purely remedial and restorative," by the consideration that, though the original "relation stands," the fallen but restored subjects or objects of it may "be virtually said to have been 'dead,' and to be 'alive again.'" But "adoption is not merely remedial and restorative." For "it has been generally held by theologians that though every part of the work of redeeming grace has reference to the fallen condition of human nature, and takes accordingly the form of a restitution of that which has degenerated to its primitive and normal state, yet, in the carrying out of this process of restitution there are high and potent agencies employed, with which we can scarcely suppose humanity to be brought into contact without having all its original elements and characteristics not only restored, but gloriously elevated and transfigured, insomuch that far more than is lost in Adam shall be gained in Christ" (p. 141). I may advert afterwards to what "is generally held by theologians" on this subject. Meanwhile, I cannot but think that as here applied by Dr. Crawford, it is like escaping Charybdis to fall into Scylla.

For a second difficulty immediately occurs. "It cannot be said, then, that the two relations are identical, or that they are by any means equivalent to one another;"—the original relation of sonship, implied in creation, and the renewed or restored relation consequent upon redemption. No; that can scarcely be said; especially if, as we have been told, God's "fatherly dealings with men in their unregeneracy are in a great measure limited to temporal mercies," while "the benefits flowing" to the regenerate are not these only, nor even "only such forfeited privileges, again restored, as unfallen man might have enjoyed in a terrestrial paradise,—but 'all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ.'"

But the author has an explanation of the co-existence and consistency of the two relations. And it is twofold. First, it is a reference to what Paul says (1 Tim. iv. 10) of the providence of God being specially exercised over believers as distinguished from other men. There is, however, here only one and the same providence, implying one and the same relation; that of dependence on the one side and protection on the other; the relation of the creature to the creator; and not two relations under the same name. To cover this, setting it aside under the guise of supplementing it, the second hypothesis is broached. It is the suggestion of there being two families, to one of which all men belong by nature, while to the other the regenerate are admitted by adoption.

Surely these are somewhat doubtful shifts, on which, however, I shall make no further remark here beyond entering my protest against adoption being held to be a forensic transaction, merely because it may sometimes be attested by a legal form (p. 142); and also against justification being said to be "properly significant of acquittal, on his own merits, of one who is proved to be innocent," "and only analogically applicable to believers" (p. 143). I cannot but object to this, as tending to introduce a loose and vague interpretation of theological terms, and to confound things which differ. Justification is acquittal, in terms of law, and on the ground of a legal righteousness. Adoption, in whatever way it may be certified, is in its nature an extra-legal procedure, with which jurisprudence has nothing to do.

But I hasten to dismiss this lecture, thanking Dr. Crawford again for his defence, in the remainder of it, of the common faith on this subject, against adversaries to whom, as he well knows, I am as much opposed as he is. And I proceed to his seventh lecture, under the heading of "Sonship of Believers compared with that of the Only-begotten."

The question, as it might almost seem, is now reduced to a very narrow point or issue. It being admitted that "the two relations," the general and the particular, or that which is by nature and that which is of grace are not "identical, or by any means

equivalent to one another ;" and it being further held that the latter is founded on the mediatorial work of Christ, and is realised in union to him by faith ;— is it anything less, or anything else, than participation with Christ in his sonship ? I maintain that it is not ; that is the head and front of my offending. I endeavour to show how such participation as I contend for is consistent with the true and proper divinity of the Son, and the eternity of his relation as the Son to the Father ; while, at the same time, I try to trace the progress of God's discoveries and dealings in this matter among unfallen angels and redeemed men. Hence, I am not careful to define precisely beforehand the *differentia*, or distinguishing property, of this sonship, as enjoyed by the saints. It is revealed in Scripture, not as contained, or capable of being embodied, in a formal proposition, but rather as exhibited in a living pattern. This indeed I conceive to be one reason, and the principal one, why the relation of the Second Person of the Godhead to the First has been so much more clearly and specifically revealed than that of the Third to either of the other two. It is a relation into which we are expected to enter. And it is revealed in action, by the Son having become incarnate, in order that in action also, the Holy Spirit, as the Spirit of the Son, may enable us, through the sympathy of filial faith, to apprehend and to fulfil it.

Craving attention to these preliminary remarks, I

proceed to deal with Dr. Crawford's objections. He takes exception, *in limine* (pp. 163-166), to one of the "reservations" under which I affirm, as he expresses it, "that believers have substantially the same standing towards God with that of his only-begotten and eternal Son." It "seems to him to be by no means of that circumstantial character which I ascribe to it; but, on the contrary, to be so radical and essential as utterly to subvert the alleged identity of the relations which the Lord Jesus and his people sustain respectively to their heavenly Father." He quotes my words:—"It is supposed that there is a difference of relationship, when, in point of fact, the difference merely lies in the dates at which, and *the grounds on which*, the same relation has been constituted in different persons. In other words, the difference has been held to be essential, whereas it is in reality only circumstantial." The italics are his own, being meant to indicate what he chiefly finds fault with. "As regards the date at which the relation has been constituted," he "admits that the difference *may* be held to be circumstantial, but not so assuredly as regards the grounds on which the relation rests. If anything can be deemed essential about a relation, it must surely be the ground on which it is constituted."

Now that may be true, when it is the original constitution of the relation that is the point in question; and therefore I hold with Dr. Crawford that in

the "Semiarian" controversy, the difference was essential between the Son's being "eternally begotten of the Father by *a necessity of nature*," and his being begotten of the Father "by *the Father's will*." The latter formula plainly denies the self-existence of the Son, which the former as plainly asserts.

But it is otherwise when the question relates to the admission of others into participation in the relation; especially when that is made to depend on their real and vital personal oneness with him in whom it is originally constituted; or, in other words, on his becoming "the firstborn among many brethren." I still think, in spite of Dr. Crawford, that as regards "the filial relation among mankind," it is "essentially"—that is really and truly—"the same in the case of one who is a son by natural descent, as in that of a son by marriage or by adoption." I am mistaken if Scripture and our Confession (ch. xxiv., Section 4) will not bear me out in thinking so. That the difference in the mode of constituting the relation does not imply differences in its experiences, I am far from maintaining; but the relation itself I hold to be the same, whether it rest on consanguinity or on affinity,—on nature or on choice. The human analogy, however, is very defective, for it lacks the element of oneness with the Son which enters radically into the divine arrangement. The ground of sonship for his brethren is his uniting them to himself as the Son If it is alleged that identity of filial

relation to the Father between him and them cannot thus be constituted, the burden of proof lies on him who alleges that. And in the course of his bearing that burden, he will have a good deal of our Lord's teaching to explain, or to explain away.*

Even as regards the Semiarian controversy, it is important to observe that the question did not turn upon relation at all, but upon nature. It was not the eternal sonship of the second person in the Godhead, but his supreme divinity, that was discussed ;

* Dr. Crawford admits the "ingenuity of the distinction" (p. 306). But "(1.) he objects to the union of believers with the Only-begotten being styled a real *personal* oneness with him." Then "(2.) the difference is altogether in favour of his position ; the sonship of believers differing from that of the Only-begotten, not only as being constituted by 'an act or work of grace,' instead of by 'a necessity of nature ;' but (3.) in this further respect, that it is a secondary or *derived* sonship, instead of being a sonship which is *original* and *essential*." I accept his second objection as my argument. His first I cannot understand until he takes up the burden I venture to lay upon him. His third, in which he complains of my not noticing his "variety of reasons" for relation by marriage or adoption not being the same as relation by consanguinity among mankind, I meet with the repetition of a simple admission that they are in many ways distinguishable. But when he ventures to quote Thomas Goodwin ; I challenge him to apply his "variety of reasons" to the noble passage in which that great divine separates so emphatically the sonship of Christ and the sonship of believers, as to the ground and manner of their respective constitutions, only to bring out all the more affectingly the real spiritual and personal oneness of Jesus and his people in this blessed relation (Goodwin's *Works* (Nichol's Edition), vol. iv. pp. 426, 427).

and not, so far as I recollect, his divinity as affecting or bearing upon his eternal sonship, but rather his divinity in connection with his person and work as mediator. I might object, therefore, to an argument being drawn from the patristic discussion of that question.

And I certainly must object in the strongest terms to Dr. Crawford's view of what he calls "the new relation towards God, implied in justification," as being essentially different when "formed on the footing of sovereign and unmerited grace," from what it would be if formed "on the footing of personal obedience;"—a view which he somewhat strangely, and in a novel fashion, introduces to prove that difference in the grounds on which in different cases it rests, or in the manner in which it is constituted, must make a difference in the relation. For in the first place, justification "on the footing of sovereign and unmerited grace" does not imply a new relation, but only a recognition of our right-standing in an old relation,—namely, the relation of subjects under law to the lawgiver. And in the second place, it is identically the same thing, whether it rests on Christ's vicarious righteousness graciously imputed to us, or on our own righteousness, if that were forthcoming. It is oneness with Christ as the righteous servant that secures our justification, just as it is oneness with Christ as the Son that secures our sonship. But the justification is one in us and in him. And so also may be the sonship.

I pass over for the present a somewhat ingenious attempt to involve me in a contradiction (p. 164); merely observing that when the passages compared are taken entire, and not, as Dr. Crawford without warning quotes them, considerably abridged and mutilated, the principle that real sonship implies community of nature will be found in both alike. I proceed at once to the objections which he urges against what he calls "the key of the whole position" (p. 167); the proposition "that the relation of fatherhood and sonship, as it exists in the Godhead, is capable of being communicated to a creature."

The first of "several very apparent fallacies" contained in my argument for the proposition in question, is this: "Even allowing that the relation of sonship, as it exists in the Godhead, was communicated to humanity in the person of our Immanuel, this would only prove that relation to be communicable *under like conditions* to those under which humanity subsisted in that adorable person" (p. 169). I have never said that in itself this proves anything more. I have carefully explained and guarded my inference from the mere fact of the incarnation, in the part of my second lecture immediately following what Dr. Crawford thinks fit to quote. Had he given me the benefit of the part which he does not quote, he might have spared his suggestion of my holding "the personality of the believer to be somehow absorbed in the personality of the Son of God." I

confess I do not quite understand what he means by a "personal union" in the case of Christ, as contrasted with "a mere mystical union constituted by faith in Christ," in the case of the believer;—of which he adds that "it comes far short, in this respect, of a personal union." His objection against my supposed inference is thus stated:—"Unless, therefore, a like personal union can be pleaded in the case of those to whom it is affirmed that 'the sonship, as existing in the Godhead, can be communicated,' no inference can be drawn in favour of that relation from the fact of the incarnation. A mere 'mystical union,' constituted by faith in Christ, comes far short, in that respect, of a personal union." I have not alleged their identity, nor have I drawn the inference supposed. But are the two unions capable either of comparison or of contrast? Is not the one, the "personal union," a union of natures, and the other, the "mystical union," a union of persons? And may not the latter be allied to the former?

By the "personal union," as regards Christ, I understand the hypostatical union of the two natures in his person: and by the "mystical union," as regards the believer, his union to Christ. How far that union is really personal, as well as mystical, and how far it may not be of such a character, so intimate and so divine, as, without any merging of his own personality in that of Christ, to admit of his participation in Christ's sonship,—these are ulterior questions, not

settled by the mere fact of the incarnation. That fact, however, I maintain, does lay a foundation for a possible settlement of them in consistency with my view, even according to what Dr. Crawford somewhat doubtfully allows. With his rather strange comparison of the two unions, neither I nor my argument need be concerned.

But Dr. Crawford does not allow what he has, for the sake of argument, been conceding, that "the relation of sonship, as it exists in the Godhead, was communicated to humanity in the person of Jesus Christ," or that the God-man "became the Son of God, in the sense in which the Eternal Word was so, *in respect of his human nature,* as well as of his divine nature" (p. 172, etc.) The strange expression about the God-man becoming the Son of God is his, not mine, though any reader of his lecture would suppose it to be mine, were he not on his guard against a free-and-easy use of the marks of quotation. My statement on the subject is more cautious, and, as I think, more scriptural. In my second lecture, I speak of the Word made flesh as not becoming, but continuing to be, the Son. But let that pass. His objection to my statement is that it "confounds the two natures in Christ, or attributes to the one what is proper and peculiar to the other." "It avails nothing," he adds, "to affirm that 'ascribing the relation of sonship, as it exists in the Godhead, to Christ's human nature, does not imply the communi-

cation to it of any divine property or attribute ;' and that 'the question is not one about nature at all, but simply and exclusively a question about relationship.'" Why will that not avail? Because "it is quite impossible to separate the subsistence of a relation from *the ground* on which that relation subsists, and in respect of which it specifically differs from other relations." This is a favourite axiom of Dr. Crawford's, for he always puts it axiomatically, as if it needed no proof. And yet to me it is not self-evident ; not at least without some explanation and limitation. If the question were about the constitution of a relation *de novo,* then I might allow that to represent it as the same with a relation previously subsisting, while it rested on a different ground, might be illogical and unfair. But that is not the case here. The question in the first instance is, whether a relation already subsisting may not continue the same when the party sustaining it assumes a new nature and passes into a new position,—the same as regards his one entire and unbroken personality? And the ulterior question is, whether it may not be shared by him with others, divinely united to him and divinely renewed in nature according to his likeness? Dr. Crawford's formula does not dispose of either of these questions ; certainly not of the first, with which alone we are here dealing.

Hence I am disposed to attach little weight to his verbal criticism on the term "only begotten."

Nor am I much moved by what follows: "We might almost as well say that the human nature of Jesus Christ partakes of that relation of *equality* with the Everlasting Father which belongs to him as the only-begotten, while at the same time it does not, and cannot, partake of those divine attributes which are the ground of that equality." He does well to put in the qualifying word "almost," for he can scarcely hold the instances to be altogether parallel. I am not aware that theologians have usually connected or identified the sonship, *per se*, with this relation of equality, which Dr. Crawford rests on "divine attributes." I rather think that, on the contrary, they have been accustomed to consider that the sonship of the only-begotten, even when pleaded to its highest point as inferring identity of nature, does indicate some sort of relational subordination, such as makes it proper to speak of the Father sending the Son, and so forth.

I have a great respect for the authority of Bishop Horsley. Long ago, on coming from the Divinity Hall, I got my first clear views on the subject of the Trinity from the study of his controversy with Priestley. I may be excused, therefore, if I here insert the following extract, which seems to me to have a material bearing on the question at issue between Dr. Crawford and me at this stage, and to settle conclusively the argument about a communication of the sonship being necessarily equivalent to a communi-

cation of the divine nature. It is an extract from his *Tracts in Controversy with Dr. Priestley*, pp. 291-294. Edit. 1812. "In the eighth section of this seventh letter, you argue against our Lord's divinity from 'the manner in which he speaks of the power by which he worked miracles as not his own but the Father's;' and from the manner in which he speaks of himself, saying *My Father is greater than I.* If from such expressions you would be content to infer that the Almighty Father is indeed the fountain and the centre of divinity, and that the equality of the Godhead is to be understood with some mysterious subordination of the Son to the Father, you would have the concurrence of the ancient fathers, and of many advocates of the true faith in all ages. If you would infer any other inferiority than what is necessarily implied in the relation of a son,"—let that be noted,—"some of the very passages to which you allude will serve for your confutation. Such as those sayings of our Lord recorded in St. John's gospel (v. 19; xiv. 24; xiv. 10). Refer the expressions to the context, and it will appear that, with something of a subordination on the part of the Son, they assert the most perfect identity of nature—the most entire unity of will and consent of intellect, and an incessant co-operation in the exertion of common powers to a common purpose. . . . Bishop Bull, in his defence of the divine faith, spends a whole chapter, and a very long chapter it is, upon the sub-

ject of the Son's subordination, which he maintains to be as much a branch of the true faith as the doctrine of the Son's eternity, or consubstantiality. The same thing is asserted by Bishop Pearson in his exposition of the Apostles' Creed. He observes that 'in the very name of Father there is something of eminence, which is not in that of Son; and something of priority we must ascribe unto the first, in respect of the second person.' 'We must not, therefore, so far endeavour to involve ourselves in the darkness of this mystery, as to deny that glory which is clearly due unto the Father. He is God; not of any other, but of himself; there is no other person who is God, but is God of him. It is no diminution of the Son to say he is from another, but it were a diminution of the Father to speak so of him; and there must be some pre-eminence where there is a place for derogation. The first person is a Father indeed, by reason of his Son, but he is not God by reason of him; whereas the Son is not only Son in regard of the Father, but also God, by reason of the same.' Upon this pre-eminence of the Father, the learned bishop founds the congruity of the divine mission; and he maintains that 'the dignity of the Father appears from the order of persons in the blessed Trinity, of which he is undoubtedly the first.' . . . And this order being so generally acknowledged by the fathers, the bishop remarks, in a note, that 'when we read in the Athanasian Creed that *in this Trinity*

none is afore or after other, we must understand the negation of priority of perfection or time.'" Bishop Horsley refers also to Stephens *On the Eternal Generation of the Son of God,* and to Dr. Waterland's *Commentary on the Athanasian Creed.*

But I do not insist further on this view of the original relations among the persons in the Godhead. I put it, however, to Dr. Crawford himself to say if the relation of equality does really stand upon the same footing with the relation of sonship, as regards the Incarnate Word. I grant that "our Redeemer is styled in Scripture the Son of God in virtue of his eternal relation to his heavenly Father—that the scriptural use of this title cannot be explained by a reference to his miraculous conception, his Messianic office, or his resurrection from the dead" (p. 165). But is he not, at all events, styled "Son of God" in connection with these three facts? And has that circumstance no bearing on his human nature as having some concern in his filial relation to the Father, as it now subsists in his one person, as "God manifest in the flesh?" The Athanasian Creed has a clause respecting Christ as God and Man; "equal to the Father, as touching his Godhead; and inferior to the Father as touching his Manhood." Will Dr. Crawford frame a corresponding clause to bring out his view,—Son of the Father as touching his Godhead; and as touching his Manhood—What? "I pause for a reply." It must, I apprehend, be either

that, as touching his manhood, he is not the Son of God at all ; or that he is the Son of God in a different sense and relation from what his being the Son of God, as touching his Godhead, implies ; or that there is but one sonship in which his manhood now shares.

But I beg Dr. Crawford's pardon. He does reply, and his reply is in the line of the second of my three suppositions—or rather, he makes me reply in terms which he apparently adopts as his own ;—"In virtue of the one nature, Christ is the Son, while in virtue of the other nature he is a subject." And here again he finds me inconsistent, for I had said that "Christ is the Son of God in respect of his human nature as well as of his divine nature." With all submission, the inconsistency arises from his not adverting to a difference of phraseology, which, in his view, may be insignificant, but which I consider important. It is one thing to say that Christ is the Son of God in respect of his human nature, and another thing to say that he is so in virtue of it. The former phrase merely means that as "the man Christ Jesus" he is Son of God ; the latter would mean that his manhood was the ground of his sonship, which is not the case. And lest this should seem a mere verbal quibble, I quote Calvin's language on the point: "Christ therefore, since he is God and man united, but not by confusion of the natures, we constantly hold to be our Lord and the true Son of God, even according to his humanity,

although not by reason of his humanity." ("Christum ergo, ut Deus est et homo, unitis, licet non confusis, naturis constans, Dominum nostrum verumque Dei Filium esse constituimus, etiam secundum humanitatem; etsi non ratione humanitatis."—*Inst.* lib. ii. c. 14. 4.) In the same way, I do not know why we might not say, if it were needful for my argument, that Christ is the subject of the Father in respect of his divine nature, though not in virtue of it; that, as the incarnate Son, he is the servant of God;—though that notion seems to offend Dr. Crawford. For I have always understood that though his divine nature was incapable of suffering either toil or pain, yet the fact of his being God all the while that he was suffering in the flesh, did enter materially into the work of our Lord's obedience and satisfaction, and did contribute essentially to render his work, as not being necessary on his own account, available and sufficient on ours. Whatever phraseology we adopt to express that view, I think it implies all that I have occasion to contend for. While I object to the proposition that Christ is the Son in respect of (*secundum*) his divine nature, and a subject in respect of his human nature, I strongly assert, that as "God and man, in two distinct natures and one person," he is the Son in virtue or by reason of (*ratione*) his Godhead, and a subject in virtue of his manhood; uniting thus in his one person the two distinct relations.

Dr. Crawford would fasten on me (pp. 173-174) a

virtual denial of the doctrine of our confession, that "two whole, perfect, and distinct natures, the Godhead and the manhood, were inseparably joined together in the one person of Jesus Christ, without conversion, composition, or confusion," with which doctrine he says "it is manifestly inconsistent to suppose that the essential properties of the one nature, or its characteristic relations as founded on these properties, are by virtue of the personal union imparted to the other nature." This is no language of mine. I see no intelligible sense in which a nature can be said to have relations. For surely relations are of a person, though they may be founded on, or held in virtue of, the properties of the nature of the person. Hence, though the grounds of Christ's relations to God lie in one or other of his natures, yet the relations themselves are purely personal. On the general subject of "a communication of properties from the one nature to the other," as explained in our confession, Dr. Crawford has some valuable remarks, in which, as well as in the statement of Dr. Cunningham which he quotes, I very cordially agree (pp. 174-176).*

* I am not sure that I understand Dr. Crawford's reply to this explanation on my part, for it was nothing more. I leave it as it stands, having no wish to fight about words. And I leave also as it stands the next paragraph, although what I stated doubtfully as to Dr. Crawford's holding the doctrine of a double relation of fatherhood in the one person of Christ, is now acknowledged and defended by him. I deal with that subject in another connection. But I refer with satisfaction to what Dr. Crawford says (309-310) as to

After all, however, Dr. Crawford is disposed to contend, though somewhat doubtfully, for a double sonship in Christ ; I say somewhat doubtfully, for at the close of his lecture (p. 177) he half reserves his right to fall back upon the alternative of his being Son as God and subject as man. The "*third* fallacy," however, which he notices in my argument,—"a very important one,"—is "the denial that Christ can be called 'the Son of God by a right or title proper to his humanity, as well as by a right or title proper to his divinity.'" That is not quite a fair representation of any statement of mine, in spite of the marks of quotation. But let it stand, and let us see how it is dealt with. In the first place, Dr. Crawford assumes that this position rests on a denial of "the general paternity of God" as regards men ; which is not the case. It is quite independent of any such view, being founded on the fact of the incarnation, and the unity of Christ's person as not affected by that event. Dr. Crawford indeed argues that because "when the Eternal Word became incarnate, the mysterious person thus constituted was *very man* as well as very God ;" therefore, "if it be one of the properties or relations of man" "*to be a son of God,* then must this human

his "having no heart to fight with me about the *word* 'sonship'" ; believing, as I do, that while I admit all that he considers essential into the original relation of man to God, he may soon see that what he would superadd, nominal as it may seem, is a quite different relation, and one which, if admitted, tends to derange the whole system of evangelical theology.

property or relation" "be attributed, in respect of his human nature, to our Immanuel." And I partly allow the force of the argument. I have accordingly used it, in a note previously quoted by Dr. Crawford, in reasoning against the notion of "a general paternity" on the part of God. But I do not use it in the way Dr. Crawford represents me as using it, as if I forgot the two natures in Christ, making, as he conceives, two sonships possible. I use it on the supposition of the unity of Christ's sonship being maintained; and I ask how, on that supposition, the "general paternity" is in his case to be disposed of?

Now, however, as it would seem, I have to deal with the idea of a double sonship in Christ; which, to my mind, I confess, presents very much the same appearance as if we contended that one individual man sustained two relations as a husband to his wife, or as a servant to his master—the one proper to his bodily and the other to his spiritual nature. Of course, as he consists of body and soul united, the conjugal or servile relation must manifest itself differently according as it is body or soul that is, as it were, in action or in exercise. But the relation is one because the person is one. Otherwise there surely is something like a divided husbandship or servantship—something therefore like a division of the one personality.* This

* Dr. Crawford quotes this sentence, and gives a long comment on it (310-312). He runs off in the analogical method; "Indeed there is no end to the difficulties and incongruities in which we

Dr. Crawford does not of course see or grant. "There is no assertion of a 'divided sonship.' What we ascribe to Christ is, *two distinct relations to God*—one proper to his divine nature, and the other proper to his human nature." Be it so. Then there are some questions one would like to ask. Is it right to use such language as Dr. Crawford uses in introducing his argument,—"When the Eternal Word was made flesh, the mysterious person thus constituted was *very man* as well as very God?" Is it a new person, a person mysteriously constituted *de novo*, that we have in "the Word made flesh?" If it were, my argument would fall, though perhaps his might stand. But I do not charge Dr. Crawford with holding any such opinion, though his phraseology evades my reasoning. He holds, as I do, the eternity and unchangeableness of the personality of "the Word," the second Person of the Godhead. Well, I infer from that the continuance of his personal relation as the Son to the Father at and since the incarnation; its continuance as unalterably the same that it was before. And that

should involve ourselves, did we insist on giving a strict and literal sense to analogical expressions. Thus it is said of God's people (Isaiah liv. 5), 'Thy maker is thy husband.' But how can He be their *husband*, it might be asked, when He is at the same time their Father?" Certainly I would not ask that My difficulty would be not about the church sustaining two relations to her Head, however incompatible these might seem to human view, but about her sustaining each or either in a double sense. Are there two husbandships and two fatherhoods? I scarcely think Dr. Crawford will say so.

being so, I cannot see how any new relation of sonship can co-exist in the same person with the old one, even though the person has assumed a new nature into union with his own. Dr. Crawford thinks he can. But I would put another question. Is relation an attribute, a property, of the person related? Are relation, and attribute or property, convertible terms? Do the same things hold true of both? I scarcely think so. And yet much of what is plausible in Dr. Crawford's reasoning depends on his confounding the two. "We apply," he says, to both relations "the same human analogy of *sonship*, because we are warranted by the usage of Scripture so to do, and because we can find no better analogy to represent them." Where, by the way, is the scriptural usage for calling Christ the Son of God simply as man? He goes on: —"But we are not to be held on that account as affirming that they are identical. On the contrary, we believe them to be in many respects greatly dissimilar. The one is a divine, while the other is a human property. The one is constituted by generation from eternity; the other by creation and providence in time. The one implies participation in the divine substance; while the other implies only conformity to the divine image." Here relation is a property, and in the case of Christ it is a property constituted by generation from eternity. Surely what is generated from eternity is the person of the Son, which is not created or constituted in time, but sub-

sists from everlasting, and subsists in a personal relation of sonship to the Father. It is a person that is related and not a property ; and the relation is not a property ; nor, in the case of the Son of God becoming man, can it be, strictly speaking, said to be either exclusively divine or exclusively human, as a property or attribute may of course be said to be. In fact, if the question were about the divine nature and the human, of which the Son of God is partaker, with their characteristic properties and attributes, I could adopt word for word Dr. Crawford's contrasted statements. But they do not seem to me applicable to his personality and his personal relation to the Father.

I do not confound the two natures in the one sonship of Christ. I admit, and hold,—and Dr. Crawford allows this,—that as the Son, Christ is both divine and human, and that as the Son, he speaks sometimes of feelings and experiences proper to the one nature exclusively, and at other times of feelings and experiences proper exclusively to the other. Of course his doing so may be explained on the theory of the double sonship. It will scarcely be explained, however, in the way in which Dr. Crawford tries to explain it, by referring to the fact that Christ had a human will, and a human intellect, as well as a divine. As one person, having united in him two natures, he retains the properties and exercises the functions of both, though how his doing so is to be explained

must ever be a profound mystery. Still that is a different thing from ascribing to his one person, not two different relations, such as the filial and the subject or servile,—but one relation, the filial or the servile, broken up into two, altogether diverse from one another. It might be curious to compare that notion with what was propounded in the "Adoption Controversy," when, as Hagenbach says,—"The orthodox doctrine was again endangered by the *Adoption* interpretation of the sonship of Christ, advanced by several Spanish bishops, especially *Elipandus of Toledo* and *Felix of Urgella*, whom *Alcuin* and others successfully combated. The adoption theory, by making a distinction between an adoptive son and a natural one, would have restored Nestorianism, though with some slight modifications" (*History of Doctrines*, vol. ii. pp. 25, 26, Clark's Edition. See especially Note 3, p. 27).

But I pass from that. My object has been to show that the Lord's manner of speaking, now referred to, while it may undoubtedly be explained on the theory of a double sonship, is at least equally explicable on the view which I take. Nor in this do I "suppose the humanity to have been deified by the actual communication to it of those properties or relations which are proper to the divinity;" unless I am forced to admit properties and relations to be identical things. The Lord Jesus, sustaining in his one person the one relation of sonship to the Father,

which is his from everlasting, sustains it now as possessed of two natures. That is what I hold to be the position which our Redeemer occupies. And, according to that analogy, so far as it can apply to us who have only one of these natures, not according to the mere human analogy of the relation between father and son among us, I imagine the sonship of those who are divinely made one with him to be constituted.

Dr. Crawford continues the same subject in his eighth lecture, in which, after a further defence of the double sonship, he makes short work of "the other three propositions alleged by me to be deducible from the fact of the incarnation" (p. 189, etc.)

The first of them, indeed, he professes to concede ; —the entire consistency of sonship with subjectship ; —with a qualification, however,—which, as has been seen, he erroneously supposes me to have admitted, —that "if we understand by the sonship of Christ that relation as it exists in the Godhead, he is assuredly Son, in virtue only of his divine nature, while he is no less evidently a subject, in virtue of his human nature." Of course I admit the distinction, in so far as the ground of these relations is concerned, but not so as to divide the personality and make him son in one of the natures and servant in the other. I hold, and my argument requires me to hold, that the one person, Jesus Christ, being both God and man, is as to his entire personality both son

and servant, and that this is involved in the fact of the incarnation, as it is also requisite for his doing the work for which he became incarnate. Obviously that is my meaning in the passage which he quotes in this connection ; "Must it not"—the incarnation —"be regarded as going far to demonstrate the converse also, that it is possible for those who are naturally subjects and servants to be sons, as he is ; —to enter somehow and to some extent into his relation to God as his son, as he enters into their relation to God as his subjects and servants?" Surely, is Dr. Crawford's somewhat unexpected reply. "It is possible for men to enter 'somehow and to some extent' into the Redeemer's filial relation to God." How then, and how far? "We can only suppose them so to do by sustaining a relation in some respects analogous to it, or by practically deriving, in consequence of their fellowship with Christ, certain privileges and benefits which would not have accrued to them if Christ had not stood in this relation to the Eternal Father." In other words, they enter "somehow and to some extent" into Christ's sonship, by not entering into it at all, but only into a relation distinct from it, though in some respects analogous to it, or by getting some good from his being the Son, which they could not have got otherwise. How will this do, on the other side?—Christ, I say, "enters into our relation to God as his subjects and servants." Surely, rejoins my friend, he enters

into a relation in some respect analogous to it, or "practically derives, in consequence of his fellowship with us," certain obligations, pains, and penalties, "which would not have accrued to him if we had not stood in this relation to the righteous Judge." Perhaps Dr. Crawford infers some mighty concession on my part from the qualifying words "somehow and to some extent." Of course, I was putting the argument at its lowest value; for if "anyhow and to any extent" we enter into his relation as he enters into ours, my case is proved. How he enters into our relation, by a miraculous birth,—and to what extent, with the reservation of sinlessness at least,—is another question;—as also how we enter into his relation, by adoption and regeneration,—and to what extent, at least with the reservation of our continuing to be not gods but men.*

Of "the two remaining propositions which are held to be deducible from the fact of the incarnation,"

* Dr. Crawford (312-315) concedes a good deal of what I ask when he represents himself, and the authorities which he and I quote, as teaching that believers do enter into a position, and do enjoy privileges, in virtue of their oneness with the Son, which but for his sonship must have been impossible. I rejoice in this agreement, and think it hopeful of more. The head and front of my offending now is, that I do not consider that as the constituting of a new relation, analogous merely to that of the Son to the Father, subsisting from all eternity and manifested in time under the conditions of the incarnation,—but that I regard it as our entering, through regeneration and adoption, into that very relation itself, as thus subsisting from eternity and thus manifested in time.

Dr. Crawford "deems it necessary to make a few remarks only in regard to the first,"—namely, that "it brings the Eternal Son into the relation of a subject, after that relation has become thoroughly disordered and deranged" (p. 190, etc.) He seems to complain of me for saying that I assume in the meanwhile,—that is, as regards the fact of the incarnation,—"the reality, not so much of the substitution of the Son of God for us, as of his identification with us." And he represents my "position" as "seeming to be, that the incarnation did, *ipso facto*, imply such identification,"—apart from "those gracious stipulations into which he entered with his heavenly Father on behalf of sinners" (p. 192). I never dreamed of anything so absurd. Of course a divine person might become man without identifying himself, or being identified, with other men; especially with fallen men. I was speaking not of any incarnation, but of the incarnation; and I might surely have got credit for not ignoring the conditions under which that great event was accomplished. When the Son of God became man, it was in terms of an everlasting covenant with the Father, by which he "graciously undertook to *substitute himself for us*." But I have been accustomed to believe that in order to his doing so, he did "*identify himself with us*;" and I see no harm in saying that it is his identifying himself with us that the incarnation, as a great fact, proves or involves. In his incarnation he becomes one of us, or

one with us, in order that he may obey and suffer for us.

But Dr. Crawford objects, as I understand him, to this notion of identification as implied, I say not in any incarnation, but in the incarnation of the Son of God. He holds that "our Lord's manhood was free from every taint of sin;" and he acknowledges that I hold that too; "although it must be owned," he obligingly adds, "that with reference to this subject I use language that is very far from doing justice to my own convictions." I am sorry he should think that my trumpet gives an uncertain sound on a point on which I have always thought and spoken, as some of my esteemed brethren have complained, only too strongly, merely because I so expressed myself as to indicate some surprise or grief that they, or any of them, should think the tenet an unimportant one. But let that pass. We agree in holding "our Lord's manhood to be free from every taint of sin." And what then? I am of opinion that this does not affect my position as to the incarnation inferring identification, because "his sinless manhood differs from ours, not in its essence, nor in anything necessary to identify human nature as human nature, but in the circumstance or accident of depravity or corruption attaching to it, or rather to those who inherit it;" and I assert this expressly against those who maintain that the Son of God could not be said to assume our nature so as to be

one with us in it, unless he assumed it such as it has been in us ever since the fall. Dr. Crawford thinks otherwise. In his view, "the *circumstance* or *accident* of depravity and corruption attaching to human nature as now inherited by us, is the very thing that marks it out as *our* nature, as the nature which distinguishes us as guilty, corrupt, and condemned." Did, then, the Son assume our nature, or did he not? Let Dr. Crawford settle that question as he pleases with the Irvingites and their apologists. For my part, I am content to maintain my own position, which primarily has reference to identity of relation, and only incidentally to identity of nature. My argument is that the Son's having assumed our nature, not as it is in us since the fall, but as it was in Adam before the fall, does not hinder his identifying himself with us in the relation in which, as fallen subjects, we stand to God, thoroughly disordered and deranged as that relation confessedly is ; nay, that it is the very thing which makes such identification on his part as was needed for our redemption possible. Nor do I see how his substituting himself for us can, in this view, be separated from his identifying himself with us. The Son in our nature, continuing to be holy and righteous, becomes one of us,—one with us,—in the relation in which, as fallen and guilty, we stand to God. And so he undertakes and meets all our liabilities. To all which the counterpart is his identifying us with himself in the relations in which he now

stands to the Father, as his obedient servant and beloved Son, and in all the fulness of grace and glory which these relations carry in their bosom. What that fulness is I do not presume to say, any more than Dr. Crawford undertakes to estimate the "amount of dignity and blessedness to be looked for as the appropriate sequel of so astonishing a display of heavenly grace" as the incarnation and the cross together set before us. We both alike rejoice in this high hope, however we may apparently differ somewhat as to the ground on which it is chiefly based in Scripture, or as to the measure which Scripture may suggest of its full and final consummation.

PART FOURTH.—The Revelation of the Fatherhood of God before the Incarnation.

In his ninth lecture Dr. Crawford proceeds, *ex gratia*, to deal with the question, "*How far the paternity of God was revealed and known to the ancient church before our Saviour's advent*" (p. 196, etc.); for he seems to hold that his success in the previous argument might exempt him from the task. He "admits" at the outset "that there is no such full and frequent and explicit recognition of God's paternal character"—I speak not of that, but of his paternal relation—"in the Old Testament, as in the doctrine of our Lord and his apostles;" and he explains this partly by the observation that "the filial relation of

the faithful to their heavenly Father was to a considerable extent overshadowed or obscured by the servile character of the Levitical dispensation, whereby, like children under tutors and governors, they were kept in comparative bondage until they should reach maturity." This goes some way to meet my views. I hold that the filial relation was constituted and did exist, in the case of Old Testament believers, and that, even in the absence of explicit revelation, it was and must have been implicitly an influential element in their spiritual experience. It is thus that I explain the large measure of evangelical life and liberty which, even under ceremonial usages, they enjoyed, and of which their devotional writings are full. Nor would I even put so strongly as Dr. Crawford puts it, their being "kept in comparative bondage." But my "arguments" are to be considered.

The first, he says, has been already discussed; it relates to the state of matters in the garden, before and after the fall. I agree with him that it is needless again to discuss that point; and therefore I proceed at once to his remarks on the second; in which I affirm that, according to Hebrew idiom, the expression, "sons of God" is used vaguely, sometimes merely to distinguish the godly from the ungodly; sometimes analogically, as appropriate to any relation implying benefaction and dependence; sometimes as a rhetorical mode of speech, giving emphasis to an appeal in which no definite relation is asserted or implied. I

thought all this was generally taught by Hebrew scholars. But let Dr. Crawford himself be heard.

It is odd how he contrives to give a convenient turn to my words. He says, "Of the 'many instances' in which the phrase 'sons of God,' is alleged to be 'little more than an idiomatic way of distinguishing the godly from the ungodly,' there is only one example referred to,"—namely (Genesis vi. 2), where "the sons of God" are contrasted with "the daughters of men." I have never said there were many such instances. I expressly say, though he does not quote it, that the expression "sons of God" "is not very often used." And then I add that "many of the instances in which it is used" are to be explained in the above or some other similar way. Dr. Crawford, if I understand him, admits the explanation in the instance given, which is in point of fact an illustrative instance, obviously applicable on other occasions. Again, he complains that of "the other uses of the phrase" which I allege, "there is unfortunately no particular instance pointed out." I have expressly pointed out three, and commented on them, in a note to my third lecture, which, as well as that which follows, Dr. Crawford would do well to read before speaking so confidently as he does on the subject.* Dr. Crawford mistakes me also if he supposes

* The note here referred to is embraced substantially in the latter part of this volume. Dr. Crawford says he has fully discussed these passages under another head (pp. 201, 202, of his 3d edition).

that I would dissent from his "remark that a phrase may be *analogical* without being *vaguely or indefinitely* analogical." Of course it may; though not easily in such instances as those to which, rightly or wrongly, I am referring; where, as I think, the expression "sons of God," or some equivalent expression, is used, when no specific relation of personal sonship is intended, but only the outburst of a strong general feeling of tenderness and truth.

I can scarcely, however, allow that "it is only in the way of analogy that we understand the words Father and Son as applied to the first and second persons in the Godhead,"—and in the way of an analogy confessedly very imperfect, borrowed from the relation "of an earthly parent to the child whom he has begotten." If the phrase is thus merely analogical in all cases,—in the case of the Son, as well as in the case of "believers received into God's family as adopted children,"—it is surely an unfortunate circumstance that it should be used to denote two such widely different relations as Dr. Crawford considers them to be. The divine sonship of the Eternal Word is not, according to such a view, placed on a very secure footing.

Nor, again, can I acquiesce in the fairness, any

Be it so. I am quite willing to leave it so. Let intelligent readers judge how far rhetoric is to be pushed as a warrant for dogmatic statement, to the utter destruction of its power and pathos as an instrument of affectionate persuasion.

more than I admire the courtesy, of the charge of "cold and ruthless criticism" hurled against me because I argue that the pathetic appeals to collective Israel,—cast more or less in the form, and breathing certainly the spirit, of paternal pleading;—of which Dr. Crawford speaks as made "so often," whereas they are really but rare;—are not sufficient to prove that the relation of personal sonship to the Father was revealed as the privilege of the saints individually. I am still of opinion, moreover, with respect to the four passages quoted (p. 202),—Deut. viii. 5; Mal. iii. 17; Ps. ciii. 13; Prov. iii. 12,—that "the very nearness of their approach to the assertion of God's fatherhood makes the stopping short of it all the more noticeable;" for in spite of what Dr. Crawford says about their implying a sort of gracious fatherly dealing,—which I admit,—they do stop short of the assertion of fatherhood. Nor am I moved to give up my inference founded on Paul's manner of quoting the last of them, though I do not attach much importance to it;—(Prov. iii. 12—"Whom the Lord loveth he correcteth, even as a father the son in whom he delighteth;" quoted in Heb. xii. 6.—"Whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth, and scourgeth every son whom he receiveth.") True, Paul quotes from the Septuagint, as Dr. Crawford kindly informs me (p. 204). But I am accustomed to hold that the inspired authors of the New Testament writings, in quoting Old Testament texts, whether in the language of the Hebrew

original, or in the language of the Greek translation, or in language differing from both, had a special meaning of their own, or rather of the Spirit inspiring them, in the words they used; and I am not aware that Dr. Crawford belongs to the school which denies that. Of course he does not, though he strangely enough adds: "But even if it had been thrown into this form by Paul himself, instead of being taken from the Septuagint, we should not in that case say that he had perverted it,"—as if I had said or insinuated that, —"but rather that he had fully brought out its real meaning;" yes, its real meaning, interpreted and applied in the light of New Testament revelation.*

I do not think it necessary to notice particularly what Dr. Crawford says about the other three arguments alleged by me on this head. He admits that the paternity in some instances given by me applies to the collective nation,—to Israel as such,—although he says that is no proof against there being 'a similar relation between God and individuals" (p. 205); as if I had said that it was. He does not deny the application of the texts I have quoted to the Messiah;

* Dr. Crawford makes a strange observation here; almost implying belief in the inspiration of the Septuagint. He rejoices in my admission that sonship is in the verse, as quoted by Paul. It is there by inspiration. The Septuagint version, which Paul quotes, may have anticipated him in his rendering. What of that? It may have been a grasp at the truth then dawning in men's minds. It is the apostle who puts his seal on the deviation from the Hebrew text; surely with authority, and for a purpose.

he simply tries to turn the edge of my reasoning by giving them a less definite meaning than I am disposed to give them, and by making much of the different grounds on which the Messiah may be supposed to be called the Son of God in the second Psalm, as if that had any relevancy to my argument, which is simply that he is declared to be the Son of God *par excellence*, in a manner unique and singular (pp. 206-7). And as to his remarks on my view of the piety of the Old Testament saints — and their devotional utterances—I am content in the meanwhile to appeal to my own exposition of that view, as doing quite as much honour as his own does to these "men of whom the world was not worthy."

I conclude this part of the subject with the following summary:—

1. No proof is adduced of any assertion of a general fatherhood in the Old Testament. Dr. Crawford indeed says (p. 213), that "there are not wanting satisfactory indications that the Divine Fatherhood, both in its general and in its special aspects, was in some measure known." As regards the "general aspect," I look in vain for any "indications" in Dr. Crawford's lecture; and he will scarcely say that it forms part of the teachings of "Moses and the Prophets."

2. It is admitted that the collective church or nation of Israel is, in a few rare instances, represented as God's son;—with an allusion for the most

part primarily to the rights and privileges of primogeniture, Israel being to the other nations of the earth what the first-born is to the rest of the family; —and also with a manifest secondary typical reference to the Messiah. And whatever may be meant by sonship in these instances, it is invariably connected with the fact of redemption, and the new creation or constitution founded on that fact.

3. In the rhetorical books, and the most rhetorical parts of these books, there are some most impassioned and affecting appeals made by the prophets to the people, in which it may be allowed that the analogy of paternal affection among men;—as well as the analogy of other human affections;—is naturally and legitimately employed. But it is employed without any hint, so far as I can see, of such a personal relation of sonship in individual believers as is usually understood by adoption.

4. The absence,—I do not say of the filial spirit,* though Dr. Crawford would fain put that unfair and invidious gloss upon my argument,—but

* I care not for the phrase being "filial spirit" or "filial element." Dr. Crawford's attaching so much importance to that (pp. 317, 318), simply shows his misunderstanding of my argument. I make no distinction between these expressions. My wonder is that with so much that really breathes the "filial spirit," and partakes of the filial element, there should be so little of anything like a clear recognition of the filial relation. And my complaint against my friend is that he would have me to deny what I admit, as regards the spirit or element of Old Testament piety.

the absence of the recognition of the filial relation in the spiritual and devotional exercises of the Old Testament, is still to me a very important and significant fact. Nor does it detract from the consummate beauty and deep soul-searching power of these exercises; or from their value and fitness for the church's use for all time,—I had almost said for all eternity. Let it be borne in mind that these holy men walked in closest fellowship with the Eternal Son, as the Angel of the covenant, the Angel Jehovah, the author of their new creation, as he was of that old creation, when the Spirit moved on the face of the waters. He may well therefore be supposed to have cast all their experiences, as he has cast from the beginning all the world's arrangements and ongoings, in the mould of that sonship of his, whose full and final development is to be the crowning glory of all the divine works and ways. Thus these experiences, though themselves in a great degree wanting the filial element,—as a matter of revelation and doctrinal knowledge,—may well turn out to be such as fit into the clearest discoveries of it, when it comes to be unfolded in the incarnate, crucified, and exalted Saviour. And well may they furnish,—these breathings of believing and expectant saints;—all the better for the very yearnings and longings of their imperfect apprehension of their highest privilege;—well may they furnish the most appropriate and welcome means of utterance to the faith and hope of the

most enlightened Christians, who have not yet attained but are pressing on.

For the holy men of old were sons, though not fully taught to realise their sonship. "They, without us, were not to be made perfect" (Heb. xi. 40). That they are made perfect now, Dr. Crawford holds as I do. Only, I venture to ask when and how? And in those passages, my interpretation of which Dr. Crawford scouts,—certainly with very little of exegetical argument, and with no suggestion of any better,—I am persuaded that I find a probable answer. In particular, I still adhere to the view which I have given of the passages in Hebrews (x. 38, xi. 40, as bearing upon xii. 22-24); identifying the Old Testament worthies celebrated in the eleventh chapter,—as instances of the "faith" by which "the just shall live" that is spoken of in the tenth,—with the "just" who are brought into the great convocation described in the twelfth. And I still hold my view to be confirmed by the argument in Galatians (iii. iv.)* I have not founded anything on 1 Pet. iii. 18—"quickened by the Spirit, by which he went and preached unto the spirits in prison," because I am not prepared to commit myself to the

* Dr. Crawford must excuse me if I simply say, with reference to the hope expressed by him (p. 318), that so far from being "satisfied with the fuller consideration he has now given to these passages (pp. 208, 211)," I am content to leave the two expositions, his and mine, to run the guantlet of exegetical criticism together.

interpretation of Bishop Horsley and others, in the face of the grave objections of more competent critics than I am. At the same time I never have been able to see how that interpretation, which admits the idea of the Lord's Spirit communicating with the spirits of the just in Hades during the time of his body's sojourn in the tomb, is contrary to Protestant doctrine, or the analogy of the faith, or the usage of Scripture language. And I have not been altogether satisfied with any other exposition. As explained by Horsley, it might be understood as hinting how the Old Testament saints came to be made perfect.

At all events, I certainly cannot agree with Dr. Crawford in thinking that the acknowledged imperfection under which Old Testament believers laboured attached as much to their views on redemption and justification as to their views on adoption. I believe that Paul teaches otherwise, and I have given ground for my belief which Dr. Crawford has not touched. Nor do I think I am without warrant of reason and Scripture when I suggest that the coming of Jesus Christ in the flesh, with all that followed thereon, imparted new light to the spirits of the just who had lived and died in faith, seeing his day afar off; and that that light was shed very specially on the glory of their Redeemer's sonship, and on their participation in all its fulness.

PART FIFTH.—The Teaching of Our Lord Respecting the Divine Fatherhood.

I do not consider it necessary to enter at any length into Dr. Crawford's discussion of this part of the subject, in his tenth lecture. I am content, for the most part, to let his scriptural interpretations and mine speak for themselves to those who will institute a fair and full examination of the passages interpreted. I might indeed warrantably decline all argument on this point with an antagonist who has the good taste and modesty to charge me with "'free handling' of the language of Holy Scripture," and such free handling as must make it impossible for "orthodox theologians," if they "adopt it," "consistently to protest against the procedure of those who strive, by the like forced and unwarrantable methods of interpretation, to explain away the most essential articles of revealed truth" (p. 225).* But, be that as it may, I leave his scriptural interpretations and mine, on this theme of our Lord's teaching, for the most part to speak for themselves.

Nor in the few remarks I have to offer will I dwell upon the strong tendency, not to say desire, evinced by Dr. Crawford to lower, as it seems to me, the

* I am sorry to be obliged to adhere to this complaint, notwithstanding Dr. Crawford's explanation (319, 320). His illustration would aggravate the offence if it did not make it ludicrous.

general strain of our Lord's teaching, and make it suggestive of nothing more than the general fatherhood of God, restored in the case of believers, and enlarged by the accession of some peculiar privileges (p. 242), but scarcely coming up even to that "special fatherhood" which I should have thought, from his previous reasoning, he might have been prepared more distinctively to admit.

I confine my observations to the biblical criticisms of this lecture.

1. The sermon on the mount is Dr. Crawford's stronghold, as it is also in a large measure my own. Dr. Crawford maintains that it was addressed generally to the promiscuous multitude, and not to his disciples in particular, and therefore it must be the general fatherhood of God that is meant when he is spoken of as "your Father," or "thy Father." Undoubtedly it was spoken in the presence and hearing of the multitude, and with a view to their instruction; and accordingly the multitude could not but feel, especially towards its close, that in teaching his disciples he was teaching them. Still it is his disciples, as his disciples, that he is teaching. He is laying down their privileges, trials, and duties, as members of the kingdom of heaven. And it is to them that he speaks, in reference to these very things, when he calls God their Father.

Well but, says Dr. Crawford (p. 216), "even if this discourse had been intended for them alone,"—I have

never asserted that it was, but only that it was addressed to his disciples as such, after the manner of a preacher's appeal to the people of God as such, with the design and hope, however, of its telling on others besides, —"it must be considered that *they* also were not as yet instructed in the great doctrines of his divine sonship and mediation, and could have no conception of anything peculiar in their filial relation to God as thence arising." That does not quite follow. They might not know all that the relation of fatherhood implied; the fulness of its blessing, or the high ideal and ground of its constitution. Still they must have recognised, as I cannot but think, a new and peculiar style of reference to the Supreme in their Master's pregnant utterances; they must have felt that a new light was beginning to dawn on their standing in God's sight and his attitude towards them.

Here I would beg to ask my friend what he means when he so coolly interpolates his own interpretation of my words, in what I say as to a modification of my opinion regarding the invocation in the Lord's prayer: "I am inclined to admit that inasmuch as the fellowship of the disciples with their master in respect of sonship was not clearly revealed" [rather, *was not at all revealed*], "when he gave this form of invocation he could not intend it then for himself and them conjointly. The Son told his brethren to say 'our Father' before he fully told them" [rather, *before he told them at all*] "of his oneness with them and their oneness

with him in their saying so" (p. 217). I humbly thank my learned critic for his apt corrections; and if it is any satisfaction to him, I can have no scruple in adopting them; though my own less dogmatic phraseology seems to me more consistent with our ignorance of the Lord's previous intercourse with his disciples, and our inability to say what impressions the Spirit may have caused them to take of his present teaching. In justice to myself, however, I must ask the reader to glance again at the passage in question, and judge for himself if much can be made of my apparent concession or qualification.

But, at all events, apart from what I have suggested as to a dawning light of revelation and an accompanying work of the Spirit in the Lord's previous intercourse with his disciples, I must emphatically demur to the conclusion which Dr. Crawford draws, when he says: "The truth is, that of the doctrine of evangelical adoption, in anything like the sense in which it is now received among us, we have not the slightest reason to suppose that any intimation had yet been given to our Lord's disciples. And accordingly, we are warranted to conclude that he could not and did not expect them to attach to what he then said to them respecting the divine fatherhood any further idea than of that general relation which the great Father of Spirits sustains towards all mankind, or, at the utmost, of the recovery of this relation from the darkening and dislocating influences of the

fall" (p. 217). Is not this last "idea," by the way, Dr. Crawford's "special fatherhood?" What more is there in his "special fatherhood" than this "idea" indicates? Or does he really allow something specifically distinct in it from "the recovery of the original relation?" If so, what precisely is it? I leave it to him to explain what he means, and also to reconcile his premises here with what he has elsewhere said about the amount of knowledge possessed by Old Testament believers. Meanwhile, I repeat that I must demur to his conclusion.

For the real question is, not about the previous knowledge or capacity of the hearers, but about the intention of the teacher. Dr. Crawford acknowledges that it may have been not merely the original relation sustained universally towards all mankind that the Lord had in view, but that relation as "recovered" from the effects of the fall in the case of his disciples. One would still wish him to be a little more precise, and to tell us which of the two meanings he prefers, or if he would alternate between them, or hold by them both. For my part, I consider the Lord as pointing very decidedly and unequivocally to a relation peculiar to those who are "the salt of the earth," "the light of the world," as distinguished from "publicans" and "hypocrites;"—the children of the kingdom, called to be sons and therefore heirs, and bound to live according to their calling. That they may not have been able at the time to apprehend all that this

high relation involves, in respect of privilege, duty, and responsibility, is really nothing to the purpose. I am entitled to dismiss that argument as irrelevant, and to dismiss also, as somewhat more than irrelevant, the clever hit about the "monogenetic sonship" with which he so rhetorically clenches it (p. 220). I continue to be of opinion, with most interpreters, that whatever may be the sort of fatherhood of which the Lord's people are the objects, it is that only which he indicates in this discourse;—not of course unfolding all its import, but referring to it, and founding upon it, as the ground of his appeals to their faith and love and hope.

Dr. Crawford follows up his great primary argument from the sermon on the mount with four rather formidable-looking criticisms.

1. He finds fault with me for saying that "while with Jesus the title father is a familiar household word,"—"I do not know that there is one instance recorded of his using the title of father with reference to the world at large, or to men generally, or, indeed, with reference to any but those whom he was pleased to regard as his disciples, and to address and treat accordingly" (p. 221). Dr. Crawford knows better: he gives instances. And what are they? The sermon on the mount and the parable of the prodigal son are two of them, on which I have no more to say than I have said. They are at all events disputable and disputed instances. But there is one more, and only one, cited by Dr. Crawford. It is the conversation

with the woman of Samaria, in which God is spoken of,—not as the father of men generally, or of disciples in particular,—but absolutely as the Father (John iv. 21-24). Is this, however, a relevant instance? Does Dr. Crawford really mean it to be accepted as such? It has positively no bearing whatever on the only matter here in debate. It determines nothing as to the extent of the relation implied in the use of the absolute word—the Father. But it teaches a most salutary lesson—very much to the purpose of the question raised by the woman regarding the externals of divine service. It has a direct and pointed reference to the kind of worship which now emphatically God expects and claims. Of course he, being a spirit, always had required that "they who worshipped him should worship him in spirit and in truth." But now much more, when he is about to make himself fully known in his Son as the Father, —sustaining a paternal character and paternal relations,—"he seeketh such to worship him." I very confidently challenge this text as being virtually on my side rather than on Dr. Crawford's, if it is to be imported into our discussion at all.

2. Dr. Crawford condemns as "free handling of the language of Holy Scripture," my remark to the effect that "while our Lord is always, as it would seem, seeking to familiarise the minds of his disciples with the idea of God being their Father, he makes little use of the human analogy. *It looks almost as if he*

studiously avoided it" (p. 223). He himself, therefore, must mean to say that our Lord makes much use of the human analogy. One would look for many specific instances of his doing so being quoted by Dr. Crawford; alas! he would look in vain. There is one, however, of which Dr. Crawford lays hold as being "admitted" even by me, with my usual inconsistency. It is the use of it as an argument *à fortiori* (Matt. vii. 9, 11; Luke xi. 11, 13): "What man is there of you, who, if his son ask," etc. I thought it had been an understood principle of logic,—which, however, it would appear Dr. Crawford denies or disowns,—that an argument *à fortiori* proceeds on contrast as well as on resemblance; and while it assumes a certain measure of similitude, such as in this case I have never disputed, it is compatible with very great and essential differences. It cannot therefore prove that of the two things compared, the one is the measure of the other, or is even meant to give the analogy according to which the other is to be conceived. I think Dr. Crawford has entirely missed the scope and bearing of my "admission," and my explanation of it. My admission is that the fact of the human analogy being employed by our Lord proves, so far, the legitimacy of its use; my explanation is that, being employed in an argument *à fortiori*,—"how much more,"—it implies nothing incompatible with the highest view of sonship, but rather points in that very direction.

I adhere therefore to my statement as to the fact,—and my suggestion as to the reason,—of our Lord's reserve in the use of the human analogy. The reason is at least a probable one,—that he meant us to conceive of the relation of fatherhood after a more divine analogy than that. As to Dr. Crawford's indignation against me because I do not see, as he does, that the "human analogy is implied in every mention of 'his heavenly Father,' or 'our heavenly Father,' which at any time is made by him" (p. 225), I would only say that it is based on a mere *petitio principii*, pure and simple, the iteration of which, without one syllable of proof, seems to me to aggravate the offensiveness of his reckless imputation about "free handling."

3. But my sense of that may be greatly mollified by the compliment which my friend pays me when, "with some necessary explanations, he substantially acquiesces in my statement that 'our Lord led his disciples to form their conceptions of what it is to have God as their Father from what they saw and heard of his own filial intercourse with God'" (p. 225). So far, this is a satisfactory agreement; only there is a slight difference. I assert this as in contradistinction to the mere human analogy, Dr. Crawford asserts it in explanation of that. Christ, according to him, admirably and perfectly illustrated the working, as it were, of the general relation, in its most perfect form, not only as restored from the ruin

of the fall, but as never having been affected by the fall. Still it is "a manifestation of human sonship" alone (p. 226), "that *human sonship* in its highest type and most consummate excellence, which, in common with all other human qualities and relations, the eternal Son of God assumed when he became incarnate." Dr. Crawford still speaks as if "qualities and relations" were in the same category; or as if sonship were an attribute pertaining to one of the two distinct natures, and not a relation sustained by the one individual person. He admits, however, so far, the difference I have pointed out. But then, in reply to my objection against his view of a double sonship,—that it makes Christ, "at one and the same time, the divine son of God, and a human son of God,"—he remarks that "there is no greater mystery in his being so than is necessarily implied in his being both divine and human;" forgetting, as it would seem, that my objection rests, not on the mystery that there is in either doctrine, but on the division of the person which his view, as I understand it, involves. But this is going back on ground already trodden.

4. I proceed to the last somewhat elaborate attack on my position. It is directed against what is, after all, not a very material article of proof on my side, though I attach some value to it as an interesting corroborative illustration. I think that the identity of his people's sonship with his own began

to be more fully taught by the Lord personally, and through his disciples, after his resurrection than it had been before ; and I give as a probable reason the fact that then his sonship was conclusively, and, for his people's good, effectually "declared" (Rom. i. 4). Of course I can scarcely expect Dr. Crawford to appreciate the force of this reason, since from his point of view it has little or no relevancy ; nor is it any wonder if he should be somewhat prejudiced in his discussion of the "two passages of Holy Scripture," to which, as he says, "we are referred in confirmation of the argument" (p. 229, etc.), and on which I have now a remark or two to make.

(1.) "One of these is Hebrews ii. 11 ;" or, rather, ii. 11-15, "where it is written,—'For which cause he is not ashamed to call them brethren.'" Dr. Crawford's criticism is as follows :—"It seems evident, both from the text itself, and from the whole tenor of the context, that what the inspired writer has in view in saying, '*for which cause* he is not ashamed to call them brethren,' is, not their participation in the Saviour's heavenly sonship, but his participation in their human nature." May it not be partly both? But how does he make out his point? "The reason," "as expressly stated in the preceding clause, is,—'That he that sanctifieth, and they that are sanctified *are all of one—i.e.* of one race or parentage,' according to what is said a few verses after, that 'forasmuch as the children are partakers

of flesh and blood, he also himself likewise took part of the same.'" Surely, however, what is said "a few verses after," is not so likely an explanation of the phrase "for which cause," as its immediate antecedent, in the very same verse,—"The sanctifier and the sanctified are all of one." In what sense "of one?" "Of one race or parentage" is Dr. Crawford's gloss. But what says the apostle? In the immediately preceding verse, they whom "the captain of their salvation is bringing unto glory" are called "sons,"—"many sons." Yes, sons. For both he and they "are all of one,"—of one person,—of one father (ἐξ ἑνος, sc. πατρος.) This is the reason why he is not ashamed to call them brethren. For that he does call them brethren is proved by the three texts from the Old Testament quoted in verses 12 and 13: texts which, as in the twenty-second Psalm, begin to shine forth in their true and bright light, when he is "declared to be the Son of God with power, by the resurrection from the dead." So much, in short compass, I may say in vindication of my "free handling." But I would wish the entire passage in my fourth lecture, with the relative discourse in my Appendix (III.), to be candidly weighed.

I scarcely think Dr. Crawford's somewhat indignant question,—"Had not Christ done enough for his people before his resurrection to warrant his not being ashamed to call them his brethren?" worthy of a serious answer. Of course he had. But the

apostle refers to the crowning proof and instance. Dr. Crawford finds fault with my illustrative appeal to Heb. xi. 16 ; "Wherefore God is not ashamed to be called their God, for he hath prepared for them a city." "The word wherefore," he says, "refers to the faith of the patriarchs as described in the previous verse." Certainly it does. That is the reason on their side. But the gracious reason on God's side is that, in being called their Father, he gives them, not an empty honour, but a substantial boon. Dr. Crawford also "asks,—*Whether it be really the fact* that Christ only became not ashamed to call his people brethren after his work of redemption was completed?" Of course, knowing all that he had done, was doing, and was to do for them, he might well call them brethren all along. But is this at all to the purpose? Does it touch the heart of a text so full of heart? I scarcely think so.

(2.) "The other passage" "is our Lord's address to Mary Magdalene after his resurrection:—'Go to my brethren and say unto them, I ascend unto my Father and your Father, and to my God and your God'" (John xx. 17). I allege that here, "for the first time Jesus calls his disciples, in unequivocal terms, his brethren;" and "I shrink from any exposition of this message of love that would make it suggestive of separation or distinction."

"The force of this argument," says Dr. Crawford, "wholly depends on two positions, in neither of

which are we prepared to acquiesce" (p. 233, etc.) These are substantially that Christ did not call his people brethren before his resurrection, and that the words he now uses imply not distinction of sonship, but identification.

In regard to the first of these, I am contented simply to contrast the direct, personal, pointed word of tenderest affection to the sorrowing eleven,—"my brethren,"—issuing warm and gushing from lips so lately parched in agony and cold in death,—as if he hasted to realise the full fruit of the travail of his soul and the full accomplishment of the Father's purpose that he should be "the first-born among many brethren,"—with the vague and doubtful instances on which Dr. Crawford relies.

The texts he quotes as instances of Christ's calling his people brethren while he was on earth are two; the one (Matt. xxv. 40), in his anticipative description of the judgment; and the other (Matt. xii. 49, 50), in his embrace of all obedient hearers as equally akin to him with mother, sisters, brothers, after the flesh,—or rather more so. Whether there are two instances of his calling them brethren during the forty days, as I think, or only one, as he thinks (Matt. xxviii. 10 and John xx. 17), is really of no consequence whatever to my argument. I am sorry to be obliged, at this stage especially, to caution the readers of Dr. Crawford's book against a most unwarrantable mode of stating my views on this point.

By means of erroneous marks of citation and skilfully-adjusted fragments of sentences, he contrives to make my "free handling" look very absurd and offensive (p. 235). He quotes me as saying that even if Christ had called his disciples brethren before his resurrection, he "could have meant nothing more than that he identified himself with them, with no benefit to them, but only with damage to himself." I have not said so. If Dr. Crawford had put it thus :—that for anything that had transpired, he might have meant nothing more than that, it would not have been so gross a perversion of my words ; though still it would have been unwarrantable to give it as a quotation. I almost despair of making myself understood by Dr. Crawford if he cannot enter into the gracious import of the apostle's statement, that because now he can speak, not of his own sufferings going on, but of their salvation completed, therefore he is in a position to call them brethren with entire satisfaction, with a fulness of meaning worthy of himself and glorious for them. I would add more about this, were it not that the extracts given by him from my lecture in the immediately preceding pages of his, if read continuously, —and still more, if read in the connection in which they stand in the original,—sufficiently explain my meaning to any candid student.

As to the second position taken up by me, I have simply to observe, in reply to the authorities with whose weight he would crush me, that the only dis-

tinction for which they contend between the sonship of Christ and that of his brethren is,—that the one is originally constituted by necessity of nature, while the other is of grace; a distinction which I cordially admit, although I may doubt if our Lord meant to indicate it here;—where, as I think, oneness and not diversity is what he has in his mind and heart.

I confess my inability to understand Dr. Crawford's meaning when he seems to impute to me the absurdity of holding that our Lord's communications with his disciples on the subject of their sonship,—or indeed on any subject,—were very full and frequent during the mysterious forty days (p. 236, etc.) My argument implies the reverse, and is strengthened the more strongly the reverse is held. Little as he said to them, he began to say it by sending them a message unprecedentedly fraternal;—a message which their feelings must have made them very ready to apprehend and lay hold of as such. I am glad, however, to welcome his closing paragraph, and his allusion to the farewell prayer (John xvii.) I shrink with awe, as I am sure he does, from too familiar treatment of that august intercessory pleading. But I own I have never been able to ponder it, especially in its overmastering close, without the conviction being forced upon me, that its significancy mainly depends on his entire and thorough identification of his little ones with himself, in all that he is to the Father as his only-begotten and well-beloved Son.

PART SIXTH.—Mode of Admission into the Evangelical Sonship.

This is the subject of Dr. Crawford's eleventh lecture, on which I have not much to say.

"Without prejudice to that general relation of sonship" which is common "to all mankind, there is a special and higher sonship pertaining to those who are the 'children of God by faith in Jesus Christ.'" And Dr. Crawford, it seems, has "endeavoured to show, by an investigation of such evidence as the Scriptures afford, that there is included in this special sonship, not only a restitution of the full privileges and blessings of the filial relation to God as sustained by Adam before the fall, but also somewhat of a conformity to that adorable being—the only-begotten Son of God—by whom this restitution is effected, and somewhat of a participation or fellowship with him in the endearments of his Father's love and the glories of his Father's kingdom" (p. 240). I would scarcely gather from his previous lectures that Dr. Crawford had been "endeavouring to show" this; I heartily wish that he would. Nor do I say this in irony, but in serious earnest. For if he did, I am persuaded that he would find himself nearer me than he thinks, and less disposed perhaps than he now is to be satisfied with speaking about "somewhat of" the blessing which, I cannot but think, belongs,

whole and entire, to those who are one with God's own Son.

The mode of admission into the evangelical sonship is, as we both hold, by adoption and regeneration. I do not find anything in Dr. Crawford's statement of these doctrines calling for remark, or differing from what I give, except in so far as he objects to my making the analogy too close between the new birth of believers on the one hand, and the human birth and divine generation of the Son on the other. I may refer, as to this matter, to my Exposition of the First Epistle of John (iii. 6-9).

It is when he comes to speak of "the means of our adoption,"—or what makes us partakers of the blessing which, in adoption and by regeneration, God confers,—that he has a serious charge to bring against me. And yet it must surely be a charge arising out of a mere misunderstanding. For I cordially concur with him as to the place which faith holds in this matter, and as to the ground on which that place is assigned to it. I hold that our adoption is connected with our believing, as really and intimately as our justification; and in the same aspect or bearing; as being, not a meritorious, but only the instrumental cause of it; and not an arbitrary or discretionary condition of the bestowal of the benefit on God's part, but simply the appropriation of the benefit on our part. But I have ventured to throw out a suggestion,—which, however, has no essential connection

with my argument, though I consider it of some practical value in a spiritual and experimental point of view,—to the effect that in the matter of adoption the fact or circumstance of faith working by love may hold a place which it is not safe to assign to it in the matter of justification; and that the love by which faith works may stand in a relation to our becoming God's adopted children similar to that in which faith itself, or faith *per se* and considered as alone, stands to our becoming justified and accepted subjects. Dr. Crawford chooses to understand this suggestion as implying that I would substitute love for faith as the means of adoption; or separate the love with which, as involved in faith, I associate adoption, from the faith with which alone justification is confessedly connected. This is certainly putting as bad a construction as possible on my suggestion; which, however, he must needs do in order to find occasion for his smart stroke in a passage (p. 250), where he obligingly puts into my mouth a cross or reverse reading of such solemn texts as "we love him, because he first loved us," and "because ye are sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father."

I think I am entitled to resent such criticism as almost precluding friendly discussion. Surely it is conceivable that the love of God,—his fatherly love, adopting as well as justifying,—grasped by faith, may beget that love by which our filial standing is realised,

just as our right judicial position is apprehended by the faith from which it is inseparable. Right or wrong, my idea is nothing more than this. Since adoption is a blessing distinct from justification and superadded to it,—Dr. Crawford holds that as decidedly as I do,—since it is a transference of the entire business of God's gracious dealing with us from the region of law and jurisprudence to the domain of the affections,—there may be room in it, more than in the other, for the recognition of believing love, or loving faith, as the element in which its experience moves and circulates. And thus the full harmony and blessed union of the two gifts on God's part, and the two graces on our part, may be brought out in full development.

As an illustrative rather than a proof text, I refer to a remarkable saying of our Lord in his farewell discourse (John xvi. 26, 27) : " At that day ye shall ask in my name : and I say not unto you, that I will pray the Father for you : for the Father himself loveth you, because ye have loved me, and have believed that I came out from God." Availing myself of a passage of Scripture previously quoted, I thus briefly comment upon our Lord's saying : " The Elder Brother, having presented himself, and those whom he ' is not ashamed to call his brethren,' to their common Father, saying, ' Behold I and the little ones whom thou hast given me,'—steps for a moment aside. He declines to be a mere negotiator between his Father

and the younger members of the family, as if there were still some distance or reserve. He insists on their using their full privilege of sonship, and making full proof of their Father's heart; tasting and seeing how he loves them for the love they bear to the Son; the love which, in a sense, constitutes them sons themselves." Now I confess that this is a very brief, and therefore a very imperfect comment. I left it as it stands in the hope that it might be read and understood somewhat in the spirit of the entire lecture in which it occurs. Had I anticipated such hard-headed hitting as Dr. Crawford deals out against it, I might have given a much longer, more formal, and fuller exposition, which, indeed, I had beside me. But, even as it is, I scarcely think it warrants Dr. Crawford's severe remarks. "*In the first place*," he says, "there is no reference to the adoption of believers, either in the words themselves, or in their context." Perhaps not. But the words are prospective, and look forward to a future experience of the parties then addressed. Is it too much liberty to imagine the time come to which they point, and to read them, by way of illustration, in the light of its discoveries? Does that give any right to Dr. Crawford to say, "The Scriptures, if thus dealt with, might, as it seems to me, be made to teach anything we choose to put into them?" (p. 257). "*In the second place*," even if the adoption of believers were referred to, Dr. Crawford observes that "*their love* is not here represented as the means of their

adoption." I have not said that, nor anything which fairly implies that. Nor have I said, as Dr. Crawford thinks I have said, that our Lord's intercession is superseded and set aside. To impute any such notion to me is too absurd, in the face of the very first clause of the text which I quote. Plainly, in the view of any candid interpreter, my language might be naturally enough construed as meaning simply, — what Dr. Crawford's own paraphrase partly at least involves,— that the intercession of Christ, being truly fraternal, is not of the nature of such a sacerdotal ministry as that by means of which false priests would mediate between parties continuing unreconciled, but is meant to place them, as his brethren, on the same footing of filial nearness to the Father which he occupies himself ;—a position, however, which they never can for a moment hold, or continue to hold, apart from him, and in which they must ever be more and more fain, the more they appreciate it, to avail themselves of his pleading for them at the Father's right hand, as well as of the promise of the Spirit which he has received of the Father on their behalf. I cannot but think that there is here something more than that forgiveness of sin and acceptance of the person which we have in justification ; that there is a still closer relation in which Christ represents his disciples as standing to " the Father ;" a relation expressly connected with their " loving him and believing that he came out from God." In spite of Dr. Crawford's summary

denunciation, I must still believe and teach that, over and above the amazing grace of their participation with him, as the righteous servant, in his righteousness, the Lord points to the still more amazing grace of their participation with him in his sonship, and in the love wherewith the Father loveth him as the Son; a love embracing in its ample bosom all who love the Son, and love him because they believe that he came out from God.

PART SEVENTH.—Privileges and Duties of the Sons of God.

It is on the privileges of sonship alone that Dr. Crawford may be held to have a controversy with me in his twelfth lecture. The enumeration which he gives of them, as being—1. Security for having all their wants supplied; 2. Parental chastening; 3. Access and communion; 4. A filial spirit; and 5. A glorious inheritance,—is one to which no material exception can be taken. I have admitted in substance, in a passage which he quotes (p. 269), that they are all of them "offices indicative and expressive of an affection like that of a parent." I say, however, that "to a large extent, they *may all be classed as benignant offices of government,*" and that "they stand out in a new light, and become far more clear, specific, and well-defined, when they are viewed in connection

with *the true and proper* fatherhood of God as distinguished from what I may be allowed to call the *analogical*." This statement, especially what of it he has marked in italics, Dr. Crawford challenges. And yet, on his own showing, I do not quite see why he should. I admit, and he himself quotes the admission, that the analogy of a human fatherhood, as applied to the Divine government, is legitimate so far as it goes ; and that it may fitly enough represent the "benignant graciousness" which, as characterising that government, is manifested in detail in such acts or offices as he describes. He would have me, perhaps, to admit more, when he says : "It is doing great injustice to our argument to represent it as merely founded on analogy. We have not only 'the analogy of the human family' to build upon when speaking of the benefits above referred to as 'filial privileges,' but *the clear and unequivocal statements of Holy Scripture*,"—to what effect?—"*that all true believers are the adopted sons of God*, and consequently that they are warranted to expect from him such treatment as every adopting parent among men is pledged to bestow on the children of his adoption" (p. 270). What have we in this beyond the human analogy again after all? Of course I do not object to it, although I maintain the doctrine of "a real and proper fatherhood," more definite and illustrious, both in itself and in its fruits, than the human analogy can grasp.

The head and front of my offending here is, that I hold the relation of sonship, constituted by our oneness with the Son, to have in it an element of inviolability or unchangeableness quite peculiar to itself. Dr. Crawford meets this view, first by "a few general observations on the statement itself," and then by "noticing the passages of Scripture appealed to in confirmation of it" (p. 272, etc.)

1. As to "the general observations," he begins with assuming that I hold adoption, as such, to have in it the element alleged, "apart from the sure grounds of the covenant of grace on which it rests;" and he makes much of an "admission" on my part that a "son's standing in his earthly father's house is not absolutely and inviolably secure," since he may renounce or forfeit it. This is candid! Would any of his readers imagine that I adverted to that fact for the very purpose of pointing out the insufficiency of the human analogy as a measure or type of the sonship of the redeemed? It is hard sometimes to believe that Dr. Crawford has read what he criticises with any care. It is not any sort of sonship that I speak of, but the sonship of those who are one with Christ; and it is unfair to represent me as saying that "adoption, merely as such, implies absolute security." Dr. Crawford allows that the sonship of the only-begotten implies that, and he knows that, right or wrong, the sonship for which I plead is participation with the only-begotten in his sonship.

The notion of another sonship in the one person of the incarnate Word is not mine but Dr. Crawford's. Of course participation in that other sonship, if it existed, would not imply, of itself, absolute security ; but participation in the one sonship of "the first-born among many brethren,"—which participation "rests on the sure ground of the covenant of grace," —does, in my opinion, imply it. Dr. Crawford thinks he has proved the impossibility of such participation as I contend for ; I think he has not. That, however, is a different matter, and has been already discussed in its proper place. All I desiderate here is a true representation of my statements.

Taking the view he does of adoption, Dr. Crawford cannot be expected to see any difference between it and the other benefits of the covenant of grace, especially justification, as regards this element of inviolability. I hold, as he does, that our standing in respect of our being justified is quite as infallibly secure as our standing in respect of our being adopted ; and that the security of the former might be guaranteed altogether apart from the latter. Still I hold also that our being raised to a participation with Christ in his sonship does involve in it something that there is not in our being reinstated in the position of righteous subjects through participation with him in his righteousness ; that the one benefit is not only the fitting sequel of the other, but may also be the means of making that other as in-

violable as it is itself; and that all this may be in terms of the covenant of grace connecting the two inseparably together.

2. I need not dwell at any length on Dr. Crawford's critical examination, if it is to be so called, of the texts which I have adduced and commented on in confirmation of my view.

As to the first of these (John viii. 35, 36),—"And the servant abideth not in the house for ever: but the Son abideth ever; if the Son therefore make you free, ye shall be free indeed,"—Dr. Crawford substantially agrees with me. He makes it "matter of question," indeed, "whether in verse 35 the word '*Son*,' as well as the word 'servant,' be used *generically* to signify *any son*, or whether it be meant to denote specifically *the Son of God*" (p. 276);—a question which I do not care to discuss with him, since I might even concede the point without fatal damage to my argument. But after weighing authorities, Dr. Crawford seems not unwilling to go along with Bengel and Tholuck, and let it be the Son who is indicated in verse 35; adding, however, at the same time, that, while "his abiding in the house is absolutely certain," the certainty of it "arises from the incommunicable and unchangeable perfections of his divine nature, in which other persons, who become sons of God by creation or by adoption merely, cannot participate." Is that in the verse? Nay, the Son's abiding in the house is connected simply with

his sonship; there is not a word about "the incommunicable perfections of his divine nature." What of "free handling" now, and "the Scriptures being made to teach almost anything we choose to put into them?" As to verse 36, again, Dr. Crawford says, "It is admitted that the freedom here promised by him is such freedom as belongs to the standing of sons" (p. 276). But then he "apprehends that the sonship thus offered, in the enjoyment of which we shall be free indeed, is not to be regarded as substantially the same as his sonship;" not "*identical*" but "*analogous;*" and analogous only to his human sonship. And what is his reason for this limitation of so broad a statement? Nothing in the statement itself, but a foregone conclusion of his own, founded on his view of what sonship in believers, as distinguished from sonship in Christ, must necessarily be. The distinction, however, in regard to permanency of standing is not fairly put as against me. "The only-begotten Son 'abideth' *of himself,* as being, in the unchangeableness of his nature, 'the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever.' On the other hand, the adopted sons 'abide,' *not of themselves, but through his grace continually upholding them.*" Have I denied that? Have I said anything implying a denial of it? Of course they abide, not of themselves, but in him, as one with him, through his grace continually upholding them in their oneness with him. They are still dependent, as his creatures, on him in

whom, as their elder brother, and in whose sonship, they stand.

The second text to which I refer is 1 John iii. 9 —"Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin; for his seed remaineth in him: and he cannot sin, because he is born of God." I refer to it very briefly in the present connection, having considered it previously in my fifth lecture in another connection;—of which, however, Dr. Crawford says nothing. And I refer to it here as bringing out the element of impeccability—be that what it may—on which both our Lord in his discourse already quoted, and his beloved apostle in this passage of his epistle, appear to lay great stress;—both of them representing it as what distinctively characterises the filial state into which the new birth introduces us, and as what ensures the inviolable permanence of that state. Dr. Crawford sees in the apostle's statement "simply the general doctrine of the unfailing permanence of divine grace in those to whom it has been savingly imparted" (p. 279). But surely that is directly and very specially connected by the apostle with being "born of God," and so consequently with sonship. I refer, however, for a fuller exposition to my *Exposition of the First Epistle of John.*

The third and last passage on which I rest is not a single verse, or two verses, but a long argument (Rom. vii. viii.), the scope of which I have endeavoured at some length to bring out. It seems to me

that by fastening on a single point Dr. Crawford evades rather than meets my reasoning. He censures my way of putting briefly the apostle's climax (verse 30) — "called, justified, glorified"—"called," I say, "as sinners, justified as believers, *glorified as sons.*"

Ah! he says, this emphasised clause!—it is repeated by him again, and both times italicised,—*glorified as sons!*—what an "unwarranted," "gratuitous interpolation—"as sons,"—not in "the text"—"added without the slightest necessity or authority."

But I did not add it as anything more than my comment or interpretation, and as such I adhere to it; and I venture to say that I have proved my case by an examination of the context, which Dr. Crawford does not touch. I affirm that in the preceding verse, "being conformed to the image of God's Son, that he might be the first-born among many brethren," is set forth as the ultimate glory of the saints.

Is it not odd, I may ask by the way, that Dr. Crawford omits all notice of this verse (29th) in the quotations he gives (p. 281) to prove that "there is no particular allusion to adoption *here*," while he sets out in formidable array verses 1, 2, 11, 28? Indeed, in so great a stickler for accurate handling, it is strange to find the beginning of this "jubilant song," —"What shall we say to these things?"—in the 31st and following verses,—connected ostentatiously with verses 28 and 30; verse 29 being ignored. I would not speak of this as "so conveniently suiting the

author's purpose;" but it is noteworthy. For, in truth, verse 28 is not complete without verse 29. Why is it so certain, as a matter of knowledge, that "all things work together for good to them that love God,—to them that are the called according to his purpose?" Is it not because his purpose, according to which they are called, is his having "predestinated them to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the first-born among many brethren?" Does not this vindicate fully my climax,—"called as sinners, justified as believers, glorified as sons?" Whom he called, when yet sinners, them he also justified, upon their believing. And whom he justified, as believers, them he also glorified. With what glory? The glory of being conformed, in respect of filial standing and filial character, to the image of his Son, who is to be the first-born among many brethren. So, the "jubilant song," after full and leisurely preparation, is ushered in. Can it be anything else than the song of triumphant sonship, sung by those whom the Son makes free, and who therefore are free indeed?

I repeat, therefore, my affirmation that in the omitted verse (29th), "being conformed to the image of God's Son, that he might be the first-born among many brethren," is set forth as the ultimate glory of the saints.

I affirm, moreover, that from the fourteenth verse downwards, it is their sonship that forms the theme of the apostle's discourse, and that over and over

again (verses 17, 18, 19, 23, 24, 29) it is represented as intimately connected with their perseverance and final salvation. I affirm still further that to say "there is no particular allusion to the sonship of believers in the beginning of this jubilant song,"—so I venture to designate the close of that wondrous eighth chapter,—nor, "in the sequel of it," is to take out the very heart of the great apostle's noble commendation of God's grace and glory, and especially of its triumphant peroration. And appealing to all who are competent to interpret Scripture at once exegetically and spiritually, I am content to leave the issue, as between my censor and me, to their decision, after they shall have calmly read in full my attempted exposition and his summary condemnation of it.

I have now completed my review of Dr. Crawford's criticism on my lectures, without, as I think, leaving untouched any material objection raised by him. I hope, however, that the strength of my case will not be judged by the measure of success with which I have met these objections in detail; for in such a mode of warfare the assailant has the advantage of distracting attention from the central battlefield by various skirmishes and manœuvres about the outskirts; and the defendant, trying to meet him at all points, may lay himself open to damage in some petty by-play which does not really affect the grand

stake at issue, though it may seem and may be held to do so. Not for my sake, but for the truth's sake, and for the sake of him who is the truth, I would ask those who read this defence and vindication of the reasonings of my book, to read again in the light of it, the entire argument as it is set forth in the book itself. And I the rather ask this, because, in winding up his remarks, Dr. Crawford chooses to throw out a suggestion fitted to create a grave prejudice against the whole spirit and method of my inquiry.

He has made at last a notable discovery. He has found out the secret of my reserve in not "laying down at the outset any definition of fatherhood and sonship;" whereas "now, at the close, it appears that I had all the while something like a definition on which I was proceeding. For I now say, 'This is the peculiar benefit of sonship—this is its great radical, distinctive, characteristic property—it puts an end conclusively to probation in every sense and in every form—it secures permanency of position in the household or family of God'" (p. 282). Dr. Crawford conceives this to be "a very radical and important error" which "seems to underlie all the other errors." It is this which has led me to set aside the general sonship of all men, and to identify the sonship of believers with that of the Son of God. It is perhaps scarcely fair to represent me as arguing these great questions from the first and all through

for a special end—to serve a purpose which I do not avow till I can scarcely help it. But I do not complain of that. I simply say, in the first place, that what Dr. Crawford has quoted is not given by me as a definition of the relation in question—it being nothing of the sort;—in the second place, that I do not attach importance to mere permanence, but to permanence in union with the Son in his sonship; and thirdly, that however Dr. Crawford may isolate a single brief passage, I hope others may be able and willing to read in connection with it the entire concluding portion of my lectures;—in which I try to indicate what, to my mind, is the real glory and blessedness of that sonship of my Lord which I see exemplified in his walk on earth, and in which I seek to have fellowship with him;—a fellowship begun on earth, to be perfected in heaven.

II.

ANSWERS TO VARIOUS OBJECTIONS.

I GIVE here the substance of the preface to the second edition of my lectures ; in which I proposed to meet certain misapprehensions which had appeared in some critical articles ; my sole aim being to obviate, if possible, any prejudice that might prove a bar to the fair examination of what I would not have put forth if I did not believe it to be important and seasonable truth.

I. One charge made against me is that I hold "the incompatibility of a simple creation-standing with sonship," although I have, it seems, "made admissions occasionally" to a contrary effect. I hold no such doctrine. I have said, indeed, in my first lecture, that the "simple creation-standing" does not involve in it sonship ; but I have not alleged any incompatibility. God might undoubtedly have created intelligent beings,—angels and men,—not only capable of sustaining the relation of sonship to himself, but actually from their very origin sustaining it. If he had, I believe that his whole plan of government would necessarily have been different from what reason and revelation concur in testifying

that it is. And it must have been matter of revelation. But I do not raise any such question. I have not anywhere alleged anything like an *à priori* incompatibility of original sonship with creatureship.

But it seems that, by denying an original creation-sonship to man, not to speak of angels, I derogate from his primeval perfection.

Let it be considered, however, in the first place, that the relation of subjectship, under law and responsibility, is the same in the Second Adam as it is in the first. The Eternal Son enters into it, without derogation from his eternal sonship. Nor will it avail to say that he enters into it as having a certain filial aspect or character. Be it so. It can be so, only in virtue of the person who enters into the relation being the Son. Still it is the relation of a subject that he assumes after all, and that alone. For surely he cannot assume a second and subordinate sonship ;—which he must have done if the relation of a subject, in his case, was itself in its own nature filial.*

* I am not sure that Dr. Crawford can admit this reasoning. If he does not, I leave it to him to explain a somewhat novel view of the incarnation and atonement. I took it for granted, in writing as above, that all evangelical divines among ourselves would concur in my premises ; that the "Word made flesh" did not enter into a new relation of sonship, but did, *de novo*, enter into a relation of subjectship ; and into a relation of subjectship distinct from that of sonship. I am not yet prepared to admit that Christ, the Incarnate Son, sustains to the Father three relations : two of son ship and one of subjectship. I see no room for more than two.

Then, secondly, let the original dignity of subjectship be duly considered. What really is it? Is it not conscious personality, in the presence of a personal God, apprehended as such? Let that thought be duly weighed; the pronouns "I" and "thou," interchangeable and interchanged, between my Maker and me.

The one only living and true God calls into existence creatures capable of standing face to face before him; beings like himself, whom he, a person, can address as persons; with whom he can have personal intercourse; to whose personal wills, intelligent and free, he can communicate and submit his own will. Apart from sonship, that is what is implied in the creation of angels and men, after his own image,—intelligent, upright, free. The relation thus constituted is surely, in its origin and nature, a very high and holy one. And if preserved in its integrity, it is capable of indefinite development. From the first, it admits of fellowship of the closest and most intimate sort; altogether friendly, and having much in common with what is filial. And it tends towards the filial. It culminates naturally in the filial. It is seen to do so when allegiance to it is tried and proved;—or when the failure of such allegiance is remedied by an adequate method of recovery.

For let it be observed, in the third place, that my whole reasoning out of Scriptures proceeds upon the idea of sonship being really the mould in which the intelligent creation of God is originally cast;—and

in which the unfallen and the redeemed portions of it were from the first destined to be perfected. The agency of the Son in giving them existence points in that direction. It affords a presumption that the beings whom the Son made capable of knowing and doing his Father's will, were meant ultimately to be partakers with himself in his own filial standing, and in his filial manner of communion with the Supreme.

II. It is asked how, according to my view of their sonship, "the relation of believers' sins to the work of Christ" is to be explained. It is "believers under the gospel" that are meant; "for these now, through regeneration and faith, have fellowship with Christ in nature and sonship-standing."

My answer is that I hold the work of Christ to have precisely the same relation to the sins of believers under the gospel, that it has to the sins of believers under the law. The efficacy of his blood, as cleansing from all sin, is alike and equally applicable to both classes of sinners.

But I "affirm that Christ's atoning work has to do only with law and justice." And this, it seems, implies that "filial sins are not answered for" in that work.

There is surely some strange confusion of thought here. If by "filial sins" we are to understand sins committed by those who are sons of God by redemption, regeneration, and adoption,—these are without doubt pre-eminently sins which need to be "answered

for" in the work of Christ. They are indeed most aggravated sins. But aggravation is a circumstance or accompaniment of sin, and does not touch its essential nature. By whomsover committed, and under whatever aggravation, sin is, as John defines it, "the transgression of the law" (1 John iii. 4). It is never anything else, anything more, or anything less. It is in that aspect of it alone that it is judicially dealt with by God; and it is in that aspect of it alone that it is judicially answered for by Christ. And let it be particularly noted that, as the context proves, it is with special reference to believers as sons of God that John gives this definition of sin. It is "filial sin," in the sense of its being a son's sin, that he has specially, if not exclusively, in his eye. Even a son cannot sin otherwise than by transgressing, as a subject, the law. And his sin can have no other expiation than that which meets and satisfies the demands of the law which he has transgressed.

This view is confirmed by another passage in John's First Epistle (ii. 1, 2)—"My little children, these things write I unto you, that ye sin not. And if any man sin, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous : and he is the propitiation for our sins : and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world." The possibility of a child of God sinning is assumed ; it has just been most emphatically asserted that he does sin (i. 8-10). And now it is intimated that when he sins, he has no other

propitiation on which to fall back but that which is common to all,—that which is available for the entire race of mankind. He transgresses the law; and he has nothing for it but to have recourse anew, as the whole world may have recourse, to that atoning work of Christ which deals with all sin, his sin and the world's sin, in exactly the same way;—in the way of satisfying the law of which sin is the transgression, and fulfilling all its righteousness.*

It is indeed, I repeat, a strange confusion of thought for any theologian to fall into,—this notion of aggravation affecting the essential character of sin. We must have regal sins, judicial sins, fraternal sins, and so on indefinitely, all answered for, as such, by the great atonement. Where is this to end? But worse than all this, We have the atonement itself emptied of all its virtue. For if it is not a strictly legal transaction, and exclusively so, it is absolutely nothing as an atonement. It has no meaning, if it is anything else, or anything more, than a pure and simple dealing with sin as "the transgression of the law."

III. It is alleged that in Scripture "the work of Christ, in respect to men as fallen, ever takes the form of a recovery of what has become lost, or a restitution of things to their normal, their original type;" "although," it is added, "in the process of restoration, and by reason of the higher potencies

* See my *Exposition of the First Epistle of John*, in loc.

with which it brings humanity into contact, there is at the same time an elevation, a kind of transfiguration of all its primal elements and conditions." "But," it seems, "if a relation different in kind from that established in creation were introduced by the appearance and mediation of Christ, then redemption is something else than the recovery and sublimation of the old ; it forms, so far, a strictly new commencement."

I have nowhere said that "a relation different in kind from that established in creation was introduced by the appearance and mediation of Christ." I have said the very reverse. I have asserted and argued that the original creation-relationship of intelligent and responsible beings had in it the germ and promise of the higher filial relationship, in the case of all who should prove themselves obedient ; that in all probability the angels who stood the test of allegiance, whatever that might be, under which their companions sinned and fell, were thereupon invested with the character of sons ; and that our first parents, had they been as faithful, would have been invested with the same character, for themselves and their posterity. In both instances, this result would have been reached, altogether irrespectively of "the appearance and mediation of Christ." I hold indeed that "the appearance and mediation of Christ," or, as I would rather put it, the incarnation and obedience of the Son,—working out the problem of highest

sonship's compatibility with hardest, lowest, most excruciating service,—does open up, for unfallen angels and redeemed men, a view of their position which they could never otherwise have had, and does enable them to realise it as they could never otherwise have done. Has any sound theologian ever written—will any evangelical theologian now venture to argue—against that? Doubtless, as regards men, the plan of salvation is remedial. But is it remedial merely? Does it simply place redeemed men where created man was at first in Eden? No. "It sublimates as well as recovers the old." Be it so. May not the sublimation be the development of what the old would have become, if the old had had fair play—and the development of that, more fully and gloriously by far than it could have been developed, even if the old had had fair play?

IV. It is alleged that, according to my view, "the incarnation becomes essential even apart from the atonement, or whatever we may include in the idea of salvation,"—since "it was only through the manifestation of the Son"—of course his manifestation in the flesh is meant—"that either angels or men could attain to the proper ideal of their creation." I have never said that, or anything implying that. On the contrary, I have sought to prove that the unfallen angels did "attain to" sonship,—"the proper ideal of their creation,"—and that man, had he not fallen,

would have attained to it,—without "the manifestation of the Son;" that is, without his manifestation in our nature and for our redemption. That both angels and men attain to the "proper ideal of their creation" more fully than they could have done if there had been no fall, no incarnation, no redemption, is not surely doctrine to be condemned.

V. But I am "in danger of pressing one specific relation so as to place its teaching at variance with what is meant to be imparted by another." I cannot quite understand how this should be, when I simply discuss the question, Is the fatherly relation which God sustains to his believing people a natural and original one, as the relations of ownership,* authority, and right of judgment undoubtedly are? Of course it is a relation consistent with these others; and be-

* In connection with the thought which this word suggests, I venture to ask, What are we to make of Paul's language in the ninth chapter of his Epistle to the Romans, especially from the twentieth verse downwards? Is it language very consistent or easily reconcilable with the notion of the original relation in which intelligent creatures are placed, by the mere fact of their creation, being one of sonship, or one that implies sonship? Is it thus that one would be disposed to speak of a father's manner of dealing with the different members of his family? To my mind, the doctrine of absolute sovereignty in election, there asserted with such awful emphasis, seems all but conclusive of the whole matter here at issue. Of course my argument is with Calvinists, or with those who hold that Paul's discourse in this passage applies to individual men, and not merely to nations.

lievers need to be reminded that "the Father" upon whom they "call" is none other than the God "who, without respect of persons, judgeth according to every man's work" (1 Peter i. 17). But is it not a relation having in it something over and above any relation of that sort constituted immediately and *ipso facto* by creation?

The allegation I refer to is especially strange when taken in connection with the implied assertion that all relations are comprised in "Jehovah being the God of any one." That view undoubtedly obviates all risk of relations conflicting with one another; and for an obvious reason; it makes the whole subject of the footing on which the saved are with God altogether vague, indeterminate, undefined.

If the question of relationship between God and his intelligent and free creatures is to take shape, as having in it the elements of anything like a distinct solution, it must be treated as a complex question. It must be resolved into a question about different relations. And the danger of one relation being so pressed as to interfere with another must be fairly faced. I have tried to face it; with what success others must judge. But it will not do to evade it, nor will it be of much avail to merge all relations in one. I believe, and hold, that there are two distinct relations which rational beings, as such, are capable of sustaining to the Supreme,—that of subjects or servants, under authority and law, capable originally

of holding loving intercourse with their sovereign lord, and also capable of being raised to a higher platform, if proved to be obedient; and that of children or sons, placed on that higher platform when probation is over, and placed there in company and in union with the Eternal Son. I am at a loss to see how either of these relations can be fairly held to interfere with the other. They met and were harmonised in the person of the man Christ Jesus. I cannot see how they may not meet and be harmonised in the person of every saved spirit.

VI. It is said that "the Sonship" of the second person in the Godhead is "identical with his divinity," and must therefore be incommunicable precisely as his divinity is incommunicable: the creature cannot share in either. Surely there is a fallacy somewhere in this statement. For it seems to militate against there being any such thing as a real distinction of divine persons. The "generation" of the Son, and the "procession" of the Spirit, if admitted to be from everlasting, force us to recognise some ground,—beyond the mere divine essence itself which the Eternal Three have in common,—for their occupying different positions, and sustaining different offices, with reference to one another. In other words, relation, if it imply what I have now expressed, is not to be identified with nature. Divine sonship is not therefore identical with deity. There lies beneath the notion of son-

ship something distinct from the divine nature, considered simply in itself and as such;—something determining the Second Person to be the Son and the Third not to be the Son.

I do not profess to throw any new light on the mystery of the Trinity; nor do I wish to enter into the very subtle reasonings in which some defenders of the orthodox faith used to put forth their logical and metaphysical ingenuity. All I wish to show is this,—that, upon any other than the Sabellian hypothesis, which virtually makes the distinction of the persons nominal and nothing more, there must be a separation of the Son's filial relation,—not in fact, of course, but in idea,—from his divine nature. His being the Son is something distinct in conception from his being God. That is enough for my purpose. For it follows that the notion of the relation being in some sort communicable, does not imply that the nature is so. It cannot be proved that, in holding the possibility of intelligent creatures being partakers of the Son's sonship, I must be convicted of holding the possibility of their being partakers of his essential godhead. Of course I do not speak of his moral nature as the Son. My view is, that they partake of his filial character as well as his filial relation. But that does not make them partakers of his proper divinity.

Is it not worthy of notice, in this connection, that whereas the relation of the Second Person in the Godhead to the First is fully unfolded, not in word only,

but in the exhibition of actual personal intercourse, and so unfolded as to suggest the possibility, not to say the probability, of our participation in it—the relation of the Third Person in the Godhead to the First and Second Persons is revealed, if revealed at all, only in the most vague and abstract manner ;—and indeed in a manner fitted, it would almost seem studiously, to preclude the notion of our having anything to do with it? The contrast surely is striking. In the case of the Holy Spirit, we have no discovery whatever of any available practical value as to his relation to the Eternal Father. We have enough to make us worship him as we worship the Father and the Son. But we have nothing that can bring us into personal union and communion with him. This, indeed, is the characteristic principle of the ministry of the Spirit (John xvi. 13-15). He does not "speak of himself." He "glorifies the Son." And he does so by bringing out and pressing home that feature in the Son's ministry which distinguishes it from his own ; its being the ministry of one who can do what he cannot do ;—who can make us partakers of his own relation to the Father.

The ministry of the Spirit is not thus at all disparaged. It is rather honoured. For it is his office to make us partakers of the new filial nature, which alone can fit us for being partakers of the new filial relation. He dwells in us as he dwelt in Christ ; the Spirit of God's own Son. Still, the distinction is

worthy of remark. The office of the Holy Spirit being limited to the application of the redemption-work, does not require for its execution any explicit disclosure of his own relation to the other persons in the Godhead. The office of the Son is different. It is to accomplish the redemption which the Spirit has to apply. This explains the unfolding of his relation, as contrasted with the *reticence* in the case of the Spirit. But the explanation holds good only on the ground that his sonship is a relation in which his people are made one with him.

VII. There is one point on which I am disposed to modify an opinion which I have expressed in my lectures. It refers to the invocation in the Lord's prayer; "Our Father." I am inclined to admit that, inasmuch as the fellowship of the disciples with their Master in respect of sonship was not clearly revealed when he gave this form of invocation, he could not intend it then for himself and them conjointly. The Son told his brethren to say "Our Father" before he fully told them of his oneness with them and their oneness with him in their saying so. That we may use the invocation now, as having communion with the Son in the use of it, I have no manner of doubt.*

* I might probably have omitted this part of my preface but for Dr. Crawford's strange reference to it. I am less inclined than I was to the modification here indicated, and more disposed to retain my original idea on the subject. Of course, the point is of no real importance, as regards my argument.

I think I can see a remarkable education of the disciples, as to this matter, in our Lord's phraseology while he was with them in person. He familiarised them with the use of the term "Father" as applicable to the Supreme Being;—and that, too, after an altogether new and unprecedented fashion. "My Father"—"Thy Father"—"Your Father"—these are expressions always on his lips in his intercourse with those whom he regarded as his own chosen ones, and in his intercourse with them exclusively. What do they mean? He kept up a distinction till he was in a position, at his resurrection, in which he "was not ashamed to call them brethren." During the days of his flesh it was for the most part "my Father"—"thy Father"—"your Father." But his resurrection puts an end to the distinction, as kept up till then. The Epistles admit of no fatherhood but such as is common to Christ and his people.

III.

CHARGE OF OSIANDERISM.

HAVING given the substance of what I thought it right to say in the preface to the second edition of my lectures, with reference to some of the strictures which had then appeared,—I do not know that I would have added anything more in the same direction, but for the appearance in an influential journal* of an article in which my name occurs. That article, understood to be from the pen of an acute and able Scottish theologian, does not profess to deal with my lectures, or with the views which they embody, as a whole. It touches only a corner of the subject. The question which it raises—Was the incarnation necessary apart from the existence of sin?—is not one which I have discussed at all; it never having occurred to me that it had any bearing whatever on my argument, or could in any legitimate way be mixed up with it. I admit, however, that if my teaching can be proved fairly to involve an affirmative answer to the question, I must own myself defeated and cry *peccavi;*—though I would be disposed in that case still to main-

* *British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, January 1866, article sixth: "The Incarnation—was it necessary apart from the existence of sin?"

tain that the fault must lie, not in the doctrine which I advocate, but in my manner of advocating it. Perhaps I might reasonably complain of the fragmentary and summary mode of treatment to which I am subjected; making it difficult, I confess, to catch the meaning of the criticism and reply to it. But I say no more of that.

The reviewer first alludes to me—for I gather from what comes after that it is to me that he alludes—in the following ominous sentence: "Osiander held a theory in regard to justification, analogous to one which has recently been propounded in regard to adoption" (p. 137). This formidable-looking charge is flung out *apropos* to the statement that "among the Reformers the subject"—that is, the subject of the incarnation—"obtained some notice, not as a separate question, but in connection with the great doctrine of justification by faith." It is flung out quite incidentally and without either proof or explanation; unless indeed the few words in which Osiander's heresy is described are to be so regarded: "He maintained that believers are justified, not by the imputation of Christ's mediatorial righteousness, but by the imputation (?) of his own proper, personal, essential, and eternal righteousness, as the Son of God." That is literally all he says about the matter.

I have tried in vain to discover or to guess wherein the analogy which he asserts consists. I have consulted his references to Dorner and Calvin, not to

speak of Osiander himself as quoted by competent authorities; and I am still at fault. The only conjecture I can form is that the reviewer holds the theory of adoption being a part of justification, involved in it or inferred from it, and not a distinct and separate benefit; or else that he regards it as equally with justification, and in the same sense, a forensic transaction on the part of God, needing to be based, like justification, on a legal satisfaction.

Even on that supposition, he accuses me wrongfully. For in the first place, I make adoption quite as much as justification an outward act of God towards us—a sentence pronounced by him upon us —and not an inward grace infused into us. And, in the second place, I connect it quite as closely and immediately as justification is connected with our union to Christ by faith; the only difference being that in justification faith grasps Christ as the righteousness of God freely given by God, the righteous Judge, to be Jehovah our righteousness, whereas in adoption it grasps him as the Son of God, freely given by God, the gracious Father, to be our elder brother, the first-born among many brethren.

That is not surely a doctrine about adoption analogous to Osiander's about justification; it is indeed the very opposite. True, I believe adoption to be a different transaction on the part of God from justification, as our standards teach. And I believe it to be in its own proper nature, not like justification, a

judicial and legal adjustment of the Supreme Ruler's controversy with us as his guilty subjects, but something over and above that, indicating and giving vent to the overflowing of his fatherly love,—to his Son in the first instance,—and then to all who are the brethren of his Son. But what of that? Is there anything in it of the mystic dream that puts away the objective element in theology and revels in subjective experiences alone? I say most confidently there is not; unless it shall be maintained that Christ is revealed and proposed as the object of faith in no other aspect of his mediatorial character and work than that which makes him the doer of a certain work that is to win for us pardon and personal safety;—a reproach which has sometimes been unworthily cast upon the Calvinistic and Evangelical system, but for which only too much occasion will be given if such suspicious and narrow criticism as I have in my view shall obtain countenance and sanction.

I write strongly, because I feel strongly. For I am firmly persuaded that not the privileges of sonship alone, but the obligations of holiness, are apt to be put in peril if the Christ with whom my faith deals —or with whom I in believing deal—is to be nothing more to me than the bringer-in of a righteousness such as rectifies my forensic state and standing before God. I bless God that he is so. I welcome him gladly and embrace him heartily as being so. Were he not so, he could be no saviour for me. My con-

science, awakened by the Spirit to an apprehension of God's holy majesty and adorable sovereignty and truth, never can be satisfied unless I see in Christ divine justice satisfied, my heavy guilt expiated, and my title to life secured by his gracious propitiation and perfect obedience in my stead. That grace I first and chiefly need; give me that, or you give me nothing. But just in proportion as I value this inestimable boon, and place it first and foremost among the things of God for which my soul craves, I would have it bound up with all the fulness of God that dwells in Christ. He must be to me an atoning sacrifice and justifying righteousness: else, I repeat, he is no saviour for me. But I am most sure of his being all that to me when I see him to be far more than that; when I apprehend him as taking me along with him, not only in the fellowship of his merit, as God's righteous servant, by the knowledge of himself justifying many (Isaiah liii. 11), but in the fellowship of his high and holy dwelling in the Father's bosom, as his only-begotten and well-beloved Son.*

* I would refer here to a statement of Dorner's, on the subject of the incarnation, which seems to me to be very suggestive: "Everything concentrates itself here, in the last instance, in the question whether the sole point of importance in the Christian religion is the impersonal, the, as it were, *thing-like* (dinglich) 'meritum Christi:' or primarily and permanently the person itself,—the 'meritum,' however, through the person,—and that as a divine human unity, not as a mere theophany, not as a mere organ." In a footnote to this sentence he remarks further: "The opposed view bears a Sabellian character, in so far as, regarding Christ as a mere

I do not know that I would need to add anything more in the way of remark on the article I have been noticing, were it not for what the reviewer says when, mentioning me by name, he distinctly charges me with holding, by implication, the view which he condemns, as to the incarnation being necessary even if there had been no sin. He is pleased indeed to compliment me in high terms, and to absolve me personally from the blame of understanding what I write about. My own opinions, it seems, are sound in detail, though the "theory" which I advocate on the whole is of dangerous tendency (p. 139). I must disown alike the flattery and the apology; for I cannot acquit the reviewer of misrepresentation. He "would maintain that if the sonship of the intelligent creation entered into God's idea of the universe, and if all sonship be based on the incarnation, then, upon

means after the redemption of all who believe has been accomplished, it retains a completely useless, dispensable person, which Sabellianism then, with greater consistency, allows entirely to disappear" (*Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, divis. ii. vol. iii. p. 247, Clark's F. T. Library). I am not to be understood as endorsing Dorner's opinions on the ground and necessity of the incarnation; but I think the passage I have quoted suggests an important distinction between two ways of viewing Christ as our Redeemer, towards the former of which even evangelical preaching has perhaps sometimes tended. Our standards clearly teach the latter; making everything turn upon real and living union with Christ personally. What I plead for is simply the recognition of that union in its full completeness, as being union with Christ in all the offices which he executes, and all the relations which he sustains, as the incarnate Son of the Father.

the supposition that Adam had never sinned, it is not easy to conceive how the sonship of the intelligent creation, which entered into God's eternal counsel as part of the plan of the universe, could have been carried out except by the incarnation." Of course not. It needed no ghost to tell his readers or to tell me that. I must be the most stupid of all mortals, in spite of my worthy friend's eulogium, if I could not see the remorseless cogency of this syllogism, without his elegant logical statement of it in formal mood and figure. But, unhappily for the minor premise in this "hypothetical reasoning," I have never said that "all sonship" either is or must be "based on the incarnation." Not only so :—I have said the very opposite explicitly, repeatedly, and emphatically. No doubt the reviewer puts the matter more correctly, though certainly not as I would put it, when he gives my idea thus—"that intelligent beings are not the sons of God by creation, but only become so by participation in the eternal sonship of the second person of the Trinity, 'as it exists in the Godhead.'" Even there, however, his inference—that this "idea" "seems to require as its proper theological complement" the obnoxious tenet in question—is altogether unwarrantable ;—unless indeed he will undertake to prove that in all the resources of infinite wisdom and power no other possible way, except the incarnation, could have been found or devised for making known the relation of

the Son to the Father with sufficient clearness to admit of obedient subjects, upon proof of their obedience, being enabled by grace to understand it, and according to their capacities to enter into it. Here, in spite of its being a negative proposition, the burden of proof lies on the reviewer; and to prove such a negative he will find to be a hard enough task to occupy him for a while before he returns to the more grateful work of demolishing me.

But, all lightness apart, I would in most serious earnest ask those divines among us, like the reviewer, who may honour my lectures with a fresh perusal, in the view of the explanations I have attempted to give, to let my arguments and statements occupy a subordinate place in their regard, and to consider if there be not some aspect or aspects of gospel truth set forth, however doubtfully and defectively, such as, with advantage to the cause and the church of God, may in other hands admit of fuller and safer development. Again I disclaim all novel speculations. I do not think I have advanced new doctrine. And I do not expect that my book, such as it is, will be considered an authoritative or standard work on the subject of which it treats. My end will be gained, and I shall be more than repaid for my anxiety and toil, if it prove suggestive and bear fruit in the minds of students and preachers able to do greater justice than, at my age and with my defective learning, I

can do to the entire scheme of God's loving designs and dispensations with reference to his intelligent offspring, as that scheme is unfolded, in a greater variety of lights than perhaps we "dream of," in the revelation of his manifold wisdom and love.

IV.

ALLEGED NOVELTY OF THE VIEWS ADVOCATED IN THE LECTURES.

In dealing with this allegation, it may be proper to explain in what sense and to what extent I disclaim it as unwarranted. Of course, if I had not thought that I might be enabled to throw some new light on the subject chosen for my lectures, at least in some aspects of it, I never would have presumed to choose it. I did not aim at originality, far less at innovation; but it had occurred to me, in the course of some study and not a little meditation, that while there was a very general agreement in substance among evangelical teachers in regard to it, there was still wanting something more in the way of orderly exposition than the church possessed;—a *desideratum* virtually acknowledged by Dr. Crawford himself, as well as by others among my critics.

That being my impression, I resolved to begin with what seemed to me to be the first principle of the whole inquiry,—the fundamental or ground relation involved in the creation of intelligent beings; and from that starting-point to proceed onwards to the highest perfection of their ultimate standing, as revealed and asserted in the dispensation of the

gospel. I was not, as I was well aware, following exactly in any beaten track, and could scarcely therefore expect to find formal and express confirmations of my successive statements ready at hand for quotation. I may say, however, that I never advanced any statement without being satisfied in my own mind that it was really in accordance with the opinions I had received from the teaching of the soundest divines. And though I did not care to encumber my book with an array of authoritative extracts,—which, being often incidental and indirect, might have required explanations to bring out their bearings,—I indicated in my preface the sort of backing which I claimed from the general consent of Christian authorship. And I expressed a hope as to the treatment which, in that and other respects, my lectures might receive ; a hope not altogether unreasonable, I think, in the circumstances.

It will be understood, therefore, that in the passages which I now bring together, I do not pretend that there will always be found an explicit affirmation, in so many words, of what I may have advanced, in the precise form in which I have put it. This is not to be expected from authors not treating formally of my theme, or not regarding it from my point of view. Their corroboration, however, of my views is only the more valuable on that account, though it may seem to turn rather on the sense and spirit of what they say, than on their exact words.

1. I begin with Goodwin. I quote him as bringing out the essential distinction that there is between the relations of man to God in Paradise and under the gospel respectively; begging the reader to give full weight to the connection which Goodwin asserts between this last and the sonship of Christ.

I make this request all the rather because in his Appendix, Dr. Crawford (p. 314) has given a passage from this author, alongside of an extract from Pearson, in order to deprive me of the benefit of an influential name. But it is a futile attempt; for his quotation does not really touch or meet mine. Pearson and Goodwin, in the passages cited by Dr. Crawford, are "contrasting," as he puts it,—I would say distinguishing between,—the sonship of Christ and that of his people. Of course, I admit and insist on the distinction, very much as these distinguished divines state it, in so far as concerns the manner in which the relation is constituted,—and in some respects also the manner in which it is realised, if I may use the phrase,—in the case of the Eternal Son and that of his adopted brethren respectively. I may not accept all their expressions and interpretations, but in the substance of their doctrine I agree.

In spite, therefore, of Dr. Crawford's counter-citation, I still solicit attention to the following passages, which bring out Goodwin's view of the sonship of believers, as quite separate from any sort of

universal creature-sonship that may be imagined, and as intimately connected with the sonship of Christ.

Writing of the superiority of the future state of the redeemed, as compared with man's position in Paradise, he says:—"I grant that this new spirit, begotten of the Spirit, is of a more divine temper, genius, and aspirement than the image of God in Adam was, which though holy, yet (was so) but in a natural way; in knowing God in and by the creatures, and by the covenant of works, and so only according to what is naturally due unto a creature reasonable, as he first falls out of the hands of his Maker. And I should not only grant that this new divine nature, born of the Spirit, is supernatural, in comparison to corrupt nature and the dispositions thereof, but also in comparison of pure nature. Insomuch as Adam was but an earthly natural man, comparatively to that which is born of the Spirit, which is the image of the heavenly, and is ordained in the end to see God in himself, and will be raised up thereto; and at present hath such a way of knowing and enjoying God, and such object spiritual suited to it as Adam's state was not capable of."—*Works*, vol. vi. p. 161, Nichol's Edition.

More particularly, in another passage, he uses language so strong, that I would hold any controversy with him on the subject, if that were conceivable, to be little better than logomachy. "Adam was the son of God by creation (Luke iii. 38). But to be a

son of God by Christ, this is a higher thing, and puts the spiritualness upon it which a holy heart values. For it is to be a son-in-law by marriage unto, and union with, the natural son of God. So then the spirituality of our sonship lies in that relation it hath unto Christ."—*Works,* vol. vi. p. 180.

And still more strongly, if possible, in yet another passage, he contrasts the servant and the son :—" So in like manner to be begotten again notes a state of sonship, a being truly made a child ; for if God begets, he begets genuinely, it proves always a true child of his begetting ; and whoever is born of God hath his image, his nature, or as the apostle speaks 'true holiness' (Eph. iv. 24). They (*i.e.* apostates) are said to be sanctified (Heb. x.), for that may have a counterfeit—namely, a setting apart to outward service by gifts and enlightenments ; but to show it is not true sanctification, or after God in true holiness, they were never said to be born of God. They as servants live in the family, are put into offices and services, and to that end do receive gifts and graces to lay out as talents (Matt. xxv.), which, not improved, they lose, but being not made children, therefore it is they abide not always in the house, as Christ speaks (John viii. 35)—'And the servant abideth not in the house for ever ; but the Son abideth ever.' They are hired servants, not begotten children. They have gifts from him as a lord, but not his image as from a father, and

so are never said to be begotten."—*Works*, vol. vi. p. 154.

2. As bearing on the same subject, the intimate connection of Christ's sonship with that of the believer, I give the following passages from Athanasius.

In his epistle on the Decrees of the Council of Nice (ch. 31) he thus writes :—"And Christ would have the sum of our faith to refer to this, for he commanded us to be baptized, not in the name of the unbegotten and the begotten, nor in the name of the uncreated and the created, but in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit ; for thus being perfected, we too are truly made sons ; and naming the name of the Father, we recognise from this name also the Word, who is in the Father. And though each one of us may call our father his own father, we must not therefore equal ourselves with the Son by nature. For even this is said of us through him : for since the Word bore our body, and was made in us, it follows that on account of the Word in us God is called also our Father. For the Spirit of the Word in us addresses through us his own Father as ours ; and this is the mind of the apostle when he says, 'God sent forth the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying, Abba, Father.'" And again, in his second oration against the Arians, he says :—"And this is the love of God to men, that of whom he is the Maker he also afterwards became by grace the Father ; and he becomes so when the men whom

he has created, as the apostle says, receive into their hearts the Spirit of his Son, crying, Abba, Father; and these are they who, having received the Word, receive power from him to become sons of God; for otherwise they could not have been sons, being by nature creatures, unless they receive the Spirit of him who is the true and natural Son of the Father. Wherefore, that this might be, the Word was made flesh, that he might make man capable of receiving the Deity. . . . From this it may be shown that we are not by nature sons, but the Son in us; and again, that God is not our Father by nature, but (the father) of the Word in us, in whom and through whom we cry, Abba, Father. And just so, too, in whomsoever the Father sees his own Son, them also he calls sons, and says of them, I have begotten; since to beget, is the sign of a son, and to make, of creatures. Wherefore we are not first begotten but made; for it is written, Let us make man; but afterwards, receiving the grace of the Spirit, we are said thenceforth also to be begotten. . . . And when men are by grace said to be begotten as sons, yet not the less are they by nature creatures." *

* See also Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity*, book v. sec. 56; where that "judicious" divine, in the course of a somewhat abstruse discussion of the relations in the Trinity, brings in, as connected with that topic, the sonship of believers,—without apparently recognising any other sonship,—under the idea of "the union or mutual participation which is between Christ and his people."

3. The following remarks of Schleiermacher, however doubtful his authority may be held to be, are not without interest. He makes adoption a part of justification; but he pleads for a high sort of adoption;—"As to the second element (of justification), it is not possible that Christ should live in us without his relationship to his Father also forming itself in us, and our thus partaking in his sonship, which is the power that he gives to become the sons of God; and this includes in it the guarantee of our sanctification. For the right of sonship is to be educated, to be free fellow-workers in the affairs of the house; and the natural law of sonship is that by means of the vital connection also likeness to the father developes itself in the child. Thus, too, both elements are inseparable; for a divine adoption without forgiveness of sins were null, since guilt begets fear, and that again bondage; and by forgiveness without adoption no constant relation to God would be established. Both in this inseparableness make up the complete reversal of our relation to God, which is only called forgiveness in so far as it is connected with the putting off the old man, and adoption in so far as it is connected with the putting on the new. And both, too, are so mutually conditioned one by the other, that each element may be viewed both as the earlier and the later; for on the one side it would seem that the feeling of the old life must first be blotted out before that of the opposing

new life can form itself. But, on the other side, it is only in the new that there lies the right and the power to shake ourselves free from the old. Thus it can be said with equal correctness, after a man's sins are forgiven he is received into the sonship of God, and after he is received into the sonship of God he receives forgiveness of sins."—*Christliche Glaube,* ii. pp. 194, 195.

4. Nor may it be out of place to quote from Treffry a specimen of what he frequently though incidentally says in his book on the Eternal Sonship :—

"The first Adam upon his fall 'begat a son in *his own* likeness;' and so 'the image of the earthy' is set upon his entire posterity. He was the type and model of that degenerate and corrupt condition which was introduced by his sin. It is the office of the second Adam to give back to a lapsed race the forfeited image of God. Nor is he, as the Son of God, the renewer only of the miserable state of man, but equally the type and model of the new creation. Such he is, both with respect to personal purity, and in his eternal filial relation. It is not without reference to this that the faithful are called *sons of God;* for the entire administration of the gospel is designed to establish, between the human spirit and God, a moral relation in some respect analogous to that which subsists between the divine Father and the divine Son.

"This was one of the objects contemplated in the

incarnation of the Son ; that thus he who was inconceivably remote from us might be brought near to us ; and that, beholding the glory, 'even of the Only Begotten from the Father,' the process of assimilation proposed in the divine counsels might be accomplished in us. Hence, 'when the fulness of the time was come, God sent forth HIS SON, made of a woman, made under the law, to redeem them that were under the law, that we might receive the ADOPTION of SONS. And because ye are SONS, God hath sent forth the SPIRIT of HIS SON into your hearts, crying, ABBA, FATHER.' He who by nature is the Son of God becomes the son of man, that we, who by nature are sons of men, may become the sons of God. He assumes our nature that we may be transformed into the likeness of his. The SON is sent forth as our Redeemer, that we may receive at once the *filial relation* and the *filial Spirit*."*

5. As regards the difference between sonship in the Old Testament and sonship in the New, I avail myself of a criticism of Delitzsch on Psalm lxxiii. 15. "'The generation of thy children' is the totality of those in whom the filial relation in which God has placed Israel to himself has become an inward reality, the Israel of God or the generation of the righteous (Psalm xiv. 5). It is a generic name, as in Deut. xiv. 1, Hosea ii. 1. For hereby is the New Testament

* Page 403, 404, edit. 1837. The italics and capitals are Treffry's own.

distinguished in this point of the υἱοθεσία from the Old, that always in the Old Testament only Israel as a people is called son—or as a totality of individuals, sons. But the individual could not yet venture to call himself a child of God. The personality is not yet set loose from the race, it is not yet independent, it is still the time of the minority."

6. With reference to the subject of adoption, Justin Martyr, after quoting from Isaiah xlii. 1, 4, "Behold my servant," etc., goes on to say, "As then, from that one Jacob, who was also called Israel, your whole nation is called Jacob and Israel, so we who keep the commandments of Christ from him who has begotten us to God, namely Christ, are called and are the true children of Jacob and Israel, and of Judah and Joseph, and of David, and of God." . . . "And when I saw that they were amazed at my saying that we are the children of God, anticipating their question, I said,—Hear, sirs, how the Holy Spirit speaks of this people, that they are all the sons of the Highest, and that this Christ shall be present in their assembly,—executing judgment on men from every nation." He then quotes Psalm lxxxii. 6, 7, "I have said, Ye are gods ; and all of you are children of the most High. But ye shall die like men, and fall like one of the princes ;" and remarks upon the difference at the seventh verse between the LXX. and the original Hebrew. He understands by "men," our first parents, and by "one of the princes," Satan. But he

adds that, however this may be interpreted, it is no matter to him, for "the Holy Spirit reproaches men," on the ground that whereas they "might have become even like God, free from suffering and death, if they had kept his commandments and were deemed worthy by him," in that event, "to be called his sons,—yet being like to Adam and Eve, they wrought death to themselves." And so, however we may explain the matter, it is clear that "they were deemed worthy to become gods, and were deemed worthy also to have the power of becoming sons of the Highest; and they will be both judged and condemned by themselves," —separately and independently, on that footing,—"as Adam and Eve also were" (*Dialogue with Trypho*, c. 123, 124). Justin Martyr, it would appear, did not assert an original sonship as belonging to men, but only a capacity, as it were, of sonship, on certain terms and conditions.

7. Bengel, on the word "Father" in Matt. vi. 9, writes to this effect:—"Never, in any clear and certain instance of invocation, is this mode of address a usage in the Old Testament; for the examples which Lightfoot has collected" from Jewish authorities "are either unlike and irrelevant, or modern and recent, proving only this one thing that the Jews had come to call God 'Father in heaven,'—which formula" or form of adoration, "Christ truly animates," or inspires with true life; for "it is the glory of believers in the New Testament so to pray. In this place accordingly is

the foundation laid for praying in the name of Christ (John xvi. 23). Whosoever is able to call upon the Father"—upon God as Father—" is able to ask all things." And on Luke xi. 1, with reference to the request of the twelve, " Lord, teach us to pray, as John also taught his disciples," and the Lord's answer to their request, Bengel remarks as follows :—" John had taught his disciples to pray, but not so that they might call God Father, although in other respects the formula or form of John was not far different from that of Christ. It was reserved for the Son of God to give this power or privilege to his own. He had given it already (Matt. vi. 9), but he had intermitted for a time—or ceased—exhorting his disciples commonly —or in common—to such praying . . . until they had made sufficient proficiency in the knowledge of the Father and the Son : which being accomplished, he in the end opened up to them all the riches of the fulness of the privilege of praying to the Father in his own very name of the Son " (John xvi. 23).

8. On the use of the Lord's prayer in the ancient church, Bingham observes that " it was an honorary privilege allowed to none but communicants, or complete and perfect Christians. . . . All catechumens or persons unbaptized were absolutely debarred from the use of this prayer ; they were not allowed to call God 'our Father' till they were regenerated and made sons by the waters of baptism." He quotes Chrysostom, who, in his *Homily on the Paralytic,* says—

"Before we have washed away our sins in the font of the holy waters, we cannot call God 'our Father;' but when we return from thence, having put off the load of our sins, we say, 'Our Father who art in heaven.'" Hence Bingham adds—"Upon this account this prayer was peculiarly called εὐχὴ πιστῶν, . . . because none had a right to use this prayer but only such as had a right to communicate at the altar, and there hear it daily repeated" (*Antiq.* b. ii. c. 7, sec. 9). Witsius bears testimony to the same effect, and quotes Theodoret in confirmation of the fact (*De Oratione Dominica*, Ex. vi. c. 18). Of course the value of this fact is not affected by the superstitious notion about baptism with which the usage was connected. It is clearly seen what sense the fathers of the early church put upon the invocation in question.

9. Omitting other authorities, I appeal now to Calvin. In the "Catechism of the Church of Geneva" (*Tracts*, vol. ii. p. 40) the question is asked, "Why do you call him Father?"—Answer, "Primarily with reference to Christ, who is his Eternal wisdom, begotten of him before all time, and being sent into this world was declared to be his Son. We infer, however, that as God is the Father of Jesus Christ, he is our Father also." Question, "Why do you call him the only Son of God, seeing that God designs" (deigns?) "to bestow this appellation upon us all?"—Answer, "That we are the sons of God we have not from nature but from adoption and grace only; in other

words, because God puts us in that place (John i. 12). But the Lord Jesus, who was begotten of the substance of the Father, and is of one essence with the Father (Eph. i. 3), is by the best title called the only Son of God, because he alone is his Son by nature (Heb. i. 1)." Question, "You mean then that this honour is proper to him as being due to him by right of nature, whereas it is communicated to us by gratuitous favour as being his members?"—Answer, "Exactly. Hence, with a view to this communication, he is called 'the First-born among many brethren' (Rom. viii. 29)." See also p. 75, on the invocation of the Lord's prayer.

It is admitted that in his *Institutes* Calvin does not formally discuss the subject of adoption. But two things are to be noted as to his teaching about it. In the first place, in describing with very considerable fulness the original state of man as made in the image of God, and in possession of his favour, Calvin makes no reference whatever to sonship as forming any part of his constitution or any element in his standing; there is no hint of anything like a filial relation, or of anything beyond intelligence and freedom, combined with holiness and righteousness, in a position of probation under authority and law (lib. i. cap. 15). And in the second place, whenever he speaks of redemption, Calvin brings in the idea of sonship; and he invariably connects it with the sonship of Christ (lib. iii. cap. 2, sec. 32, etc.)

V.

THE PLAN OF REDEMPTION MORE THAN REMEDIAL.

In considering the question—Whether the plan of salvation is remedial only, or is that and something more—it is important to distinguish between the nature with which man was originally endowed and the position which he was appointed to occupy in relation to his Maker. It is in the latter aspect of it alone that the question crosses my path or touches my argument.

So far as man's original nature is concerned, either in its essential characteristics of intelligence, conscience, and free will, or in its variable properties of knowledge, righteousness, and holiness, my line of thought raises no controversy. I hold, with all Protestant divines, that man was created a pure and perfect moral being, wanting in no element necessary to his consummate excellency and blessedness as a self-conscious, reasonable, and responsible agent. All the principles and faculties of his constitution having been depraved and dishonoured by the fall, his recovery from that ruin consists in their restoration to their pristine immaculate virtue. A distinction, indeed,

must be admitted between primitive untried innocency and ultimate confirmed obedience ; for the new birth in the regenerate must not only re-edify and re-adorn the broken image of God in their moral nature, but must infuse, as it were, into it such an increase of strength and vital power as may make it proof against the newly-acquired knowledge of evil, as well as the old liability to temptation ;—whether from within, as in the case of angels, or from without, as in the case of men. Still all this is in the line of the original constitution impressed on man's moral nature at his creation. It is, strictly speaking, the restoration of that constitution to its original perfection, and nothing more. For I do not imagine that saints in glory have any new capacity of knowing and loving God beyond what Adam had in paradise ; nor can I regard the enhancing of that capacity, through a larger communication of the divine will and the divine nature, as in the least detracting from its primal worth, or as implying any change from what it was from the beginning.

But man's original position, viewed as determining his relation to his Maker, is quite a distinct thing from his original moral nature, viewed as determining his affection towards him. The distinction is so obvious that I need not stay to define or describe it, and it is such as to warrant an equally-marked distinction as regards any comparison that may be instituted between the economy of heaven and

the economy of the garden. It is no impeachment of the original perfection of man's moral nature to say that his state, or standing with reference to God, was not, in the same sense and to the same extent, originally perfect. In fact, it cannot be alleged to be so, unless it is maintained that the perfection of a moral agent's position relatively to his moral governor is his being upon probation ; in which case that must be the position of saints in glory, and must continue to be their position for ever. In this respect they are again simply where Adam was before he sinned and fell.

No doubt their position may be safer than his was, just as their moral character may be firmer and more matured. The circumstances also of their location may be improved ; reptile influences and solicitations may be excluded ; a more efficacious tree of life provided ; and more potent grace imparted ; so that by these and the like means and appliances their position may be rendered absolutely secure. In some such way the pledge and promise of everlasting life may be fulfilled, by what may be fairly regarded as nothing more than a return or restoration to the old paradisiacal state, analogous to the recovery of the old paradisiacal nature.

But does any evangelical theologian accept this as a true and full account of the standing of the redeemed hereafter in heaven, or even of their standing now on earth ? Certainly none who admit the

evangelical doctrine of justification by faith,—not to speak of its Calvinistic corollary, the perseverance of the saints,—can with any consistency do so. According to their divinity, we who believe are not merely placed again upon probation, as Adam was at first. That for us is past and over, in virtue of our interest in him who has on our behalf fulfilled all righteousness. Explain it as they may, they must concede to us, not only better means and better help for securing our old standing recovered and regained, but a standing such as, in one important respect at least, is distinctively new. It is a standing in which there is not only no risk of failure upon trial, but no trial making failure a possible contingency; or, in a word, no trial, properly so called, at all. We are not simply kept safe in a position that is in itself hazardous and precarious; we occupy a position from which every conceivable element of precariousness and hazard is, by the very constitution and conditions of its establishment, conclusively and for ever shut out.

Is this anything else than a new relation to God?—not the perfecting of an old one, but the forming of a new, one;—to which perhaps the old may have pointed, more or less clearly, from the first, as to its fitting crown and consummation, but with which the old is not to be confounded or identified;—seeing that the two are in some particulars radically diverse from one another?

One more question remains,—Is not the diversity

brought out in the contrast which may be drawn between our position of mere subjectship upon trial, in the first Adam, and our position of approved subjectship, culminating into sonship, in the second?

This appears to me to be the real state of the question, in so far as it has any bearing on the subject of my lectures. And I might be satisfied with having thus merely stated it, were it not that it has come to pass, I scarcely know how, that in some quarters a prejudice has been created against my line of argument, as if it tended in the direction of certain subtle speculations which the mediæval logic of the schools imported into theology, and of which, it seems, modern German pantheism is apt to take advantage. On this account I offer a few additional remarks, simply for the purpose of rescuing what seems to me a great and vital truth out of these supposed entanglements.

I must, in the first place, protest against the notion that the popish doctrine of the *donum superadditum,* or superadded grace, has anything to do with the question which I discuss concerning the sonship. That doctrine has respect exclusively to the nature or character of man, not at all to his standing. It was invented to explain away the corruption caused by the fall, making it consist in the mere withdrawal of what was no part of man's original constitution, but a gift bestowed over and above that, the withdrawal of which simply left him

as he was when first made. Its proper theological place is under the head of "the want of original righteousness."* It has no meaning in any other connection than that now explained. So irrelevant indeed is it to the question of my lectures, that it does not hinder Bellarmine from holding an original sonship,—in which opinion he is opposed by Witsius (*Covenants*, i. 3. 26). In fact, it might be shown that, if it had anything to do with the matter at all, the popish dogma lies rather on the side of those who advocate an original sonship, if they allow it to have been compromised or forfeited by the fall. But there is no connection whatever between the two questions. I am free to assert against Rome, as strongly as any one, the original perfection of man's nature in itself, and apart from any superadded gift of grace; though as regards his standing or position, in relation to his Maker, I venture to doubt or deny his original sonship.

It is on this last point alone that the only issue in which I am concerned is raised. And quite apart from any mystical and transcendental fancies of fantastic type or dreamy allegory, in which the later fathers and the schoolmen may have indulged when treating of paradise and its arrangements, the issue may, in the language of Scottish theology at least, be briefly enough explained.

It is maintained, apparently, by some authorities

* See Cunningham's *Historical Theology*, vol. i. pp. 516, etc.

of great weight, that the creation-state of man was absolutely perfect in such a sense and to such an extent as to preclude the idea of its prefiguring, or in any way pointing to, any higher condition or relation in store or in reserve for him. This, it seems, is implied in what is said about the Creator beholding all that he had made and pronouncing it very good. It is a large inference that is thus drawn from so summary an indication of the divine approval. Certainly the complacency with which God rested from his creative work proves, on the one hand, that there was not in it any fault or flaw of any sort, such as sin too soon brought into it; and on the other hand, that the whole economy connected with it was perfectly adapted to the purpose contemplated when God made man after his image and placed him on probation in the garden. Such relative perfection, — perfection relative to the end in view,—is surely what is meant; not such absolute perfection as would shut out the possibility of progress, or even of change. Those to whom I refer do themselves admit progress; and in particular they hold that the redemption-state is an advance on the creation-state, inasmuch as, first, the creation-state from the beginning, in the paradise that was lost, held out the prospect of indefinite increase of holy blessedness,—a prospect realised progressively in paradise restored; and, inasmuch as, secondly, the gracious and wonderful manner of the restoration may well be supposed to impart to the restored state a

higher character than the original state could ever have had. This last ground of superiority is not at all necessarily, or even naturally, connected with the opinion that, apart from the existence of sin, the incarnation of the Son must have taken place ; for it rests on no *à priori* hypothetical reasoning on that point, but on an *à posteriori* inference from the accomplished fact. It is the first of the two propositions that may seem to admit of debate. And yet, when fairly put, I do not think it should. At all events, it is not a proposition which it concerns me specially to uphold ; for it is admitted to be one very generally held by sound divines without reference to any opinion about the sonship.

And indeed I do not see how it can be altogether denied, in consistency with the theology of the covenants, or of probation in any form. I do not raise any question of typology. I would not speak of any typical or figurative meaning to be found or imagined in Eden itself, or in its constitution and its ordinances ; although surely, without prejudice to the strictly historical character of the whole economy, the Sabbath, as its principal religious rite, may be supposed to have pointed then, as it does now, to some state more analogous to the rest of the Creator than the working upon trial to which his servant was set in the garden. But I ask if there are not circumstances in the account of the creation-state, most literally understood, that favour the idea of its pointing for-

ward to a distinctively higher state to be reached through obedience,—rather than the idea of its being itself virtually the final heaven, admitting only of such continuous, unbroken progress as there will be room for when it is realised in the coming eternity?

Of course, it is not a question of places, but of states. The locality of the higher state pointed forward to might have turned out to be identical with that of the creation-state pointing forward to it; as the locality of our future heaven after the resurrection may be this very earth we tread now.

But is heaven really to be nothing more than paradise restored? Is it to be a fenced enclosure, with forbidden fruit in the midst of it? Certainly that is not what the Apocalyptic description, with its ever-open city and ever-accessible tree of life, suggests to my imagination; nor is it what my faith and hope look for at the coming of my Lord.

I cannot, I own, conceive of our first parents being placed in a state of trial and probation without a hint of some better thing being prepared for them as the issue of their faithfulness; something more than growing contentment, as they became more and more reconciled to their present position, precarious as it must be at the best, and to the last; something that would put an end to trial and probation and its precariousness altogether, and place them on a different footing with the God they served; in a word, a new state into which they might be ushered when their

faithfulness had been long enough and well enough tested. In fact, I cannot conceive of the possibility of a state of conditional trial and probation, turning upon a formal command and prohibition, without some indication being given of its being preliminary and preparatory to a quite different state from which that element is to be excluded.

May not this partly, at least, explain the power of Satan's temptation, "Ye shall be as gods,"—(or "sons of the Highest," as the parallel expression runs in Ps. lxxxii. 6),—as being a temptation to snatch prematurely and unlawfully "the recompense of the reward," which in the Lord's good time and way would have become theirs? Be that as it may, it does not seem very consistent with the doctrine of the covenant of works to maintain that it held out nothing more, as implied in its promise of life, than the mere continuance of such life as they already possessed, with only such sort of gradual increase of blessedness as may take place in the final state of glory. Witsius argues elaborately in favour of a different view (*Covs.*, b. i. c. 4); a view substantially in harmony with all that the doctrine of the fatherhood, as I advocate it, requires for its support, at least against any present objector.

VI.

NATURE AND AUTHORITY OF THE MORAL LAW.

It might seem almost necessary to offer an apology for dwelling so much as I have done in my first lecture on what may be thought by some to be very elementary principles. But they are, in my view, very vital. And there is in many quarters a strange incapacity to apprehend or unwillingness to admit them. I shall give an instance, by referring for a little to a recent work bearing this title, *On the Fatherhood of God*, by Thomas Griffith, A.M., Prebendary of St. Paul's (1862).

I may premise, however, that I regard the title as altogether inapplicable to the book, and fitted, though of course not intended, to mislead. It is not the fatherhood of God at all, as it seems to me, that the writer discusses, but an entirely different subject, the moral government of God.* This is his formal definition or description, at the outset of his treatise :— "I mean by this phrase that we must conceive of God as no mere universal Breath, and no mere blind

* This remark applies to other treatises ; as for instance, to a large portion of Dr. Crawford's volume, as I have shown in my "Reply."

Force, but as a Personal Will endued with wisdom and goodness, the intelligent Author, moral Governor, and righteous Judge of all things" (p. 5). That, and nothing more, is what he sets himself to "assert, vindicate, and establish." And he is consistent throughout in holding to this view of God's fatherhood. Over and over again he repeats it. Thus he says :—"In his relation to us, God is all that a Father can be to his children ; not alone the Author of our being, but our moral Governor, our righteous Judge" (p. 84). Again he speaks of "the working out of a universal system of retributive justice, or paternal government" (p. 184). Mark the identification of "retributive justice" with "paternal government." In another place, he formally explains the matter thus :—"The Fatherhood of God, in its widest sense, is of vast extent. It comprises his upholding all things by his power ; his prescribing to them their laws of action by his wisdom ; his keeping up throughout the universe one vast system of paternal administration in pursuance of one purpose of eternal good" (p. 214). But I need not multiply quotations.

As an exposition and defence of the moral government of God, the work of Mr. Griffith is one of considerable value. It contains some striking enough arguments and illustrations in proof of the personality, authority, and will of God. I think it is defective in the views given of moral evil, the manner of its en-

trance into the world, its effects, and the method of its cure.

Perhaps its defectiveness in some of these particulars may be partly explained by the opinion which he seems to hold on the subject of law, an opinion which appears to me to be erroneous and dangerous.

He is dealing with objections to the fatherhood of God,—that is, to the doctrine of there being a living will concerned in the government of the universe,—taken from the fixedness of order and the prevalence of law. He proves that interference with law is no part of a paternal government as thus explained :—"The true idea of God's Fatherhood is that of the government of a constitutional King, who is the embodiment and executive of *law*, who sits at the helm of *law*, and superintends the working of *law*, as himself the fountain of *law*,—with no personal caprices, no personal interferences, no mending of defects by sudden incursions of *ex post facto* will, but providing against defects by the quiet constancy of an ever-present purpose underlying and actuating all things" (p. 182).* I am not quite sure that I understand these closing words. But let that pass. It is what comes after that I am concerned to notice. He goes on to argue for what he calls "a universal system of retributive justice, or paternal government" in connection with law ; and he lays great stress on its being universal.

* The capitals and italics in all the quotations are the author's own.

"A system of *universal* retribution is being carried out by the divine will, not in one direction only, but in all; not with reference to personal character merely, but with reference to all the actings of life throughout the universe. And according to this system, we are amenable not only to the so-called, in a narrow sense, Moral laws, but equally to the Mechanical laws, the Physical laws, the Mental laws, all the laws which regulate, each in its own department, universal being. All equally have their sanctions, which must be enforced; all equally their authority, which must be vindicated by reward when they are attended to, by punishment when they are interfered with" (pp. 184, 185). He enlarges on this topic; placing as it seems to me, obedience to all these different kinds of law precisely on the same footing in respect of obligation and title to reward, and disobedience also to all of them precisely on the same footing in respect of culpability and ill-desert.

This is his answer, and his only answer, to the objection that "God does not adapt his dealings with us to our notions of moral justice." In reality, as might easily be shown, it is no answer at all; since it leaves the ineradicable craving for justice as unsatisfied as ever, and the enigma which perplexes it as hard as ever. But that is not to my present purpose. I wish rather to point out the fundamental error which runs through all this reasoning. It is a very serious one. It strikes at the root of conscience

in man and judgment in God. It resolves all virtue in the creature into prudence; and all government in the Creator into the mere action and reaction upon one another of the forces of the universe. I can scarcely think that this writer is fully aware of the real import of his statements and reasonings, or of the extent to which he commits himself to the doctrine of Combe's *Constitution of Man;*—though really, his argument, as an answer to the objection with which he is dealing, has not even any shallow speciousness unless he means to put exactly in the same category, as a fair antithesis, the ill-desert of a "godly man," who, "through negligence or ignorance, violates the laws of physical life;" and the good-desert of an ungodly man who, "whether intentionally or not," "fulfils the laws of his organic system." It is very sad to see a Christian divine trifling so egregiously with the solemn and awful term, the solemn and awful thought—"retribution;"—applying it equally to what follows from a man's falling on the ice and to what follows on his uttering an oath or an untruth.

I might ask, in this connection, what does the writer mean when he talks of "the so-called, in a narrow sense, Moral Laws?" Is it that the term "Moral" should be used in a wider sense, as applicable to the "Mechanical laws, the Physical laws, the Chemical laws," equally with the laws, or the law, of duty, commonly designated by that name? I cannot understand him to mean anything else.

And yet, if that is his meaning, he commits an egregious logical, or ethical, fallacy, and what is worse, surrenders the entire principle of the moral government of God.

There is a logical fallacy here which imposes upon many. It is admitted that the natural laws—embracing under that phrase the mechanical, physical, and chemical laws—fall within the range of the moral law; as indeed "all the laws which regulate, each in its own department, universal being," necessarily must do. In other words, we are morally bound to have respect to the natural laws which are observed to operate in the created world, and to keep them in view, as ordinances of the Creator, in the regulation of our conduct. Ordinarily also we are bound to act according to these natural laws—to act so that their operation shall benefit and not hurt us. But the obligation to do so does not arise out of these laws themselves; nor is it measured or determined by them. It is not constituted by these laws. It belongs to another category altogether;—the category of a higher law; a law which, being itself unchangeable as the nature and will of the Supreme, must rule me always in my dealing with these other laws, and may compel me often practically to set them at defiance. For they have no standing beyond the material creation; and consequently they have no right to control the immortal spirit in its allegiance to the Creator. The

hero, the patriot, the philanthropist, the martyr—even the enlightened self-disciplinarian seeking his own highest perfection—may suggest obvious instances in point.

But the logical fallacy is the least evil involved in the loose way of talk in which this author, with many others, indulges. To extend the term "Moral" to these natural laws, is not really to exalt the latter, but to debase and destroy the former. If my obligation to keep the laws of the Decalogue, or the two commandments which are its sum, is of the same sort as my obligation to have respect to the law of gravitation—if the one is neither more nor less moral than the other—then duty, as "*a categorical imperative,*" on the part of God, and responsibility, as conscience toward God on the part of man, become mere names. Government, properly so called, is out of the question. The entire system of "universal being," in the midst of which I find myself, from its lowest to its highest range, is still no doubt a system in which, after a sort, law prevails, and order is upheld by law. But it is a kind of self-acting law, working out its end by the equable pressure of its various departments on the various constitutions, and constitutional powers and susceptibilities, of those under it; enforcing itself or avenging itself in the same way upon all, from the meanest monad to the loftiest archangel; and so ultimately securing universal conformity to the purposes of the great

Creator. That may be a theory of the universe satisfactory to some minds. But it cannot be satisfactory to any who defend, as this author does most strenuously, and in the main successfully, the view of the Creator which represents him as a real living person, ruling real living persons made after his image ;—ruling them by the assertion of his rectoral authority as their sovereign over them, and their accountability as his subjects to him.

On the whole, I conclude that the only safeguard of morality and religion, the only defence of human duty and the divine throne, is to keep the moral law clear and distinct, as being radically different, in its essential character and nature, from all the generalised observations of fact which have been suffered to usurp, or allowed for convenience to borrow, the name ; and I would add, almost as a corollary from that, to keep clear and distinct from one another God's necessary government of moral beings by law and judgment, and his free fatherhood.

VII.

MAGISTERIAL AND PATERNAL GOVERNMENT.

A SINGULAR and striking confirmation of the view given in my first lecture, on paternal as distinguished from magisterial rule, is to be found in Locke's *Two Treatises on Government,* and in the two works of Sir Robert Filmer, Bart.,—his *Observations, etc.,* and his *Patriarcha, or the Natural Power of Kings* (1680),—to which Locke's Treatises were a reply. The Baronet's brochures are of little worth. Their only value is that they called out such an antagonist, and gave that great man occasion for not only destroying his opponent, but erecting a stronghold on the side of liberty that has never since been shaken. I cannot enter into details. But I may note it as a significant fact that Sir Robert's fundamental position makes all government paternal, and that he builds upon that position the most unrestricted doctrine of absolute power that has ever been propounded in an enlightened age. Passive obedience and non-resistance are his cherished tenets. The right of kings to make laws and overrule laws, to command their subjects as they see fit, with no counter-right of opposition recognisable in any circumstances whatever, is pled to the most extreme point. And the basis of

the whole pleading is the idea of a paternal government. All government, according to him, is originally paternal; and as being so, it is hereditary. He has great difficulty in tracing the hereditary line of descent. The inextricable complexities of ever-changing dynasties, empires, kingdoms, commonwealths, puzzle him somewhat. But in spite of facts his theory carries him through, just as the High Church theory of apostolic succession carries divines through in the face of all historical embarrassments. The High Church divines contrive, in spite of endlessly-doubtful ecclesiastical genealogies, to invest the modern bishop with all the prerogatives belonging to what they hold to be the primary episcopate. And so also Sir Robert, as representing the ultra-loyalist party of his day, makes no scruple about placing all existing legitimate kings in the position of the first parent of our race, and assigning to them the very same sort of authority which, according to him, Adam had over his family begotten of his loins and living under his roof. And what follows, according to Sir Robert's logic? Nothing short of the most absolute right, on the part of all kings, to treat their subjects, who are their children, as dependants wholly at their disposal, without natural privilege or claim of any sort, beyond what a mere infant, or a mere boy, has in the household of his father. No other warrant is needed for the cruellest tyranny on the one hand, and the tamest acquiescence on the other. Hence

the zeal with which Locke repudiates the paternal theory of human government, and insists on its being based on another principle; a principle which by no means, as some suppose, excludes a divine ordinance as sanctioning human government, but only makes the actual carrying out of the divine ordinance dependent instrumentally, as it must always ultimately be, on the consent of the community.

Of course, the only point of analogy here between the human government and the divine, is the necessity that there is for an entire separation and seclusion of the paternal element from the proper and original ideal of both. Whether the government rests immediately on the sovereignty of God, or mediately on the consent of men, makes no difference, as regards the present question. In either case it is a government based fundamentally on mere law and judgment, and altogether exclusive of the paternal relation or the idea of fatherhood. The intrusion of that relation or idea, when it is human government that is to be considered, inevitably leads to tyranny, for the popular voice is excluded. When it is the divine government that is to be considered, it introduces a corresponding disorder; not in the way of establishing tyranny, but rather in the way of tending to anarchy; for in that case the absolute divine supremacy, in virtue of which God necessarily vindicates his just rule, is practically excluded.

For there are at bottom only these two opposite

ways of working out the theory of all government being paternal, and paternal only. In the case of human government, it exempts the governor from the obligation of observing as well as enforcing righteous laws, and so gives him a discretionary power which he may push to any extent of severity. In the case of the divine government, it does the same thing, but with an opposite issue. It makes the Divine Governor independent, in his government, of his own righteous law ; and so ascribes to him a discretionary power which he who ascribes it may push to any extent of laxity. The only security for liberty in human governments, and for authority in the divine, is the recognition of the principle,—and the recognition of it as a first and fundamental principle, —that the foundation of all government is law, in the strict forensic sense of the term ; and that the essential function of all governors is to administer law, and to administer it judicially and not paternally.

VIII.

COMMUNICABLENESS OF THE DIVINE SONSHIP.

As my view of the communicableness of the original divine relation of sonship lies at the root of my whole argument, and as it is that which has appeared most startling to some who heard the lectures, I may be excused if I add a few words of explanation, with reference specially to the second.

One chief difficulty here lies in the apprehension that we may lower the original divine ideal of sonship, as subsisting from all eternity in the Godhead, by reducing it to the level of a relation which may have a beginning, being formed in time; and a relation, moreover, in which a mere creature may be a party, or a partaker.

The difficulty, I fear, when the question is once raised, cannot be very easily evaded or set aside. The fact or phenomenon of Christ's sonship in his incarnate state must be fully met; and it must be met according to the ordinary doctrine concerning his humanity—that is, on the assumption of his being "both God and man, in two distinct natures, and one person, for ever." The difficulty does not arise when it is a question as to nature, for the two natures, the

divine and the human, exist in the one person, the man Christ Jesus. But it does arise when it is a question as to relation. How does the one person stand related to the Father? In what sense is he his Son?

I might here, as I think, roll over the question upon those who hold the original relation between God and his intelligent creatures, whether angels or men, to have been filial. I might ask them to dispose of it according to their view. When the eternal Son became truly and thoroughly man, he became of course man, as sustaining that original filial relation to the Supreme. Is that his sonship, since then, until now, and for ever? Has it come in the place of his own proper eternal sonship? Or are the two identical? What has become of that original filial relation, which is alleged to be the birthright of the intelligent creature man, in the man Christ Jesus? Is it lost? Or does it still attach to him? If so, to what effect? *Quid valet?* Or is it absorbed and merged in the higher sonship? Then does he not so far cease to be man? Is this not something like the heresy of his manhood being swallowed up in his divinity?

But, besides, in this view, it is surely worthy of remark that, with reference to the end or design for which the Son became incarnate, he is never represented as discharging filial obligations on our behalf, or answering for breaches of filial duty. His whole work of righteousness and atonement has respect to

our standing as subjects and servants under law to his Father as our moral governor. If we sinned and fell as sons, I do not find anything, either in the Old Testament types or in Christ's New Testament fulfilment of them, to satisfy me that our case is met. This is an important consideration, to which, in another connection, I may have occasion afterwards to advert more fully. I mention it here by the way; yet not I think altogether irrelevantly, as regards my present point.

It is more natural, however, here to ask how, admitting the eternal distinction of persons in the Godhead, it should in the least detract from the position of the Son—how it should not rather enhance the glory of it—to believe that at the instance of the Father, and with the concurrence of the Spirit ("I speak as a man"), he should have created intelligent beings, originally subjects, as all created beings must be, and nothing more, yet capable of becoming sons, as he is? So he truly creates them after his own image; sons of God potentially, in respect of faculties to be tried and developed; more truly than he could have done by making them sons on a lower footing and after a lower pattern.

It surely is a great and ennobling thought, that the Eternal Son of the Father should create intelligent beings, not to be sons of God originally in any inferior sense, in respect simply of their intelligence, but to be capable of becoming sons of God, in and

with himself, upon their intelligent recognition of him in that character. I am more and more persuaded, the more I think of it, that the notion of the created state of angels and men being filial, not only deranges the entire economy of legal and judicial government on the part of the supreme God, but detracts from the dignity and destiny of these intelligences, as originally made by the Son in his own image, and detracts also from the glory of the Son, as making them in his own image, with a view to their being ultimately sons, as he is himself.

In particular, as regards man, I would wish this question to be considered, Whether the incarnation does not force upon us the idea of a sonship for humanity altogether new?—a sonship after the type, not of Adam, but of Christ? I am anxious to press that question. I am anxious especially to press it with reference to the notion which some seem to have, that this is arrogating too much to the creature; that it is putting the creature in fact on a level with the uncreated one, the creator.

I might raise a counter-question, What are we to say of the uncreated one, the creator, putting himself on a level with the creature? The incarnation has two sides on which it may be looked at.

But apart from that rejoinder, is it really investing the creature with any properly divine attribute or prerogative to say that, in virtue of a divine act and work; an act of divine sovereignty—a work of

divine power; he may come to be regarded by the Father in the same light in which his Son is regarded by him: to be the object of the same complacency, and the subject of the same reciprocal love?

I repeat here that this is wholly incompatible with anything like a wholesale, universal, and indiscriminate elevation of the entire human family into the filial relation, or "related state," in virtue of the incarnation. That seems to be the opinion of some Anglican divines of the school of Maurice. I contend, on the contrary, for individual personality, and individually personal dealing, in this whole matter. The Father owns the incarnate Son as the man Christ Jesus, having a distinct individual personality. And in him he owns, not manhood in the abstract, nor all men *en masse*, or in the lump, but men one by one, as one by one they are moved by his grace to consent to their being to him what his incarnate Son is.

IX.

IMMACULATE SINLESSNESS OF CHRIST'S HUMAN NATURE.

On the subject of our Lord's humanity, and its entire exemption, in virtue of its origin, from all taint of the guilt or the corruption inherited by all the rest of Adam's race, the voice of the church has been always clear and unanimous. I do not, therefore, consider it necessary to cite authorities in proof; I rather wish to indicate the reason why, in common with almost all the theologians of all ages, I attach great importance to the doctrine.

If the question regarding it is to be isolated, it may seem to be unimportant. And, for some purposes, it may be convenient to isolate it. The isolation of it may suit the views of those who do not care to inquire too particularly into the precise nature, either of the ruin caused by the fall, or of the deliverance effected by Christ.

For, on the one hand, if the fact of Adam's fall is denied; or if the effect of it, as entailing on all his posterity guilt and corruption,—a righteous sentence of condemnation and a thoroughly depraved nature,—is under-estimated; the question vanishes altogether;

or, at least, becomes one of comparative insignificance. But then, on the other hand, in that case, the ideas of redemption, atonement, propitiation, substitution, are apt to disappear also, growing thin and hazy till they melt into the dim obscure. I do not say this of the words; for theologians of the misty school are fond of using the current orthodox and evangelical phrases. Nay, they affect a peculiar fervour in the use of them, and appropriate, as in a high sense their own, statements in Scripture and in the creeds which speak, as we have been accustomed to read them,—and speak most explicitly and unequivocally,—of expiation by blood. But then their high sense is very indefinite, transcendental, undefinable. Indeed, they avow their dislike of definition. They refuse to say exactly what the work of Christ for men is. That by his obedience and suffering—his life and death—he has removed, in some manner they know not how, an obstacle of some sort, they know not what, which must otherwise have stood in the way of man's restoration to the Divine favour and his attainment of peace of conscience—that is nearly all the length to which they are inclined to go, in explaining what is meant by such precise modes of speech as Christ's "laying down his life for the sheep," or his "giving himself a ransom for many." At the same time they dwell rather generally on the grace and condescension of the Son in his humanity; and on some mysterious efficacy, as it would seem, which that holy,

loving, lovely humanity of Christ has to assimilate humanity in us to itself; and so, in a sense, to redeem, and purge, and elevate the nature which he has assumed,—the flesh in which he has come.

Now it is not wonderful, that to those who thus conceive of Christ's redeeming work, or who in any other similar way virtually divest it of its atoning character, the question,—Whether it was human nature as it was in Adam before he fell that Christ took, or human nature as it has ever since been in Adam and all his seed?—may present the aspect merely of an unmeaning dispute, or an unhappy logomachy. Nay, the view which represents him as assuming our nature, exactly as it exists in us, and having it sanctified in himself, exactly as it needs be sanctified in us, really fits into their notion of the way in which he saves us, and the way in which his saving us should influence us, better than the other.

But the case is quite reversed when we regard Christ's sufferings and death as, in the strict and proper sense, piacular; when we conceive of him as redeeming sinners by actually suffering for them, the just for the unjust; taking their place under the law which condemns them, and bearing in their stead the condemnation; submitting to the penal infliction of divine wrath in their room;—when, in a word, we introduce the idea of substitution. Then the doctrine of our Lord's humanity being that of Adam, not as Adam made it when he sinned and fell, but as God

made it in the beginning, is all important. It is vital.

If Christ is himself personally involved in the consequences of the fall, he cannot redeem, by substitution, others in the same predicament. He must be, in his birth, and in virtue of the miracle of his conception, what no other born of woman ever was, or could be declared to be, "The Holy Child Jesus." Such an high priest became us, who is not only "holy, harmless, undefiled," in heart and character and life, but "separate from sinners" (Heb. vii. 26);—separate from sinners in his very manner of being or becoming man; separate originally; and therefore able to save them by dying in their room.

Here I may remark, in passing, we have one explanation of what is apt to perplex or scandalise an uninformed and unreflecting onlooker, when a case of heresy has to be met in the church, whether in controversy or by discipline. A very small and narrow point seems often to be chosen. The tug of war is about a minute corner of the field. Apparently, no central or essential truth is touched. And this occasions trouble. The reason may be partly this—that as a tree may begin to manifest decay at its extremities, while the real seat of the decay is in its inmost principle of life, so, when he lapses into error, the religious man cleaves to what he considers to be the heart's core of the gospel, while almost unconsciously he dallies at the outskirts with doubtful disputations.

As the process goes on, he becomes more and more anxious to hold to the form of sound words in the main, although he may raise or entertain speculative questions, as he counts them, in things of subordinate and unimportant detail. And so, at last, he almost unwittingly and unawares gets more involved than he intended in deviations from the customary modes of thought and expression. Still it is on what he regards as mere accessories ; for he is slow to perceive how these react on the very fundamentals of the faith. Thus, without conscious dishonesty, dogmatic heresiarchs—who are often, indeed for the most part, earnest though partial in their religiousness—persist in professing their unabated belief in the vital doctrines of the gospel, as set forth in the articles of an orthodox creed, long after they have really emasculated these articles, and explained away these doctrines, so as either to reduce them to mere platitudes, or dissolve them in mysticism. Hence it happens that they can be detected and exposed,—even to their own conviction, if that is possible, not to speak of the conviction of the church,—only in an outpost, as it were ; by assailing them on what might be regarded as debatable ground, open to harmless differences of opinion, and proving, it may be indirectly, that the contest carried on there is really decisive of the whole war.

This, perhaps, is partly a digression, though it is not altogether foreign to the matter in hand. For I believe that the error on the subject of our Lord's

humanity to which I am adverting, cuts deep into the doctrine of the sonship, whether viewed as his or as ours. If, in his birth, he became man exactly as we are born men since the fall, I cannot conceive of of his manhood entering, *ab origine*, into the filial relation which he sustains to the Father. There must be need of a preliminary work or process of sanctification, both legal and moral, in his case as in ours, before he can be, as man, or *quoad* his manhood, the Son of God. And even with that sanctification of his manhood, his sonship in his humanity is not after all anything different from what any sanctified man might claim—it is not really one with his sonship in his divinity. We are landed again in the monstrous anomaly of a double relation of sonship subsisting in the same person. And, moreover, we are shut up into a very sad conclusion as regards ourselves. For evidently it is only in so far as he is the Son in respect of his manhood, that we can be partakers with him in his sonship. But now it appears that he can be the Son, in respect of his manhood, only on the condition of his manhood, which is originally such as ours, being sanctified as ours needs to be. Does not this really imply that, so far as sonship is concerned, we might dispense with him?—that we, with our manhood sanctified, might be sons in our own right, as it were, just as he, with his manhood sanctified, is himself? And, what is worse, does it not imply that sonship, in the

only sense in which humanity is capable of sustaining that relation, is nothing else and nothing more than human nature purged from the pollution of the fall, first in Christ, and then in us? That idea of sonship may satisfy some. I own I cannot acquiesce in it. I look to the one person of the Incarnate Word. I look to him as sustaining but one relation of sonship. This can be only in virtue of his human nature being essentially pure, as it came originally from his own hand when he made man in his own image. Looking to him thus, I rejoice to think that, through his redeeming and renovating work of grace, he admits me, so far as I am capable of being admitted, into participation with himself in the one filial relation which, as Emmanuel, he now sustains, and will ever sustain, to the Everlasting Father.

THE END.

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